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Secure Computation Towards Practical
Applications
Fernando Krell Loy
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central area of research in cryptography. Its
goal is to allow a set of players to jointly compute a function on their inputs while protecting
and preserving the privacy of each player’s input.
Motivated by the huge growth of data available and the rise of global privacy concerns
of entities using this data, we study the feasibility of using secure computation techniques
on large scale data sets to address these concerns.
An important limitation of generic secure computation protocols is that they require at
least linear time complexity. This seems to rule out applications involving big amounts of
data. On the other hand, specific applications may have particular properties that allow for
ad-hoc secure protocols overcoming the linear time barrier. In addition, in some settings the
full level of security guaranteed by MPC protocols may not be required, and some controlled
amount of privacy leakage can be acceptable.
Towards this end, we first take a theoretical point of view, and study whether sublinear
time RAM programs can be computed securely with sublinear time complexity in the two
party setting. We then take a more practical approach, and study the specific scenario of
private database querying, where both the server’s data and the client’s query need to be
protected. In this last setting we provide two private database management systems achiev-
ing different levels of efficiency, functionality, and security. These three results provide an
overview of this three-dimensional trade-off space.
For the above systems, we describe formal security definitions and establish mathemat-
ical proofs of security. We also take a practical approach providing an implementation of
the systems and experimental analysis of their efficiency.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the amount of data generated, collected, and stored has been
steadily increasing. This growth is now reaching dramatic proportions and touching ev-
ery aspect of our life, including social, political, commercial, scientific, medical, and legal
contexts. With the rise in size, potential applications and utility of these data, privacy
concerns have become more acute. An example is the revelation of the U.S. Government’s
data collection programs, which rekindle the privacy debate.
The privacy issue can be mitigated by the use of standard encryption of the data gener-
ated, at the cost of hindering the applications’ functionality. The ability of searching over
encrypted data provides critical capabilities for database management systems that need
to guarantee privacy protection for data and queries: examples include information sharing
between law enforcement agencies and electronic discovery in private databases, e.g., log
files, bank records, during lawsuits; private queries to census data, police investigations
using data from automated license plate readers [LAp].
Searching over encrypted data can be thought of a special case of secure multi-party
computation protocols. A secure computation protocol allows a set of parties to evaluate a
(possibly randomized) functionality, while keeping each party’s input private from the rest
of the parties. In the case of searching over private data, one party would input its private
data, while the other party would input the token or query to be searched.
An important aspect of secure multi-party computation protocols is that their running
time must be at least linear in the size of the parties’ inputs. In particular, each party
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must at least touch every single bit of its input. This lower bound is in fact necessary
for full security since otherwise a participant may infer some information about other par-
ties’ input by looking which of its inputs bits have been accessed.1 Consider, for example,
a database management system (DBMS) where a client perform queries on a server ad-
ministered database. The database nodes or records untouched by the server during the
evaluation of a query reveal, for example, that those nodes or records do not satisfy the
query, disclosing non-trivial information about the client’s query to the server.
The above linear lower bound seems to rule out many applications of interest. Indeed,
as mentioned above, today’s applications involve high volumes of data, and even a simple
linear scan on the data may be prohibitively expensive.
The purpose of this thesis is to overcome the above limitation by taking advantage of
some key points common to many applications:
• On simple problems such as binary search, graph queries, table look-ups, and many
others, the exact same operation is computed repeatedly over the same preprocessed
data.
• Data does not vary significantly after a few operations. This is the case in many
database scenarios.
• In some settings, full security is not worth the cost of expensive secure computation.
However, a somewhat weaker notion of security is still necessary. By allowing a limited
amount of privacy leakage, applications may gain significantly in terms of efficiency
and functionality.
• A third party, such as a cloud provider, is available (not necessarily considered
trusted).
Having in mind the above insights, this work aims at answering the following questions:
Is it possible to take advantage of the above mentioned assumptions and available crypto-
graphic tools in order to circumvent the linear time barrier of secure computation? How
1We are assuming that the parties are computing a non-trivial function where every input bit has non-zero
influence over the output of the function.
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efficient can we be? What kind of functionalities can we support? How much do we need
to leak?
In this work we take a practical approach to address the above questions, and provide
three specific protocols that shed light on the matter. These three different approaches give
new trade-off marks by varying the level of privacy, functionality, and efficiency supported.
The strongest result (security-wise) presented in this work takes advantage of the fact
that in many client-server applications, the server’s data is mostly static, and the client
repeats similar queries on small-size inputs chosen anew each time. We present a protocol
for secure two-party computation that is sublinear (in an amortized sense) in the size of the
input for functionalities that can be computed in sublinear time (insecurely) over a Random
Access Machine. In addition to the algorithmic construction, we provide an implementation
of our approach. Our experimental results show that our asymptotic sublinear running time
outperforms the state-of-the-art generic secure two-party computation schemes for relatively
small data sizes for today’s standard. The results of the work in this direction is presented
in Chapter 3.
In spite of the novelty and theoretical interest of the above result, the protocol does not
achieve the level of efficiency needed in most practical applications. This is due to large
constants and degree of polylogarithmic factors behind the “big O” notation in terms of
computation and communication complexity. In our next result, we move towards efficiency
in the trade-off space. Our goal is to build a new scheme for the more specific application of
private search on databases that is highly efficient, rich in functionality, and at the same time
assures strong levels of query and data privacy. To this end, we adhere to the following
general approach of building large secure systems, in which full security is prohibitively
costly:
In a large problem, we identify small privacy-critical subproblems, and solve these se-
curely (their outputs must be of low privacy consequence, and are handled in plaintext).
Then we use the outputs of the subtasks (often only a small portion of them will need to be
evaluated) to complete the overall task efficiently.
The output of each privacy-critical subproblem translates in our system to leakage in
terms of access pattern to database records, and database data structures. In addition,
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we work in the split-server model, in which an honest-but-curious third party maintains
an encrypted version of the database, assisting clients’ queries. Combining these two ap-
proaches allows our system to be exceptionally efficient while protecting the client’s privacy
from the server. We propose Blind Seer: A Scalable Private DBMS. We demonstrate via
an implementation of a prototype and experimental results that the query running time of
Blind Seer is within a small constant factor to plaintext solutions (MySQL). In particular,
we show that many queries can be answered within milliseconds for hundred of millions
records databases. In terms of functionality, Blind Seer allows for arbitrary boolean expres-
sion, free-text search, negation and ranges client queries. The system also provides efficient
and robust access control. Results of this work are presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Our next and final contribution is motivated by the poor understanding of the access
pattern leakage of the schemes of Chapters 4 and 5 (and others). We ask whether a private
search scheme can be as efficient and rich in functionality as Blind Seer, without requiring
the above leakage to the third party. We build a new scheme that lies in-between the above
two constructions in the privacy/efficiency/functionality trade-off space. Our novel private
search scheme supports queries in DNF formulas on keywords and removes all important
leakage to the third party. We provide a prototype of our system, and show experimental
results. This system is presented in Chapter 6.
Organization. In Chapter 2 we present basic concepts and definition required for a clear
and self-contained presentation of each contribution. Chapter 3 is dedicated to our protocol
for sublinear secure two party computation. The following three chapters are concerned
with the Private Search scenario. In particular, the basic construction of the Blind Seer
system is presented in Chapter 4. The Blind Seer system is next augmented in Chapter 5
with a stronger security mechanism that prevents attacks from malicious database clients.
Chapter 6 presents a new scheme based on Blind Seer that prevents important privacy
leakage introduced by Blind Seer. We cover related work on Chapter 7, and conclude this
thesis in Chapter 8.




A Bloom filter (BF) [Blo70] is a simple data structure that facilitates efficient set member-
ship queries. The filter B is an ℓ-bit string initialized with 0ℓ and associated with a set of h
different hash functions H = {Hi : {0, 1}∗ → [ℓ]}hi=1. For an element α ∈ {0, 1}∗, let H(α)
the sequence of the hash results of α, i.e.,
H(α) = (H1(α),H2(α), . . . ,Hh(α)).
To add an element α into the filter, we turn on the bits in the positions pointed by the hash
result H(α). To check whether an element β is in the filter, we compute the set H(β) and
check if all pointed bits are set. Bloom filters guarantee no false negatives, however they














where t is the number of keywords in the Bloom filter.
Given a false positive rate fp and the number of elements t in the filter the optimal
length ℓ of B and the optimal number of hash functions h to use can be approximately
computed as :















2.2 Random Access Machines
Let D be a memory array of n entries of size ℓ bits each. Each array element can be accessed
in constant time via a read/write instructions. An instruction I ∈ ({read,write}×N×{0, 1}ℓ)
takes the form (write, v, d) (“write data element d in location/address v”) or (read, v,⊥)
(“read the data element stored at location v”).
In the RAM model, a function f(x,D) (where x is assumed to be “small”, and it can
be read entirely in constant time) is computed by via a sequence of instructions over the
memory array D. Each instruction is given by a “next instruction” function Π that takes
as input the current state of the program and the last data read from D, and outputs an
instruction I or an special stop instruction together with the final output of the program..
The execution of a RAM program can be viewed as follows:
• Set stateΠ = (1logn, 1ℓ, start, x) and d = 0ℓ. Then until termination do:
1. Compute (I, state′Π) = Π(stateΠ, d). Set stateΠ = state
′
Π.
2. If I = (stop, 0, z) then terminate with output z.
3. If I = (write, v, d′) then set D[v] = d′.
4. If I = (read, v,⊥) then set d = D[v].
The memory array D can grow beyond n entries, so the RAM program may issue write
(and then read) instructions for indices greater than n. The space complexity of a RAM
program on initial inputs x,D is the maximum number of entries used by the memory
array D during the course of the execution. The program’s time complexity is the number
of instructions issued in the execution as described above. For our application in Chapter 3,
we do not want the running time of a RAM program to reveal anything about the input x.
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Thus, we will assume that any RAM program has associated with it a polynomial t such
that the running time on x,D is exactly t(log n, ℓ, |x|).
2.3 Oblivious RAM
An oblivious-RAM (ORAM) [GO96] scheme is a mechanism that simulates a RAM read/write
access to an underlying (virtual) array D via a series of accesses to some (real) array D̃. The
key property of the scheme is obliviousness, meaning that no information about the virtual
accesses to D is leaked by observation of the real accesses to D̃. An ORAM construction can
be used to compile any RAM program into an oblivious version of that program, ensuring
that the entity holding the array D̃ learns nothing from the program, excepts its running
time.
An ORAM scheme consists of two algorithms OSetup and OAccess for initialization and
execution, respectively. OSetup initializes some state state composed by access parame-
ters param and data structure struct. The second algorithm, OAccess, is used to compile
a single read/write instruction I (on the virtual array D) into a sequence of read/write
instructions Ĩ1, Ĩ2, . . . to be executed on (the real array) D̃. The compilation of an in-
struction I into Ĩ1, Ĩ2, . . . , can be adaptive; i.e., instruction Ĩj may depend on the values
read in some prior instructions. To capture this, we define an iterative procedure called
doInstruction that makes repeated use of OAccess. Given a read/write instruction I, we
define doInstruction(stateoram, I) as follows:
• Set d = 0ℓ. Then until termination do:
1. Compute (Ĩ , state′)← OAccess(state, I, d), and set state = state′.
2. If Ĩ = (done, z) then terminate with output z.
3. If Ĩ = (write, v, d′) then set D̃[v] = d′.
4. If Ĩ = (read, v,⊥) then set d = D̃[v].
If I was a read instruction with I = (read, v,⊥), then the final output z should be the
value “written” at D[v].
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Correctness. Let I1, . . . , Ik be any sequence of instructions with Ik = (read, v,⊥), and
Ij = (write, v, d) the last instruction that writes to address v. If we start with D̃ initialized to
empty and then run stateoram ← OSetup(1κ) followed by doInstruction(I1), . . . , doInstruction(Ik),
then the final output is d with all but negligible probability.
Security. The security requirement is that for any two equal-length sequences of RAM
instructions, the (real) access patterns generated by those instructions are indistinguishable.
We state next the standard definition from the literature, which assumes the two instruction
sequences are chosen in advance. However, it appears that existing ORAM constructions are
secure even if the adversary is allowed to adaptively choose the next instruction after observ-
ing the access pattern on D̃ caused by the previous instruction, but this has not been claimed
by any ORAM construction in the literature. Formally, let ORAM = 〈OSetup,OAccess〉
be an ORAM construction and consider the following experiment:
Experiment ExpAPHORAM,Adv(κ):
1. The adversary Adv outputs two sequences of queries (I0, I1), where I0 = {I01 , . . . , I0k}
and I1 = {I11 , . . . , I1k} for arbitrary k.
2. Sample a uniformly random bit b.
3. Run state← OSetup(1κ); initialize D̃ to empty; and then execute doInstruction(state, Ib1),
. . ., doInstruction(state, Ibk) (note that state is updated each time doInstruction is run).
The adversary is allowed to observe D̃ the entire time.
4. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The experiment evaluates to 1
iff b′ = b.
Definition 1. An ORAM construction ORAM = 〈OSetup,OAccess〉 is access-pattern hid-
















Where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of algorithms Adv, OSetup,
and OAccess.
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Time/Space complexity. Existing ORAM constructions have the following complexity
for an array of length s: the server’s storage is s · polylog(s); the client’s storage is O(log s);
and the (amortized) work required to read/write one entry of the array is polylog(s).
2.4 Pseudorandom Functions and Generators.
Let k be a secret parameter. Let F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ be a keyed, polynomial
time computable function, and G : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}poly(k) be a stretching, polynomial time
computable function.
We say that F is a pseudorandom function (PRF) [GGM86] if no probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm can distinguish any sequence of (F (k, x1), . . . , F (k, xn)) from a uni-
formly random string of the same length when k is chosen uniformly random from {0, 1}k.
This should hold even if the algorithm can choose n and (x1, . . . , xn) as it wishes adaptively.
For notational convenience, hereafter we will use Fk(x) to mean F (k, x).
Similarly, we say that G is pseudorandom generator (PRG) [BM84] if no probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm can distinguish between a uniformly random string in {0, 1}poly(k)
from G(s) for an uniformly random string s ∈ {0, 1}k.
2.5 Semantically Secure Encryption.
Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme. We define the security of an
encryption scheme against an eavesdropping adversary via following game:
GameINDΠ (A, κ):
1. Adversary A chooses equal length messages m0,m1.
2. Run Gen(κ) to derive a key sk, sample a uniformly random bit b, and sends the
ciphertext Encsk(mb) to A.
3. A outputs a decision bit b′.
4. If b′ = b, the game outputs 1, and otherwise 0.
Let AdvINDΠ (A, κ) = |Pr[GameINDΠ (A, κ) = 1]− 12 |.
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We say that Π is semantically secure if and only if AdvINDΠ (A, κ) < negl(κ) [GM84].
Semantic security for a public key scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is defined similarly, only A is
given the public key pk. The resulting definition is equivalent to indistinguishability under
chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA).
2.6 Yao’s Garbled Circuits
Garbled Circuits (GC). Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao82] allow to evaluate Boolean circuits
on hidden inputs provided by another party. Let C be a Boolean circuit with n input wires,
m gates, and (assume for simplicity) one output wire; let (1, . . . , n) be the indices to the
input wires and q = n + m + 1 be the index to the output wire. To generate a garbled
circuit C̃, a pair of random keys w0i , w
1
i are associated with each wire i in the circuit; key
w0i corresponds to the value ‘0’ on wire i, while w
1
i corresponds to the value ‘1’. Then, for
each gate g in the circuit, with its input wires i, j and its output wire k, a garbled gate
g̃ (consisting of four ciphertexts) is constructed so that given the input keys wbii and w
bj
j ,
it is possible to recover w
g(bi,bj)
k . The garbled circuit C̃ is simply the collection of all the
garbled gates. By recursively evaluating the garbled gates, one can compute the garbled
key wbq from the input the keys (w
a1
1 , . . . , w
an
n ), where b = C(a1, . . . , an). We will sometimes
call wire keys corresponding to input/output garbled input/output, and denote them by ã
and b̃, i.e., ã = (wa11 , . . . , w
an
n ), b̃ = w
b
q. We will also use the notation of garbled evaluation
b̃ = C̃(ã).
Oblivious Transfer (OT). An oblivious transfer (OT) [EGL85; Rab81] is a two-party
protocol supporting a sender that holds values (x0, x1) and a receiver that holds an index
r ∈ {0, 1}. The receiver learns xr, but neither the sender nor the receiver learns anything
else, i.e., the receiver learns nothing about any other values held by the sender, and the
sender learns nothing about the receiver’s index. For the prototypes of systems described
in Chapters 3,4, and 5, we use the Naor-Pinkas protocol [NP01] as a basis and optimize the
performance using OT extension [IKNP03] and OT preprocessing [Bea95].
Secure Two-Party Computation. Yao’s garbled circuit can be combined with and obliv-
ious transfer protocol to build a constant-round protocol for secure two party computation
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for any Boolean circuit. One party acts as the garbled circuit generator G and the other as
the circuit evaluator E. G builds the garbled circuit and send it to E together with the keys
corresponding to G’s input. Before E evaluates the garbles circuit, both parties engage in
a series of OT execution to transfer the keys corresponding to E’s input. The protocol can
finish in two possible ways. One possibility is that E sends the computed output keys to G
(G gets the output). The other option is to have G to send the key pairs corresponding to
every output wire (in which case E gets the output).
Note that the only party that needs to know the circuit is G, and E only needs to known
the circuit topology. Moreover, the garbled gate reveals nothing about the actual gate if
the output keys are encrypted under a semantically secure encryption scheme. Hence, the
protocol allows for a form of private function evaluation in which only G knows the function,
while E only knows its topology.
The construction can be optimized in several ways. We made extensive use of the free-
XOR technique [KS08a], that allows XOR gates to be evaluates at virtually no cost. We
also use the point-and-permute [Rog91; MNPS04] that allows to reduce of cost of evaluating
each gate by decripting only one of the four gate’s entries. In addition, we use is the row-
reduction technique, which decreases the size of the garbled gate, and hence, improving
communication bandwidth.
We refer the reader to [BHR12; LP09] for clear description and proof of security of
garbled circuits.
2.7 Private Database Search
In the second part of this Thesis we focus on the problem of private search over database.
The setting involves three main players. The database owner, whom we usually call the
server S, the client or querier C, and a third-party we call the index server whom we denote as
IS. The database owner outsources its data to the third party, and gives search capabilities
to clients, with the property that the third party learns nothing about the data nor the
client’s queries, and the client only learns the result set of its queries. This setting was
called Outsourced Symmetric Private Information Retrieval in [JJK+13], and it is defined
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by an algorithm Setup and a procedure Search. The following formal definition allows for a
parameter fp denoting false positives in the result set of the client queries.
Definition 2. Let λ be a security parameter, let fp ∈ [0, 1] some tunable parameter, and let
DB denote a dataset corresponding to a set of documents {Di}, each associated with a set
of searchable keywords Wi. We define an OSPIR Scheme as a pair of interactive algorithms
• (params,EDB) ← Setup(1λ,DB, fp). S inputs database DB = (Di,Wi), and gets back
params. IS gets EDB.
• (records) ← Search(params,EDB, q). S inputs params, IS inputs EDB and C inputs q.
C gets records.
such that for all λ and for all DB, q, if (params,EDB) ← Setup(1λ,DB), (records) ←
Search(params,EDB, q), then DBfp(q) = records, where DBfp(q) denotes the records of DB
satisfying query q plus each DB record with probability fp.
Security for these schemes are defined via the standard ideal vs. real world paradigm.
However, we defer the security definitions to Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, since the different
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Chapter 3
Secure Two-Party Computation in
Sublinear Amortized Time
3.1 Introduction
Consider the task of searching over a sorted database of n items. Using binary search, this
can be done in time O(log n). Now consider a secure version of this task where a client
wishes to learn whether an item is in a sorted database held by a server, with neither party
learning anything more. Applying generic secure computation [Yao86; GMW87] to this
task, we would begin by expressing the computation as a (binary or arithmetic) circuit of
size at least n, resulting in a protocol of complexity Ω(n). Moreover, (at least) linear time
complexity is inherent : in any secure protocol for this problem the server must “touch”
every entry of the database; otherwise, the server learns information about the client’s
input by observing which entries of its database were never accessed.
This linear time barrer seems to eliminate the possibility of ever performing practical
secure computation over large datasets. However, one may notice two opportunities for
improvement:
• Many interesting procedures (such as searching over a sorted database) can be done
in sublinear time on a random-access machine (RAM). Thus, it might be convenient
to have protocols for generic secure computation that are based on the RAM model
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of computation rather than circuits, as generic protocols do.
• The fact that linear work is inherent for secure computation of any non-trivial func-
tion f only applies when f is computed once. However, it does not rule out the
possibility of doing better, in an amortized sense, when the parties compute the same
function multiple times.
Inspired by the above, we explore scenarios where secure computation with sublinear
amortized work is possible. We focus on a setting where a client and server repeatedly
evaluate a function f , maintaining state across these executions, with the server’s (huge)
input D changing only a little between executions, and the client’s (small) input x chosen
anew each time f is evaluated. (It is useful to keep in mind the concrete application of
a client making several read/write requests to a large database D, though our results are
more general.) Our main result is:
Theorem 1. Suppose f can be computed in time t and space s in the RAM model of
computation. Then there is a secure two-party protocol for f in which the client and server
run in amortized time O(t) · polylog(s), the client uses space O(log(s)), and the server uses
space s · polylog(s).
The above holds in the semi-honest adversarial model.
3.1.1 Contributions
We show a generic protocol achieving the above bounds by applying any protocol for secure
two-party computation in a particular way to any oblivious RAM (ORAM) construction
(see section 2.3). This demonstrates the feasibility of secure computation with sublinear
amortized complexity. We then explore a concrete, optimized instantiation of our protocol
based on the tree-based ORAM construction of Shi et al. [SCSL11], and using Yao’s garbled-
circuit approach [Yao86] for the secure two-party computation. We chose the tree-based
ORAM construction of Shi et al. because of its simplicity and its poly-logarithmic worst-case
complexity (as opposed to other schemes that only achieve this in an amortized sense), it
requires small client state, and its time complexity in practice (i.e., taking constant factors
into account) is among the best known. We can also use the same techniques on the more
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recent tree-based construction in [SvDS+13] achieving better efficiency. (In Section 3.8 we
briefly discuss why we expect other schemes to yield worse overall performance for our
application.) We chose Yao’s garbled-circuit approach for secure computation since several
recent results [HEKM11; Mal11] show that it is both quite efficient and can scale to handle
circuits with tens of millions of gates. When combining these two schemes, we apply a
number of optimizations to reduce the sizes of the circuits that need to be evaluated using
generic secure computation.
We implemented this optimized protocol, and evaluated it for the task of binary search.
For small datasets our protocol is slower than standard protocols for secure computation,
but our protocol outperforms the latter for databases containing more than 218 entries.
3.1.2 Background
Ostrovsky and Shoup [OS97] observed that ORAM and secure computation can be com-
bined, though in a different context and using a different approach. Specifically, they con-
sider a (stateless) client storing data on two servers that are assumed not to collude. They
focus on private storage of the data belonging to the client, rather than secure computation
of a function over inputs held by a client and server as we do here.
They describe a protocol where the user stores its data according to any ORAM mech-
anism, using one server to simulate the ORAM server, and sharing the ORAM client state
across both servers. Now a read or update can be executed by having the two servers apply
generic secure two party computation to privately execute the appropriate ORAM instruc-
tions, communicating through the user (with the result being an updated ORAM storage,
and updated shared client state).
Our generic protocol follows directly from this idea, although conceptually there are
some differences in context. In particular, their setting has three parties, and the data all
belongs to one trusted party (the user) storing it in untrusted remote locations (the two
servers). In our context, we have two parties (a client and server), and the server stores its
own data obliviously, according to the ORAM protocol, so as to allow secure computation
on both parties’ inputs.
Damg̊ard et al. [DMN11] also observe that ORAM can be used for secure computation.
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In their approach, which they only briefly sketch, players share the entire (super-linear)
state of the ORAM, in contrast to our protocol where the client maintains only logarithmic
state. They make no attempt to optimize the concrete efficiency of their protocol, nor do
they offer any implementation or evaluation of their approach.
Though the above two works have a flavor similar to our own, our work is the first to
explicitly point out that ORAM can be used to achieve secure two-party computation with
sublinear complexity (for functions that can be computed in sublinear time on a RAM).
Oblivious RAM was introduced in [GO96], and in the past few years several improved
constructions have been proposed (c.f. [WS08; WSC08; PR10a; GM11; GMOT12; KLO12;
SCSL11; SSS12]). We refer the reader to [SCSL11; SSS12] for further discussion and pointers
to the sizeable literature on this topic.
3.2 Overview
Our starting point is the ORAM primitive, introduced in [GO96], which allows a client
(with a small memory) to perform RAM computations using the (large) memory of a remote
untrusted server. At a high level, the client stores encrypted entries on the server, and then
emulates a RAM computation of some function by replacing each read/write access of the
original RAM computation with a series of read/write accesses such that the actual access
pattern of the client remains hidden from the server.
The above suggests a method for computing f(x,D) for any function f defined in the
random-access model of computation, where the client holds (small) input x and the server
holds (large) input D: store the memory array used during the computation on the server,
and have the client access this array using an ORAM scheme. This requires an (expensive)
pre-processing phase during which the client and server initialize the ORAM data structure
with D; after this, however, the client and server can repeatedly evaluate f(xi,D) (on dif-
ferent inputs x1, . . . of the client’s choice) very efficiently. Specifically, if f can be evaluated
in time t and space s on a RAM, then each evaluation of f in this client/server model now
takes (amortized) time t · polylog(s).
The above approach, however, only provides “one-sided security,” in that it ensures pri-
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vacy of the client’s input against the server; it provides no security guarantees for the server
against the client! We can address this by having the parties compute the next ORAM
instruction “inside” a (standard) secure two-party computation protocol, with the interme-
diate state being shared between the client and server. The resulting ORAM instruction
is output to the server, who can then read/write the appropriate entry in the ORAM data
structure that it stores, and incorporate the result (in case of a read operation) in the shared
state. The key observations here are that (1) it is ok to output the ORAM instructions to
the server, since the ORAM itself ensures privacy for the client; thus, secure computation is
needed only to determine the next instruction that should be executed. Moreover, (2) each
computation of this “next-instruction function” is performed on small inputs whose lengths
are logarithmic in s and independent of t: specifically, the inputs are just (shares of) the
current state for the RAM computation of f (which we assume to have size O(log s), as is
typically the case) and (shares of) the current state for the ORAM itself (which has size
O(log s)). Thus, the asymptotic work for the secure computation of f remains unchanged.
For our optimized construction, we rely on the specific ORAM construction of Shi et
al. [SCSL11], and optimized versions of Yao’s garbled-circuit protocol. We develop our
concrete protocol with the aim of minimizing our reliance on garbled circuits for complex
functionalities. Instead, we perform local computations whenever we can do so without
losing security. For example, we carefully use encryption scheme where block-cipher com-
putations can be done locally, with just an XOR computed via secure computation. For
the parts of our protocol that do utilize generic secure computation, we rely on garbled-
circuit optimization techniques such as the free-XOR approach [KS08a], oblivious-transfer
extension [IKNP03], and pipelined circuit execution [HEKM11]. We also use precomputa-
tion (e.g., [Bea95]) to push expensive computations to a preprocessing stage. Our resulting
scheme only requires simple XOR operations for oblivious-transfer computations in an on-
line stage, while exponentiations and even hashing can be done as part of preprocessing.
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3.3 Secure Computation for RAM machines
We focus on the setting where a server holds a (large) database D and a client wants to
repeatedly compute f(x,D) for different inputs x; moreover, f may also change the contents
of D itself. We allow the client to keep (short) state between executions, and the server will
keep state that reflects the (updated) contents of D.
For simplicity, we focus only on the two-party (client/server) setting in the semi-honest
model but it is clear that our definitions can be extended to the multi-party case with
malicious adversaries.
Definition of security. We use a standard simulation-based definition of secure compu-
tation [Gol04], comparing a real execution to that of an ideal (reactive) functionality F .
In the ideal execution, the functionality maintains the updated state of D on behalf of the
server. We also allow F to take a description of f as input (which allows us to consider a
single ideal functionality).
The real-world execution proceeds as follows. An environment Z initially gives the server
a database D = D(1), and the client and server then run protocol Πf (with the client using
input init and the server using input D) that ends with the client and server each storing
some state that they will maintain (and update) throughout the subsequent execution. In
the ith iteration (i = 1, . . .), the environment gives xi to the client; the client and server then
run protocol Πf (with the client using its state and input xi, and the server using its state)
with the client receiving output outi. The client sends outi to Z, thus allowing adaptivity in
Z’s next input selection xi+1. At some point, Z terminates execution by sending a special
end message to the players. At this time, an honest player simply terminates execution; a
corrupted player sends its entire view to Z.
For a given environment Z and some fixed value κ for the security parameter, we
let realΠf ,Z(κ) be the random variable denoting the output of Z following the specified
execution in the real world.
In the ideal world, we let F be a trusted functionality that maintains state throughout
the execution. An environment Z initially gives the server a database D = D(1), which the
server in turn sends to F . In the ith iteration (i = 1, . . .), the environment gives xi to the
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client who sends this value to F . The trusted functionality then computes
(outi,D
(i+1))← f(xi,D(i)),
and sends outi to the client. (Note the server does not learn anything from the execution,
neither about outi nor about the updated contents of D.) The client ends outi to Z. At
some point, Z terminates execution by sending a special end message to the players. The
honest player simply terminates execution; the corrupted player may send an arbitrary
function of its entire view to Z.
For a given environment Z, some fixed value κ for the security parameter, and some
algorithm S being run by the corrupted party, we let idealF,S,Z(κ) be the random variable
denoting the output of Z following the specified execution.
Definition 3. We say that protocol Πf securely computes f if there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time ideal-world adversary S (run by the corrupted player) such that for all





realΠf ,Z(κ) = 1
]




In this section we present our generic solution for achieving secure computation with sub-
linear amortized work, based on any ORAM scheme and any secure two-party computation
(2PC) protocol. While our optimized protocol (in Section 3.6) is more efficient, this generic
protocol demonstrates theoretical feasibility and provides a conceptually clean illustration
of our overall approach.
Recall from section 2.3 that the underlying ORAM is defined by two algorithms OSetup
and OAccess. The first represents the initialization algorithm, which establishes the client’s
initial state and can be viewed as also initializing an empty array that will be used as the
main ORAM data structure. This algorithm takes as input κ (a security parameter), s
(the length of the virtual array being emulated), and ℓ (the length of each entry in both
the virtual and actual arrays). The second algorithm OAccess defines the actual ORAM
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Secure initialization protocol
Input: The server has an array D of length n.
Protocol:
1. Initialization. The participants run a secure computation of OSetup(1κ, 1s, 1ℓ),
which results in each party receiving a secret share of the initial ORAM state. We
denote this by [state].
2. Insertion. For v = 1, . . . , n do
(a) The server sets I = (write, v,D[v])) and secret-shares I with the client. Denote
the sharing by [I].
(b) The parties run ([state′], [⊥]) ← doInstruction([state], [I]) (see Figure 3.3), and
set [state] = [state′].
Figure 3.1: Secure initialization protocol πInit.
functionality, namely the process of mapping a virtual instruction I to a sequence of real
instructions {Îi}i. Algorithm OAccess takes as input (1) the current ORAM state state,
(2) the virtual instruction I being emulated, and (3) the last value d read from the ORAM
array, and outputs (1) an updated ORAM state state′ and (2) the next instruction Î to run.
With the above in place, we can now define our protocol for secure computation of
a function f over an input x held by the client (and assumed to be small) and an array
D ∈ ({0, 1}ℓ)n held by the server (and assumed to be large). We assume f is defined in
the RAM model of computation in terms of a next-instruction function Π which, given the
current state and value d (that will always be equal to the last-read element), outputs the
next instruction and an updated state (see section 2.2). We let s denote a bound on the
number of memory cells of length ℓ required by this computation (including storage of D
in the first n positions of memory). Our protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The parties run a secure computation of OSetup. The resulting ORAM state state is
shared between the client and server.
2. The parties run a secure computation of a sequence of (virtual) write instructions that
insert each of the n elements of D into memory. The way this is done is described
below.
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Secure evaluation protocol πf
Inputs: The server has array D̃ and the client has input n, 1ℓ, and x. They also have
shares of an ORAM state, denoted [state].
Protocol:
1. The client sets stateΠ = (n, 1
ℓ, start, x) and d = 0ℓ and secret-shares both values with
the server; we denote the shared values by [stateΠ] and [d], respectively.
2. Do:
(a) The parties securely compute ([state′Π], [I])← Π([stateΠ], [d]), and set [stateΠ] =
[state′Π].
(b) The parties run a secure computation to see if stateΠ = (stop, z). If so, break.
(c) The parties execute ([state′], [d′])← doInstruction([state], [I]). They set [state] =
[state′] and [d] = [d′].
3. The server sends (the appropriate portion of) its share of [stateΠ] to the client, who
recovers the output z.
Output: The client outputs z.
Figure 3.2: Secure evaluation of a RAM program defined by next-instruction function Π.
3. The parties compute f by using secure computation to evaluate the next-instruction
function Π. This generates a sequence of (virtual) instructions, shared between the
parties, each of which is computed as described below.
4. When computation of f is done, the state associated with this computation (stateΠ)
encodes the output z. The server sends the appropriate portion of its share of stateΠ
to the client, who can then recover z.
See Figures 3.1 and 3.2 (Initialization and evaluation protocols) for the secure initialization
and secure computation of the RAM next-instruction. In the figures, we let [v] denote a
secret-sharing of a value v between the two parties. It remains to describe how a single
virtual instruction I (shared between the two parties) is evaluated. This is done as follows
(also see Figure 3.3):
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1. The parties use repeated secure computation of OAccess to obtain a sequence of real
instructions Î1, . . .. Each such instruction Î is revealed to the server, who executes the
instruction on the ORAM data structure that it stores. If Î was a read instruction,
then the value d that was read is secret-shared with the client.
2. After all the real instructions have been executed, emulation of instruction I is com-
plete. If I was a read instruction, then the (virtual) value d′ that was read is secret-
shared between the client and server.
The key point to notice is that each secure computation that is invoked is run only over
small inputs. This is what allows the amortized cost of the protocol to be sublinear.
The following summarizes our main theoretical result.
Theorem 2. If an ORAM construction and a 2PC protocol secure against semi-honest
The doInstruction subroutine
Inputs: The server has array D̃, and the server and client have shares of an ORAM state
(denoted [state]) and a RAM instruction (denoted [I]).
1. The server sets d = 0ℓ and secret shares this value with the client; we denote the
shared value by [d].
2. Do:
(a) The parties securely compute ([state′], [Î]) ← OAccess([state], [I], [d]), and set
[state] = [state′].
(b) The parties run a secure computation to see if Î = (done, z). If so, set [d] = [z]
and break.
(c) The client sends its share of [Î] to the server, who reconstructs [Î]. Then:
i. If Î = (write, v, d′), the server sets D̃[v] = d′ and sets d = d′.
ii. If Î = (read, v,⊥), the server sets d = D̃[v].
(d) The server secret-shares d with the client.
Output: Each player outputs its shares of state and d.
Figure 3.3: Subroutine for executing one RAM instruction.
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adversaries are used, then our protocol securely computes f against semi-honest adversaries.
Furthermore, if f can be computed in time t and space s on a RAM, then our protocol runs
in amortized time O(t) ·polylog(s), the client uses space O(log(s)), and the server uses space
s · polylog(s).
We comment that if the underlying secure-computation is secure against malicious par-
ties, then a simple change to our protocol will suffice for obtaining security against malicious
parties as well. We simply change the outputs of all secure computations to include a signa-
ture on the outputs described above (using a signing key held by the other party), and we
modify the functions used in the secure-computation such that they verify the signature on
each input before continuing. We leave the proof of this informal claim to future work. We
note that we cannot make such a claim for our more efficient, concrete solution presented
in Section 3.6.2.
3.5 Security of the Generic Construction
We now prove that the construction presented in the previous section is a secure MPC
protocol according to Definition 3.
At the very high level, security against the client holds because he only manipulates the
data protected by secret sharing and MPC; the server additionally sees plaintext ORAM
instructions – but they do not reveal anything by the ORAM guarantee. (ORAM secu-
rity [GO96] is proven in the non-adaptive setting only. However, our security simulation
goes through, since the adaptive input and function selection by Z does not depend on
protocol message view (that is, Z receives the view from the adversary after the stop mes-
sage), and hence the simulators can query the ORAM functions after Z had completed the
adaptive selection.)
We start with the descriptions of the client simulator Scl, who interacts with Z. In i-th
computation, Scl receives xi and yi = f(xi,D
(i−1)), stores them, and postpones it simulation
until he receives the special end symbol from Z. At this point, Scl outputs entire simulation,
as follows:
Pre-processing. Scl simulates pre-processing by generating an appropriate number of ran-
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dom ORAM state shares:
1. Scl runs the OSetup(1
κ) functionality to obtain an initial state for the ORAM,
and generates a uniformly random share [state]c for the client.
2. Let I1, . . . , I|D(0)| be instructions of the form (write, v, 0̄) for 1 ≤ v ≤ |D(0)|. Scl
sequentially applies OAccess(state, Ii) for each i, updating the ORAM state and
generating a uniformly random share of it after each execution.
Computation. For each RAM f to be evaluated, Scl will simulate its execution evaluating
the same number of instructions of the form (read, 0,⊥) using OAccess. Denote by |f |
the execution length of RAM f . Then, for each functionality f :
1. Scl starts with a previously generated share [state]c of the ORAM state that was
generated during the pre-processing, or during the last computation.
2. Let I1, . . . , I|f | be instructions of the form (read, 0,⊥). As in the pre-processing
phase, Scl sequentially runs OAccess on I1, . . . , I|f |, along with the current ORAM
state. After each instruction is evaluated, OAccess returns an updated state, and
Scl generates a new uniformly random state share [state]
′
c.
3. The output reconstruction is simulated by opening to yi the secret sharing of the
output.
The server simulator Sserv proceeds similarly to Scl. The notable difference is that
the generated view additionally contains the instructions issued by OAccess. Specifically,
during pre-processing, OAccess is used to evaluate instructions of the form Ij = (write, v, 0̄)
for 1 ≤ v ≤ |D(i−1)|. For each such instruction, OAccess generates a sequence of subqueries
Îj, which are included in the generated view. Similarly, during the computation of each
functionality f , each instruction is converted by OAccess into a sequence of subqueries.
These subqueries are included in the generated view (in addition to the state shares).
It is not hard to see that these simulators produce views indistinguishable from real
execution. The reduction to the (non-adaptive) security of ORAM is straightforward, given
our prior observation that the simulators produce their output only after the entire sequence
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of xi is specified by Z (and hence the adaptively chosen sequence of xi can be fed non-
adaptively into the ORAM security experiment).
3.6 An Optimized Protocol
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we showed that any ORAM protocol can be combined with any
secure two-party computation scheme to obtain a secure computation scheme with sub-
linear amortized complexity. In this section we present a far more efficient and practical
scheme, based on instantiating our generic protocol with Yao’s garbled circuits and the
ORAM construction of Shi et. al [SCSL11]. However, rather than applying the secure com-
putation primitive on the entire ORAM instruction, we deviate from the generic protocol
by performing parts of the computation locally, whenever we could do so without violating
security. This section describes our scheme, including concrete algorithmic and engineering
decisions we made when instantiating our protocol, as well as implementation choices and
complexity analysis. In Section 3.7 we present experimental performance results, demon-
strating considerable improvement over using traditional secure computation over the entire
input (i.e. without ORAM).
3.6.1 The Binary Tree ORAM
We begin with an overview of the ORAM construction of [SCSL11], which is the starting
point of our protocol. The main data storage structure used in this scheme is a binary tree
with the following properties. To store N data items in the ORAM, we construct a binary
tree of height logN , where each node has the capacity to hold logN data items. Every
item stored in the binary tree is assigned to a randomly chosen leaf node. The identifier of
this leaf node is appended to the item, and the item, along with its assignment, is encrypted
and stored somewhere on the path between the root and its assigned leaf node. To find
a data item, the client begins by retrieving the leaf node identifier associated with that
item; we will explain how this is done below. He sends the identifier of the leaf node to the
server, who then fetches and sends all items along the appropriate path, one node at a time.
The client decrypts the content of each node and searches for the item he is looking for.
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When he finds it, he removes it from its current node, assigns it a new leaf identifier chosen
uniformly at random and inserts the item at the root node of the tree. He then continues
searching all nodes along the path in order to prevent the server from learning where he
found the item of interest.
Since the above look-up process will work only while there is room in the root node for
new incoming items, the authors of [SCSL11] devise the following load balancing mechanism
to prevent nodes from overflowing. After each ORAM access instruction, two nodes are
chosen at random from each level of the tree. One arbitrary item is evicted from each of
these nodes, and is inserted in the child node that lies on the path towards its assigned leaf
node. While the server will learn which nodes were chosen for this eviction, it should not
learn which children receive the evicted items. To hide this information, the client insert
encrypted data in both of the two child nodes, performing a “dummy” insertion in one node,
and a real insertion in the other. In a more recent scheme [SvDS+13], eviction is done across
the same path retrieved earlier, pushing down element as they can.
All that remains to describe is how the client recovers the leaf identifier associated with
the item of interest. The number of such identifiers is linear in the size of the database,
so storing the identifiers on the client side is not an option. The solution is to store these
assignments on the server, recursively using the same type of binary trees. A crucial property
which makes this solution possible is that an item can store more than a single mapping. If
an item stores r mappings, then the total number of recursively built trees is logrN . The
smallest tree will have very few items, and can thus be stored by the client. As an example,
let the largest tree contain items with virtual addresses v
(1)
1 , . . . , v
(1)
N that are assigned
leaf identifiers L
(1)
1 , . . . , L
(1)
N . Then the tree at level 2 has
N
r
items with virtual addresses
v
(2)




, where the item with virtual address v
(2)





(j − 1)r < i ≤ jr. With this modification, an ORAM look-up consists of a series of look-
ups, one in each of these trees, beginning with the smallest tree. In particular, given a
virtual address v for a database query, the client derives the look-up values that he needs
to use in tree i by computing v(i) = ⌊ v
ri
⌋ for 0 ≤ i ≤ logrN . Having these values the client
starts with a look-up in the smallest tree for value v(logr N). He retrieves L(logr N) from
his local memory and finds in it the mapping (v(logr N−1), L(logr N−1)). Now he looks for
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v(logr N−1) in the next smallest tree using leaf identifier L(logr N−1). This process continues
until the client retrieves the real database item at address v from the largest tree at the
top level of the recursion. In each tree, the accessed item is assigned a new leaf node at
random, and the item is inserted back in the tree’s root node. In addition, its mapping is
updated in the tree below to record its new leaf node.
The intuition for the security of this scheme can be summarized as follows. Every time
the client looks up item vi, he assigns it a new leaf node and re-inserts it at the root. It
follows that the paths taken to find vi in two different look-ups are independent of one
another, and cannot be distinguished from the look-up of any other two nodes. During
the eviction process, a node is just as likely to accept a new item as it is to lose an item.
Shi et al. prove in their work that with buckets of size O(log(MN/δ)) the probability that
a bucket will overflow after M ORAM instructions is less than δ. It follows that with a
bucket size of O(logN), the probability of overflow is negligible in the security parameter.
However, as we shall see below, the precise constant makes a big difference, both in the
resulting security and in the efficiency of the scheme.
3.6.2 High Level Protocol
As above, we assume a database of N items, and we allow each item in each recursive level
to hold r mappings between virtual addresses and leaf identifiers from the level above. The
client and a server perform the following steps to access an item at an address v:
1. The parties have shares vC and vS of the virtual address for the query in the database
v = vC ⊕ vS .
2. The client and the server run a two party computation protocol to produce shares
v
(1)




S , . . . , v
(logr N)
S of the virtual addresses that they will look-up
in each tree of the ORAM storage: ⌊ v
ri
⌋ = v(i)C ⊕ v
(i)
S for 0 ≤ i ≤ logrN .
3. The client generates random leaf identifiers
L̃(1), . . . , L̃(logr N) that will be assigned to items as they are re-inserted at the root.
4. The last tree in the ORAM storage has only a constant number of nodes, each con-
taining a constant number of items. The client and server store shares of the leaf
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identifiers for these items. They execute a two party protocol that takes these shares




S . The server’s output of the secure
computation is the leaf value L(logr N). The client has no output.
5. For each i such that logrN ≥ i ≥ 2:
(a) The server retrieves the nodes on the path between the root and the leaf L(i) in
the i-th tree.
(b) The parties execute a secure two party protocol. The server’s inputs are the
nodes recovered above, and the secret share v
(i−1)
S . The client’s input is v
(i−1)
C .





S , and which lies somewhere along the path to L
(i).
(c) The parties execute a secure two party protocol to update the content of item v(i)





S in the i− 1-th tree.
(d) The parties execute a secure two party protocol to tag item v(i) with it’s new leaf
node assignment L̃(i), and to insert v(i) in the first empty position of the root
node.
6. For the first level tree that contains the actual items for the database, the server
retrieves the nodes on the path between the root and the leaf L(1). The parties




S . The outputs of the
protocol are secret shares of the data d = dC ⊕ dS found at virtual address v. The
server tags v with L̃(1), and the parties perform another secure protocol to insert v at
the first empty spot in the root node.
3.6.3 Optimizations and Implementation Choices
Encryption and Decryption In our protocol description so far, we have left implicit
the fact all data stored in the database at the server must be encrypted. Every time
a data item is used in the RAM computation, it must first be decrypted, and it must
be re-encrypted before it is re-inserted at the root node. In a naive application of our
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generic solution, the parties would have to decrypt, and later re-encrypt the data item
completely inside a Yao circuit, which can be very time consuming. We choose the following
encryption scheme, with an eye towards minimizing the computation done inside the garbled
circuit: Enc(m; r) = (FK(r)⊕m, r), where F can be any pseudo-random function. The key
K is stored by the client, and kept secret from the server. To ensure that encryption
and decryption can be efficiently computed inside a garbled circuit, the server sends r to
the client in the clear, along with a random r′ that will be used for re-encryption. The
client computes FK(r) and FK(r
′) outside the secure computation. Now the only part of
decryption or re-encryption that has to be done inside the garbled circuit is Boolean XOR,
which is very cheap.
While this greatly improves the efficiency of our scheme, we note that it has to be
done with care: sending the encryption randomness to the client could reveal information
about the access pattern of the RAM, and, consequently, about the server’s data. The issue
arises during the eviction procedure, when a data item is moved from a parent to one of its
children. During this process, it is important that neither player learn which child received
the evicted data; the construction of Shi et al. [SCSL11] has the client touch both children,
writing a dummy item to one of the two nodes, and the evicted item to the other node,
thereby hiding from the server which node received the real item. In our case, this must
be hidden from the client as well, which is ensured by performing the operation inside a
secure computation. However, the exact way in which randomness is assigned to ciphertext
has a crucial effect on security. For example, suppose the server sends randomness r1 and
r2 to be used in the re-encryption, and our operation is designed so that r1 is always used
for encrypting the dummy item and r2 is always used for the real item. The client can
then keep track of the real item by waiting to receive r2 for decryption in the future! We
must therefore design the re-encryption operation so that randomness is associated with a
node in the tree rather than the content of the ciphertext. Then, r1 is always used in the
left child, and r2 in the right, independent of which node receives the real item and which
receives the dummy item.
Although this issue is easily handled1, it demonstrates the subtlety that arises when we
1To give some intuition of security, note that as long as the assignment of the encryption randomness is




















Figure 3.4: Overflow probability as a function of bucket size, for 65536 virtual instructions
on a database of 65536 items.
depart from the generic protocol in order to improve the efficiency of the scheme.
Choosing a Bucket Size At each node of the ORAM structure we have a bucket of
items, and choosing the size of each bucket can have a big impact on the efficiency of the
scheme: we have to perform searches over B logN items for buckets of size B. However,
if the buckets are too small, there is a high probability that some element will “overflow”
its bucket during the eviction process. This overflow event can leak information about the
access pattern, so it is important to choose large enough buckets. Shi et al. [SCSL11] prove
that in an ORAM containing N elements, if the buckets are of size O(log(MN/δ)), then
after M memory accesses, the probability of overflow is less than δ. It follows that to
get, say, security 2−20, it suffices to have buckets of size O(logN), but the constant in the
notation is important.
independent of the access pattern, nothing can be learned by the client during decryption. To make this
formal, we show that we can simulate his view by choosing random values for each bucket, storing them
between look-ups, and sending those same values the next time that bucket is scanned. This simulation
would fail only if the assignment of the random values to buckets were somehow dependent on the particular
content of the RAM.
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In Figure 3.4 we provide our results from simulating overflow for various bucket sizes.
Notice that the value approaches 0 only as we approach 2 logN , and in fact the probability
of failure is very high for values closer to logN . Based on these simulations, we have
chosen to use buckets of size 2 logN . We ran our experiment with N = 216 and estimated
the probability of overflowing any bucket when we insert all N items, and then perform an
additional N operations on the resulting database. We used 10,000 trials in the experiment.
Note that for the specific example of binary search, we only need to perform logN operations
on the database; for 216 elements and a bucket size of 32, we determined with confidence
of 98% that the probability of overflow is less than .0001. The runtime of our protocol
(roughly) doubles when our bucket size doubles, so although we might prefer still stronger
security guarantees, increasing the bucket size to 3 logN will have a considerable impact on
performance. 2
Computing Addresses Recursively Recall that the leaf node assigned to item v(i) in
the ith tree is stored in item v(i+1) = ⌊v(i)
r
⌋ of the i + 1th tree. In Step 2, where the two
parties compute shares of v(i) for each i in 1, . . . , logrN , we observe that if r is a power of 2,
each party can compute its own shares locally from its share of v. If r = 2j and v = vC⊕vS ,
then we can obtain v(i) = ⌊ v
ri
⌋ by deleting the last i · j bits of v. Similarly v(i)C and v
(i)
S can
be obtained by deleting the last i · j bits from the values vC and vS . This allows us to avoid
performing another secure computation when recovering shares of the recursive addresses.
Node Storage Instantiation Shi et al. [SCSL11] point out that the data stored in each
node of the tree could itself be stored in another ORAM scheme, either using the same tree-
based scheme described above, or using any of the other existing schemes. We have chosen
to simply store the items in an array, performing a linear scan on the entire node. For the
data sets we consider, N = 106 or 107, and 20 ≤ logN ≤ 25. Replacing a linear scan with
an ORAM scheme costing O(log3N), or even O(log2N), simply does not pay off. We could
2The work of this Chapter we developed before newer versions of the tree-based ORAM were proposed
(Path-ORAM [SvDS+13]). This newer technique allows us to reduce the bucket size to a small constant.
In [GGH+13] authors shows a new eviction procedure that allow to reduce the buckets capacity to as low
as 2 elements.
CHAPTER 3. SECURE TWO-PARTY COMPUTATION IN SUBLINEAR
AMORTIZED TIME 33
consider the simpler ORAM of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] that has overhead O(
√
N),
but the cost of shuffling around data items and computing pseudorandom functions inside
garbled circuits would certainly erase any savings.
Using Client Storage When the client and server search for an item v, after they recover
the leaf node assigned to v, the server fetches the logN buckets along the path to the leaf,
each bucket containing up to logN items. The parties then perform a secure computation
over the items, looking for a match on v. We have a choice in how to carry out this
secure computation: we could compare one item at a time with v, or search as many as
log2N items in one secure computation. The advantage to searching fewer items is that
the garbled circuit will be smaller, requiring less client-side storage for the computation.
The disadvantage is that each computation will have to output secret shares of the state of
the search, indicating whether v has already been found, and, if so, what the value of its
payload is; each computation will also have to take the shares of this state as input, and
reconstruct the state before continuing with the search. The extra state information will
require additional wires and gates in the garbled circuits, as well as additional encryptions
and decryptions for preparing and evaluating the circuit. We have chosen to perform just
a single secure computation over log2N items, using the maximal client storage, and the
minimal computation. However, we note that the additional computation would have little
impact,3 and we could instead reduce the client storage at relatively little cost. To compute
the circuit that searches log2N items, the client needs to store approximately 400, 000
encryption keys, each 80 bits long.
Garbled Circuit Optimizations The most computationally expensive part of Yao’s
garbled circuit protocol is often thought to be the oblivious transfer (OT) sub-protocol
[EGL85]. The parties must employ OT once for every input wire of the party that evaluates
the circuit, and each such application (naively performed) requires expensive operations
such as exponentiations. We use the following known optimizations to reduce OT costs
and to further push its computation almost entirely to the preprocessing stage, before the
3This is because sharing the state and reconstructing the state are both done using XOR gates, which
are particularly cheap for garbled circuits, as we discuss below.
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parties begin the computation (even before they have their inputs), reducing the on-line
OT computations to just simple XOR operations.
The most important technique we use is the OT extension protocol of Ishai et al. [IKNP03],
which allows to compute an arbitrary number of OT instances, given a small (security pa-
rameter) number of “base” OT instances. We implement the base instances using the
protocol of Naor and Pinkas [NP01], which requires six exponentiations in a prime order
group, three of which can be computed during pre-processing. Following [IKNP03], the
remaining OT instances will only cost us a couple of hash evaluations per instance. We
then push these hash function evaluations to the preprocessing stage, in a way that requires
only XOR during the on-line stage. Finally, Beaver’s technique [Bea95] allows us to start
computing the OT’s in the preprocessing stage as well, by running OT random inputs for
both parties; the output is then corrected by appropriately sending real input XORed with
the used random inputs in the online stage.
We rely on several other known garbled circuit optimizations. First, we use the free
XOR gates technique of Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08a], which results in more than 60%
improvement in the evaluation time for an XOR gate, compared to other gates. Accordingly,
we aim to construct our circuits using as few non-XOR gates as possible.
Second, we utilize a wider variety of gates (as opposed to the traditional Boolean AND,
OR, XOR, NAND gates). This pays off since in the garbled circuit construction every
non-XOR gate requires performing encryption and decryption, and all gates of the same
size are equally costly in this regard. In our implementation we construct and use 10 of the
16 possible gates that have 2 input bits and one output bit. We also rely heavily on the
multiplexer gate on 3 input bits; this gate uses the first input bit to select the output from
the other two input bits. In one circuit, we use a 16-bit multiplexer, which uses 4 input bits
to select from 16 other inputs.
Finally, we utilize pipelined circuit execution, which avoids the naive traditional approach
where one party sends the garbled circuit in its entirety to the second one. This naive
approach is often impractical, as for large inputs the garbled circuits can be several gigabytes
in size, and the receiving party cannot start the evaluation until the entire garbled circuit
has been generated and transmitted and stored in his memory. To mitigate that, we follow




















Figure 3.5: Time for performing binary search using our protocol vs. time for performing
binary search using a standard garbled-circuit protocol as a function of the number of
database entries. Each entry is 512 bits long.
the technique introduced by Huang et al. [HEKM11], allowing the generation and evaluation
of the garbled circuit to be executed in parallel, where the sender can transmit each garbled
gate as soon as he generates it, and continue to garble the next gates while the receiver is
evaluating the received gates, thus improving the total evaluation time. This also alleviates
the memory requirements for both parties since the garbler can discards the gates he has
sent, and the receiver can discard a gate that he has evaluated.
3.7 Implementation
The goal of our experiments was to evaluate and compare execution times for two protocols
implementing binary search: one using standard optimized Yao, and the other using our
ORAM-based approach described in the previous section. In our experiments, each of the
two parties was run on a different server, each with a Intel Xeon 2.5GHz CPU, 16 GB of
RAM, two 500 GB hard disk drives, and running a 64-bit Ubuntu operating system. They
each had a 1 Gbit ethernet interface, and were connected through a 1Gbit switch.
Before running our experiments, we first populated the database structure on the server
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side: in our ORAM protocol, we randomly placed the encrypted data throughout the ORAM
structure, and in the Yao protocol performing a linear scan, we simply stored the data in
a large array. We then generated and stored the necessary circuit descriptions on each
machine. Finally, the two parties interacted to pre-process the expensive part of the OT
operations, in a manner that is independent of their inputs. We did not create the garbled
gates for the circuits during pre-processing; the server begins generating these once con-
tacted by the client. However, the server sent garbled gates to the client as they were ready,
so as to minimize the impact on the total computation time. When we measured time in
our experiments, we included: 1) the online phase of the OT protocol, 2) the time it takes to
create the garbled gates and transfer the resulting ciphertexts, and 3) the processing time
of the garbled circuits.
3.7.1 Performance
In Figure 3.5, we compare the performance of our construction when computing a ORAM-
based binary search to the performance of a Yao-based linear scan. We have plotted the
x-axis on a logarithmic scale to improve readability. From the plot it can be seen that
we outperform the Yao linear scan by a factor of 3 when dealing with input of size 219,
completing the logN operations in less than 7 minutes, compared to 24 minutes for Yao. For
input of size 220, we complete our computation in 8.3 minutes, while the Yao implementation
failed to complete due to memory constrains. While we had no trouble running our ORAM-
based protocol on input of size 220, for N = 221, we ran out of memory when populating
the server’s ORAM during pre-processing.
In Figure 3.6 we demonstrate how our protocol performs when evaluating a single read
operation over N data elements of size 512 bits, for N ∈ {216, 217, 218, 219, 220}. We note
that runtime for binary search using the ORAM is almost exactly the time it takes to
run logN single look-ups; this is expected, since the circuit for computing the next RAM
instruction is very small. For 216 items and a bucket size of 32, a single operation takes 27
seconds, while for 220 items and buckets of size 40, it takes about 50 seconds. Recall that
when relying only on secure computation, computing any function, even those making a
constant number of look-ups, requires a full linear scan; in this scenario, the performance






















Figure 3.6: Single ORAM look-up times for different database sizes and item data lengths.
gain is more than 30-fold. One example of such a function allows the client to search a large
social network, in order to fetch the neighborhood of a particular node.
3.7.2 Discussion
Memory Constraints Memory is the primary limitation on scaling the computation to
larger values of N . For the linear scan, the problem stems from the size of the circuit
description, which is more than 23 gigabytes and 850 million wires, if N = 219 and the
data elements are 512 bits. The pipe-lining technique of Huang et al. [HEKM11] prevents
the parties from storing all 23 gigabytes in RAM, but the client still stores an 80 bit secret
key for every wire in the circuit, and the server stores two; this requires 8.5 gigabytes of
memory for the client and 17 gigabytes for server. This ends up requiring far more space
than the data itself, which is only 512N = 33 megabytes.
In contrast, when N = 219 and the data size is 512, the largest circuit in our protocol is
less than 50 megabytes, and contains about 1million wires. On the other hand, each level
of the data storage has a factor of 4 logN overhead (when our bucket size is 2 logN), so
server storage for the top level alone is more than 40000N = 2.5 gigabytes. This explains
why we eventually ran into trouble when pre-processing the data; to broaden the scale of
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what we can handle, we will need to improve the way we handle memory while inserting
elements into the ORAM structure.
Pre-processing We have not done any calculations regarding the time required for secure
pre-processing. As explained above, when running our experiments, we populated the
ORAM structure by randomly placing items in the trees. This is of course insecure, since
the server will know where all the items are in the ORAM: to ensure security, the insertion
of the data would have to be interactive. One naive way to ensure security is to insert
each item, one at a time, by performing the “write” protocol inside a secure computation,
precisely as we have described an ORAM look-up. If we start this process with a data
structure large enough to hold all items, we can estimate the time it will take to insert 216
elements of 512 bits each, by multiplying the 13 seconds we require for a write operation by
216. It seems this would take almost 20 days to compute! We leave the problem of finding
a more efficient method for data insertion to future work. One natural approach would be
to start with smaller structures, repeatedly doubling their size in some secure manner as
insertion progresses. We stress that the pre-processing we do in our work is fully secure in
a three-party model, where the database owner pre-processes his data, and then transfers
the encrypted data to a semi-honest third party, who performs the secure computation on
his behalf.
The Recursion Parameter In all of our experiments, we have chosen r = 16; that is,
every item in tree i > 1 stores the leaf nodes of 16 items from tree i−1. This is a parameter
that we could change, and it may have an impact on performance. However, one parameter
we did investigate is the choice of how far to recurse. As can be seen in Table 1, the best
performance occurs when the bottom level, which requires a linear scan, holds fewer than
212 items. Interestingly, beyond that, further recursion does not seem to make a difference.
The ith tree
Counting Gates Let N be the number of elements, let d be the length of each element,
and let B denote the bucket size of each node. We calculate the number of non-XOR gates
in the garbled circuits of our ORAM operation, and provide some relevant observations. We
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DB size 2 trees 3 trees 4 trees 5 trees
220 35 14 12.5 13
219 20 11.5 12.5 -
218 12.5 9.5 9.5 -
Table 3.1: Time in seconds of a single ORAM access, with various numbers of recursion
levels in the ORAM structure. The number of items in the bottom level is 2N−4i+4 when
there are i trees.
first consider the top level tree that contains the database items. During a lookup we need to
check logN nodes along the path to the leaf associated with the searched item. Each of these
nodes contains B elements of size logN+d: a virtual address of size logN and a data element
of size d. We use approximately 1 non-XOR gates for each of these. Therefore, a single
lookup consists of B logN(logN + d) non-free gates. In the eviction process that follows,
we scan 2 logN nodes for eviction, and write to both of children of each node (one write is
dummy). Thus, the eviction circuits require 6B logN(logN+d) non-free gates, which gives
us a total of 7B logN(logN + d) non-free gates for each ORAM operation in the top level
tree. The analysis at the lower level trees is similar, but asymptotically, this dominates the
computation, since the lower level trees have only N/16i elements. We provide concrete
numbers in Table 2, taken directly from our circuits. We considere B = 2 logN and d=512.
We note that our circuits grow linearly in the size of each bucket. Also interesting is that
it grows linearly in d. Since the Yao linear scan is also linear in the data size, with dN
gates, we see that varying the length of the data element will have little impact on our
comparison.
3.8 Using Other ORAM Schemes
In our concrete protocol we instantiated (and then optimized) our generic construction using
the tree-based ORAM scheme of [SCSL11]4. However, there are several other oblivious
RAM schemes which we considered as possible instantiations for our ORAM component.
4As mentioned earlier, we could have also use the Path-ORAM scheme [SvDS+13]
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DB size XOR gates Non-free gates Wires
220 19,159,883 3,730,546 44,039,222
219 16,519,818 3,166,420 37,656,448
218 14,219,281 2,700,966 30,941,947
217 12,185,264 2,302,208 27,366,108
216 10,377,527 1,954,042 23,655,368
Table 3.2: Gate and wires counts for different size databases with item data of length 512
We discovered that these schemes would entail higher complexity in the context of a two
party computation protocol5 since they involve more complicated building blocks such as
pseudorandom shuffling protocol and Cuckoo hashing.
For example, the ORAM protocol of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [GO96] introduced the ba-
sic hierarchical structure that underlies many subsequent ORAM protocols. This approach
crucially relies on two components that turn out to be quite inefficient when evaluated with
a secure two-party computation: (1) the use of a pseudorandom function (PRF) in order to
consistently generate a random mapping from virtual addresses to physical addresses; and
(2) a joint shuffling procedure for mixing the different levels in the ORAM data structure.
We direct the reader to [GO96] for the full details of the scheme.
Several more-recent ORAM solutions [PR10b; GM11; GMOT12; KLO12] rely on cuckoo
hashing (in addition to also using PRF computations). For their security, a new construction
for a cuckoo hash table is needed [GM11], which involves building the corresponding cuckoo
graph and conducting breadth-first search on the graph in order to allocate each new item
inserted into the cuckoo table. Compiling this step into a secure two-party computation
protocol seems likely to introduce a prohibitive performance hit.
5Note that a better performing ORAM protocol does not necessarily translate to a better performing
protocol when put through a generic secure computation.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this work we showed efficient protocols for secure two party computation achieving only
a small polylogarithmic overhead over the running time of the insecure version of the same
functionality. This is a significant asymptotic improvement over traditional generic secure
computation techniques, which inherently impose computation overhead at least linear in
the input size. Our protocols rely on any (arbitrary) underlying oblivious RAM and generic
two party computation protocols. We further investigate the most efficient instantiation
of the protocol and demonstrated, empirically, the expected theoretical improvement. In
particular, we implemented a protocol that performs a single access to a databases of size
218 elements, outperforming an implementation of basic secure computation by a factor of
60. This translates also to a three-fold improvement in the running time of binary search.
In addition to these concrete improvements, our work sheds light on many of the details
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Chapter 4
Blind Seer: A Scalable Private
DBMS
4.1 Introduction
As noted in the very introduction of this thesis, the amount of data generated and stored
is now reaching dramatic proportions, and it is touching every aspect of our life (social,
political, commercial, scientific, medical, and legal contexts). Personal, corporate and gov-
ernment concerns about privacy increase with the rise in size and potential applications
utilizing these data. For example, the recent revelation of the U.S. Government’s data
collection programs reignited the privacy debate.
In this and the following chapters we address the issue of privacy for database manage-
ment systems (DBMS), where the privacy of both the data and the query must be protected.
As an example, consider the scenario where a law enforcement agency needs to search air-
line manifests for specific persons or patterns. Because of the classified nature of the query
(and even of the existence of a matching record), the query cannot be revealed to the DB
administrator. With the absence of truly reliable and trusted third parties, today’s solution,
supported by legislation, is to simply require the manifests and any other permitted data
to be furnished to the agency. However, a solution that allows the agency to ask for and
receive only the data it is interested in (without revealing its interest), would serve two
important goals:
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• allay the negative popular sentiment associated with large personal data collection
and management that is not publicly accounted for.
• enhance agencies’ ability to mine data, by obtaining permission to query a richer data
set that could not be legally obtained in its entirety.
In particular, we implement external policy enforcement on queries, thus preventing
many forms of abuse. Our system allows an independent oblivious controller to enforce that
queries satisfy the specificity requirement.
Other motivating scenarios are abundant, including private queries over census data,
information sharing between law enforcement agencies (especially across jurisdictional and
national boundaries) and electronic discovery in lawsuits, where parties have to turn over
relevant documents, but don’t want to share their entire corpus [Kay12; PI05]. Often in
these scenarios the (private) query should be answered only if it satisfies a certain (secret)
policy.
While achieving full privacy for these scenarios is possible by building on cryptographic
tools such as SPIR [GIKM00], FHE [Gen09], ORAM [GO96] or multiparty computation
(MPC), those solutions either run in polynomial time, or have very expensive basic steps
in the sublinear algorithms. Recall the ORAM based system of Chapter 3. Figure 3.5
show that it takes about 1000 seconds to run a binary search on 220 entries; subsequent
works [LO13a; GGH+13] remain too expensive for our setting. On the other hand, for data
sets of moderate or large sizes, even linear computation is prohibitive. This motivates the
following.
Design goals. Build a secure and usable DBMS system, rich in functionality, and with
performance very close to existing insecure implementations, so as to maintain the current
modus operandi of potential users such as government agencies and commercial organiza-
tions. At the same time, we must provide reasonable and provable privacy guarantees for
the system.
These are the hard design requirements that we achieve with Blind Seer (BLoom filter
INDex SEarch of Encrypted Results). Our work can be seen as an example of applying
cryptographic rigor to design and analysis of a large system. Privacy/efficiency trade-offs
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are inherent in many large systems. We believe that the approach we take (identifying and
permitting a controlled amount of leakage, and proving that there is no additional leakage)
will be useful in future secure systems.
Significance. We solve a significant open problem in private DB: efficient sublinear
search for arbitrary Boolean queries. While private keyword-search was achieved in some
models, this did not extend to general Boolean formulas. Natural breaking of a formula
to terms and individual keyword-searching of each leaks formula structure and encrypted
results for each keyword, significantly compromising privacy of both query and data. Until
our work, and the (very different) independent and concurrent works [CJJ+13; JJK+13], it
was not known how to efficiently avoid this leakage. (See Section 4.1.2 and Chapter 7 for
extended discussion on related work.)
Setting
Traditionally, DB querying is seen as a two-player engagement: the client queries the server
operated by the data owner, although delegation of the server operation to a third player
is increasingly common.
Players. In our system, there are three main players: client C, server S, and index server
IS (there is another logical entity, query checker QC, whose task of private query compliance
checking is technically secondary, albeit practically important. For generality, we consider
QC as a separate player, although its role is normally played by either S or IS). We split
off IS from S mainly for performance reasons; having C communicating mainly with the
third party IS, allows keeping S oblivious of the client queries, and hence we can aim for
far better privacy-performance trade-offs. We note also that our system can be generalized
to handle multiple clients in several ways (presenting different trade-offs), but we focus our
presentation on the single client setting.
Allowed leakage. The best possible privacy for us would guarantee that C learns only
the result set, and IS and S learn nothing at all. However, achieving this would be quite
costly, and almost certainly far too expensive as a replacement for any existing DBMS. On
the other hand, to perform practical-efficient equality check of encrypted data, we would
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likely require the use of deterministic encryption, which allows to identify and accumulate
access and search patterns. In addition, for certain conjunctive queries, sublinear search
algorithms are currently unknown, even for insecure DBMS. Thus, unless we opt for a
linear time for all conjunctive queries, the running time already inevitably reveals some
information (see Section 4.5.2 for more discussion).
As a result, we accept that certain “minimal” amount of leakage is unavoidable. In
particular, we allow players C and IS to learn certain search pattern information, such as
the pattern of returned results, and the traversal pattern of the encrypted search tree. We
stress that we still formally prove security of the resulting system – our simulators of players’
views are given the advice corresponding to the allowed leakage. We specify the allowed
leakage in more detail in Section 4.5.
In Section 4.8 we provide further motivation, examples and discussion of our setting and
choices.
4.1.1 Contributions
We design, prove secure, implement and evaluate the first scalable privacy-preserving DBMS
which simultaneously satisfies all the following features (see the following sections for a more
complete description and comparison to previous works):
• Rich functionality: we support a rich set of queries including arbitrary Boolean formu-
las, ranges, stemming, and negations, while hiding search column names and including
free keyword searches over text fields in the database. We note that there is no stan-
dard way in MySQL to obtain the latter.
• Practical scalability. Our performance (similar to MySQL) is proportional to the
number of terms in the query and to the result set size for the CNF term with the
smallest number of results.
For a DB of size 10TB containing 100M records with 70 searchable index terms per
DB row, our system executes many types of queries that return few results in well
under a second, which is comparable to MySQL.
• Provable security. We guarantee the privacy of the data from both IS and C, as well
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as the privacy of C’s query from S and IS. We prove security with respect to well
defined, reasonable, and controlled leakage. In particular, while certain information
about search patterns and the size of the result set is leaked, we do provide some
privacy of the result set size, suited for the case when identifying that there is one
result as opposed to zero results is undesirable (Section 4.4.2).
• Natural integration of private policy enforcement. We represent policies as Boolean
circuits over the query, and can support any policy that depends only on the query,
with performance that depends on the policy circuit size.
• Support for DB updates, deletions and insertions.
To our knowledge the combination of performance, features and provable security of
our system has never been achieved, even without implementation, and represents a break-
through in private data management. Indeed, previous solutions either require at least
linear work, address a more limited type of queries (e.g., just keyword search), or provide
weaker privacy guarantees. The independent and concurrent work of [CJJ+13; JJK+13] is
the only system comparable to Blind Seer, in the sense that it too features a similar combi-
nation of rich functionality, practical scalability, provable security, and policy enforcement.
However, the trade offs that they achieve among these requirements and their technical
approach are quite different than ours.
Our scale captures moderate-to-large data, which encompasses datasets in the motivat-
ing scenarios above (such as the census data, on which we ran our evaluation), and represents
a major step towards privacy for truly “big data”. Our work achieves several orders of mag-
nitude performance improvement as compared to the fully secure cryptographic solution,
and much greater functionality and privacy as compared to practical single keyword search
and heuristic solutions.
4.1.2 Background
The closest to our setting/work is a OSPIR-OXT [JJK+13], a very recent extension of the
SSE solution of [CJJ+13](called OXT protocol), which additionally (to the SSE require-
ments) addresses data privacy against the client (and hence, as we do, addresses private
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DB). We note that the work of [CJJ+13; JJK+13] is performed independently and concur-
rently to the development of this work. OSPIR-OXT supports the same class of functions
as OXT, that is, formulas of the type k0 ∧ φ(k1, ..., km−1). Their search time complexity is
O(m×D(k0)), where D(k0) is the number of records containing keyword k0. In the worst
case, such as when the client has little a priori information about the DB and chooses a
sub-optimal term to appear first in the query term, the complexity of OSPIR-OXT can be
linear in the DB size. In contrast, the solution for general formulas proposed here does
not depend on the client’s knowledge of data distribution or representation choice (beyond
the size of the formula). However, for typical practical applications this is not a serious
issue, as the client can represent his query as a conjunction, and moreover, can make a good
guess for which term will have low frequency in the data and is a good choice as the first
term. Thus, a large majority of practically useful queries can be evaluated by OSPIR-OXT
with asymptotic complexity similar to Blind Seer. In terms of security, our guarantees
vary: OSPIR-OXT achieves security against malicious client, which is much stronger than
our semi-honest setting, and of particular importance for the policy enforcement (this is
handled in Chapter 5). Blind Seer and OSPIR-OXT leakage profile vary and are incompa-
rable; different access pattern structures (search tree for Blind Seer and index lookups for
OSPIR-OXT). Because of the use of a more expensive basic step of SFE, the protection of
query-related data, at least in some cases, is somewhat better in Blind Seer. For example,
depending on the DB data, we may hide everything about the individual terms of the query,
while OSPIR-OXT leak to the client and (their counterpart of the) IS the support sizes for
individual terms of the disjunctive queries (individual term supports are revealed to the
client, but this is only an issue if the query does not ask for all the columns of the records).
At the same time, the concrete query performance of OSPIR-OXT is somewhat better
than ours, due to their elegant non-interactive approach. The very expensive step of DB
setup is faster for us, and the CPU load is lower, as we use mainly symmetric-key primitives.
We also note that our interactive approach allows significant flexibility. For example, the
0-1 security (cf. Section 4.4.2), is naturally and cheaply achievable in our system; it appears
harder/more expensive to achieve in a non-interactive system, and in fact is not considered
in [JJK+13]. The use of GC as the basic block similarly provides significant flexibility and
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opportunities for feature expansion. A strong point of OSPIR-OXT is easy scalability due
to storing search structures on disk. This is achieved at the cost of significant additional
system complexity and setup time. Finally, OSPIR-OXT naturally support multiple clients,
while our natural extensions to multiple clients require that all clients share a secret key
not known to IS.
Because of the different trade offs presented by our work and that of [JJK+13], each
system is better suited for different applications/use cases. It is interesting to note that these
two works, the first ones to address the major open problem of truly practical, provably
secure, and very rich (including any formula) query DBMS, are based on very different
technical approaches. We believe that this adds to the value and strength of each of these
systems.
4.2 Overview
Participants. Recall, our system consists of four participants: server S, client C, index
server IS, and query checker QC. The server owns a database DB, and provides its encrypted
searchable copy to IS, who obliviously services C’s queries. QC, a logical player who can be
co-located with and may often be an agent of S, privately enforces a policy over the query.
This is needed to ensure control over hidden queries from C. Player interaction is depicted
in Figure 4.1.
Approach. We present a high-level overview of our approach and refer the reader to
Section 4.3 for technical details. We adhere to the following general approach of building
large secure systems, in which full security is prohibitively costly: in a large problem, we
identify small privacy-critical subproblems, and solve those securely (their outputs must be
of low privacy consequence, and are handled in plaintext). Then we use the outputs of the
subtasks (often only a small portion of them will need to be evaluated) to complete the
overall task efficiently.
We solve the large problem (encrypted search on large DB) by traversing an encrypted
search tree. This allows the subtasks of privately computing whether a tree node has a
child matching the (arbitrarily complex) query to be designated as security-critical. Further,
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Figure 4.1: High-level overview of Blind Seer. There are three different operations depicted:
preprocessing (step 0), database searching (step 1-4) and data modifications (step 5).
unlike the protected input and the internals of this subtask, its output, obtained in plaintext
by IS and C, reveals little private information, but is critical in pruning the search tree and
achieving efficient sublinear (logarithmic for some queries) search complexity. Putting it
together, our search is performed by traversing the search tree, where each node decision is
made via very efficient secure function evaluation (SFE).
We use Bloom filters (BF) to store collections of keywords in each tree node. Bloom
filters serve this role well because they support small storage, constant time access, and
invariance of access patterns with respect to different queries and match outputs. For SFE,
we use state-of-the-art Yao’s garbled circuits.
Because of SFE’s privacy guarantee in each tree node, the overall leakage (i.e. additional
information learned by the players) essentially amounts to the traversal pattern in the
encrypted search tree.
We discuss technical details of these and other aspects of the system, such as encrypted
search tree construction, data representation, policy checking, etc., in Section 4.3. We stress
that many of these details are technically involved.
CHAPTER 4. BLIND SEER: A SCALABLE PRIVATE DBMS 51
Notations. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. For ℓ-bit strings a and b, let a ∨ b (resp., a ∧ b and
a ⊕ b) denote the bitwise-OR (resp. bitwise-AND and bitwise-XOR) of a and b. Let
S = (i1, i2, . . . , iη) be a sequence of integers. We define a projection of a ∈ {0, 1}ℓ on S
as a↓S= ai1ai2 · · · aiη ; for example, with S = (2, 4), we have 0101↓S= 11. We also define
a filtering of a = a1a2 . . . aℓ by S as a‡S = b1b2 . . . bℓ where bj = aj if j ∈ S, or bj = 0
otherwise; for example, with S = (2, 4), we have 1110‡S = 0100.
4.3 Basic System Design
In this section, we will begin by describing the basic system design supporting only simple
private query. In the next section, we will augment this basic design with additional features.
4.3.1 BF Search Tree
Our key data structure enabling sublinear search is a BF search tree for the database
records. We stress that there is only one global search tree for the entire database. Let n
be the number of database records and T be a balanced b-ary tree of height logb n
1 (we
assume n = bz from some positive integer z for simplicity). In the search tree, each leaf is
associated with each database record, and each node v is associated with a Bloom filter Bv.
The filter Bv contains all the keywords from the (leaf) records that the node v have (as itself
or as its descendants). For example, if a node contains a record that has Jeff in the fname
field, a keyword α = ‘fname:Jeff’ is inserted to Bv. The length ℓv of Bv is determined by
the upper bound of the number of possible keywords, derived from DB schema, so that two
nodes of the same level in the search tree have equal-length Bloom filters. The insertion
of keywords is performed by shrinking the output of the hash functions H(α)) to fit in the
corresponding BF length ℓv. Here, H is the set of hash functions associated with the root
node BF. See Figure 4.2.
Search using a BF search tree. Consider a simple recursive algorithm Search below.
Let α and β be keywords and r the root of the search tree. Note that Search(α ∧ β, r) will
1In our prototype implementation, b is set to 10.
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Let (Ri, . . . , Rn) be the overall database records. The Bloom filter BFa,b contains all the keywords
of records Ra, Ra+1, . . . , Rb.
Figure 4.2: Index structure: Bloom-filter-based search tree.
output all the leaves (i.e., record locations) containing both keywords α and β; any ancestor
of a leaf has all the keywords that the leaf has, and therefore there should be a search path
from the root to each leaf containing α and β. This algorithm can be easily extended to
searching for any monotone Boolean formula of keywords.
Search(α ∧ β, v):
If the BF Bv contains α and β, then
If v is a leaf, then output {v}.
Otherwise, output
⋃
c: children of v Search(α ∧ β, c).
Otherwise, output ∅.
4.3.2 Preprocessing
Roughly speaking, in this phase, S gives an encrypted DB to IS. To be more specific, by
executing the following protocols, the two parties encrypt and permute the records, create
a search tree for the permuted records, and prepare record decryption keys.
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Encrypting database index/records. In this step, the server first permutes its DB to
hide information of the order of records in the DB and then creates BF-search tree on this
permuted DB; these DB and search tree are encrypted and sent to the index server.
1. (Shuffle and encrypt the records.) The server generates a key pair (pk , sk) for a public-
key semi-homomorphic (e.g., additively homomorphic) encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec).
Given a database of n records, the server S randomly shuffles the records. Let
(R1, . . . , Rn) be the shuffled records. S then chooses a random string si, and computes
s̃i ← Encpk (si) and R̃i = G(si)⊕Ri, where G is a pseudo-random function (PRG).
2. (Encrypt the BF search tree.) S constructs a BF search tree T for the permuted
records (R1, . . . , Rn). It then chooses a key k at random for a PRF F . The Bloom
filter Bv in each node v is encrypted as follows: B̃v = Bv ⊕ Fk(v).
3. (Share) Finally, the S sends the (permuted) encrypted records (pk , (s̃1, R̃1), . . . , (s̃n, R̃n))
and the encrypted search tree {B̃v : v ∈ T} to the index server. The client will re-
ceive the PRF key k, and the hash functions H = {hi}ηi=1 used in the Bloom filter
generation.
Preparing record decryption keys. To save the decryption time in the on-line phase,
the index server and the server precompute record decryption keys as follows:
(Blind the decryption keys) The index server IS chooses a random permutation ψ :
[n]→ [n]. For each i ∈ [n], it chooses ri randomly and computes s̃′ψ(i) ← s̃i ·Encpk (ri).
Then, it sends (s̃′1, . . . , s̃
′
n) to S. Then, the server decrypts each s̃
′
i to obtain the




Our system supports any SQL query that can be represented as a monotone Boolean for-
mula where each variable corresponds to one of the following search conditions: keyword
match, range, and negation. So, without loss of generality, we support non-monotone formu-
las as well, modulo possible performance overhead (see how we support negations below).
See Figure 4.3 as an example.
CHAPTER 4. BLIND SEER: A SCALABLE PRIVATE DBMS 54




(fname = JEFF OR fname = JOHN) AND zip = 34301 AND income ≤ 200








T1 T2 T3 T4
T2 T3 T4
Figure 4.3: High level circuit representation of a query.
Traversing the search tree privately. The search procedure starts with the client
transforming the query into the corresponding Boolean circuit. Then, starting from the
root of the search tree, the client and the index server will compute this circuit Q via
secure computation. If the circuit Q outputs true, the parties visit the children of the node,
and again evaluate this circuit Q on those nodes recursively, until they reach leaf nodes;
otherwise, the traversal at the node terminates. Note that evaluation of Q outputs a single
bit denoting the search result at that node. It is fully secure, and reveals no information
about individual keywords.
In order to use secure computation, we need to specify the query circuit and the inputs
of the two parties to it. However, since the main technicalities lie in constructing circuits
for the variables corresponding to search conditions, we will describe how to construct those
sub-circuits only; the circuit for the Boolean formula on top of the variables is constructed
in a standard manner.
Keyword match condition. We first consider a case where a variable corresponds to a
keyword match condition. For example, in Figure 4.3 the variable T1 indicates whether the
Bloom filter Bv in a given node v contains the keyword α = ‘fname:JEFF’. Consider the
Bloom filter hash values for the keyword α, and let Z denote the positions to be checked.
If the Bloom filter Bv contains the keyword α, the projected bits w.r.t. Z should be all set,
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that is, we need to check
Bv↓Z ?= 1η . (4.1)
Recall that the index server has an encrypted Bloom filter B̃v = Bv ⊕Fk(v), and the client
the PRF key k and the hash functions H = {hi}ηi=1. Therefore, the circuit to be computed
should first decrypt and then check the equation (4.1). That is, the keyword match circuit
looks as follows:





Here, (b1, . . . , bη) is from the encrypted BF and (r1, . . . , rη) from the pseudorandom mask.
That is, to this circuit KM, the index server will feed B̃v↓Z as the first part (b1, . . . , bη) of
the input, and the client will feed Fk(v)↓Z as the second (r1, . . . , rη). In order that the two
parties may execute secure computation, it is necessary that the client compute Z and send
it (in plaintext) to the index server.
Range/negation condition. Consider the variable T4 in Figure 4.3 for example. Using the
technique from [RVBM09], we augment the BF to support inserting a number x ∈ Z2n , say
with n = 32, and checking if the BF contains a number in a given range.
To insert an integer a in a BF, all the canonical ranges containing a are added in the
filter. A canonical range with level i is a range of size 2i that start on an even position.
That is, [x2i, (x + 1)2i) for some integer x. For each level, there is only one canonical
range containing the number a. In particular, for each i ∈ Zn, compute xi such that
a ∈ [xi2i, (xi + 1)2i) and insert ‘r:income:i:xi’ to the Bloom filter.
Given a range query [a, b), we check whether a canonical range inside the given query
belongs to the BF. In particular, for each i ∈ Zn, find, if any, the minimum yi such that
[yi2
i, (yi+1)2
i) ∈ [a, b) and the maximum zi such that [zi2i, (zi+1)2i) ∈ [a, b); then check if
the BF contains a keyword ‘r:income:i:yi’ or ‘r:income:i:zi’. If any of the checks succeeds
for some i, then output yes; otherwise output no. Therefore, a circuit for a range query is
essentially ORs of keyword match circuits.
For example, consider a range query within Z24 . When inserting a number 9, the
following canonical ranges are inserted: [9, 10), [8, 10), [8, 12), [8, 16). Given a range query
[7, 11), the following canonical ranges are checked: [7, 8), [10, 11), [8, 10). We have a match
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[8, 10).
Negation conditions can be easily changed to range conditions; for example, a condition
‘NOT work hrs = 40’ is equivalent to ‘work hrs ≤ 39 OR work hrs ≥ 41’.
Overall procedure in a node . The client and the index server execute the following in a
node v of the search tree.
1. The client constructs a query circuit corresponding to the given SQL query. Then, it
garbles the circuit and sends the garbled circuit, Yao keys for its input (corresponding
to PRFk(v)‡Z).
2. The client and the index server execute OT so that IS obtains Yao keys for its input
(i.e., encrypted BF). Then, the index server evaluates the garbled circuit and sends
the resulting output Yao key to the client.
3. The client decides whether to proceed based on the result.
Record Retrieval. When the client and the index server reach some of the leaf nodes in
the tree, the client retrieves the associated records. In particular, if computing the query
circuit on the ith leaf outputs success, the index server sends (ψ(i), ri, R̃i) to the client.
Then, the client sends ψ(i) to S, and gets back s′
ψ(i). Note that it holds s
′
ψ(i) := siri. The
client C decrypts R̃i using si and obtains the output record.
4.4 Advanced Features
In this section, we discuss how our system supports advanced features such as query policies,
and one-case indistinguishability. We also overview insert/delete/update operations from
the server.
4.4.1 Policy Enforcement
The policy enforcement over a query is performed through a three-party protocol among
the query checker QC (holding the policy), the client C (holding the query), and the index
server IS. A policy is represented as a circuit that takes a query as input and outputs accept
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or reject. In our system, QC garbles this policy circuit, and IS evaluates the garbled policy
circuit on the client’s query. A key idea here is to have the client and the query checker
share the information of input/output wire key pairs in this garbled policy circuit; then, the
client can later construct a garbled query circuit (used in the search tree traversal) to be
dependent on the output of the policy circuit. Assuming semi-honest security, this sharing
of information can be easily achieved by having the client choose those key pairs (instead
of QC) and send them to QC. The detailed procedure follows.
Before the tree search procedure described in the previous section begins, the client C,
the query checker QC, and the index server IS execute the following protocol.
1. Let q = (q1, . . . , qm) ∈ {0, 1}m be a string that encodes a query (we will discuss
our encoding method later in this section). The client generates Yao key pairs Wq =
((w01 , w
1




m)) for the input wires of the policy circuit, and a key pair Wx =
(t0, t1) for the output wire. The client sends the key pairs Wq and Wx to query checker
QC. It also sends the index server the garbled input q̃ = (wq11 , w
q2
2 , . . . , w
qm
m ).
2. Let P be the policy circuit. QC generates a garbled circuit P̃ using Wq as input key
pairs, and Wx as the output key pair (QC chooses the other key pairs of P̃ at random).
Then, QC sends P̃ to the index server.
3. The index server evaluates the circuit P̃ on q̃ obtaining the output wire key x̃ = P̃ (q̃).
Note that x̃ ∈Wx.
After the execution of this protocol, the original search tree procedure starts as described
before. However, the procedure is slightly changed when evaluating a leaf node as follows:
1. Let Q′(b, r, x) = Q(b, r)∧ x be an augmented circuit, where Q is the query circuit, b
and r are the inputs from IS and C respectively, and x is a bit representing the output
from the policy circuit. The client C generates a garbled query circuit Q̃′ using wire
key pair Wx for the bit x. Then, it sends (Q̃
′, r̃) to the index server, where r̃ is the
garbled input of r.
2. After obtaining the input keys b̃ for b via OT with C, the index server IS evaluates
Q̃′(b̃, r̃, x̃) and sends the resulting output key to the client. Recall that it has already
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evaluated the garbled policy circuit P̃ (q̃) and obtained x̃.
3. The client checks the received key and decides to accept or reject.
Regarding privacy, the client learns nothing about the policy, since it never sees the
garbled policy circuit. The index server obtains the topology of the policy circuit (from the
garbled policy circuit).
Note that the garbled policy circuit is evaluated only once, before the search tree exe-
cution starts. Therefore, the policy checking mechanism introduces only a small overhead.
It is also worth observing that, so far, we have not assumed any restriction on the policy
to be evaluated. Since Yao-based computation can compute any function represented as a
circuit, in principle, we could enforce any policy computable in a reasonable time (as long
as it depends only on the query). We next describe in detail our own implemented policy
circuit.
Encoding a query. In our system, a query is represented as a Bloom filter. This filter
contains all the relevant columns and operations, and search terms and conditions. For
example, consider the following query:
SELECT id WHERE fname = ALICE AND dob <= 1975-1-1 AND CONTAINED IN(notes1, engineer) (4.2)
The bloom filter will contain the following:
• fname, fname:=, fname:ALICE, fname:=:ALICE
• dob, dob:<=, dob:1975-1-1, dob:<=:1975-1-1
• notes1, notes1:contained in, notes1:engineer,
notes1:contained in:engineer
Policy circuit. The current implementation provides a parser for any policy that can
be represented as a monotone DNF where each variable indicates whether some policy
condition (BF keyword) belongs to the input BF representing a query as described above;
if the formula output is true, then the client’s query is disallowed. For example, a policy
may disallow a query if it contains an equality check on fname with value ALICE and a range
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in dob. In this case, the policy circuit is a simple formula V1 AND V2, where the variable V1
is true if the input BF contains fname:=:ALICE, and V2 is true if the filter contains dob:<=.
Indeed, query (4.2) above will be disallowed.
We believe that this provides a wide coverage of policies. For example, our parser also
supports a policy that allows only range operation on fname, indirectly. One technical
issue is that we do not want to allow any false approval of a query that fails the policy
(though a tunable small probability of false rejection of a good query is acceptable), but the
Bloom filters allow no false negatives. We can fix this issue by adding keywords representing
absence column, or column operators to the BF. In the example above the system adds the
following keywords:
NOT:fname:range, NOT:dob:=, NOT:notes1:stem, NOT:lname, NOT:zip, ....
Now, the aforementioned policy is equivalent to one that disallows queries if the cor-
responding the BF contains fname and NOT:fname:range. If the check succeeds, then the
query is disallowed. Likewise, a policy allowing only equality operation on dob will check if
the filter has dob and NOT:dob:=. In addition, the policy can now disallow queries that do
not contain an equality on dob column or that do not contain lname. More importantly,
the policy can now enforce that the query must have lname value if fname was present.
4.4.2 One-case Indistinguishability
So far, in our system the index server learns how many records the client retrieved from
the query. In many use cases, this leakage should be insignificant to the index server, in
particular, when the number of returned results is expected to be, say, more than a hundred.
However, there do exist some use cases in which this leakage is critical. For example, suppose
that a government agent queries the passenger database of an airline company looking for
persons of interest (POI). We assume that the probability that there is indeed a POI is
small, and the airline or the index server discovering that a query resulted in a match may
cause panic. Motivated from the above scenario, we consider a security notion which we
call one-case indistinguishability.
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Motivation. Consider a triple (q,D0, r) where q is a query, and D0 is a database with
the query q resulting in no record, but r satisfies q. Let D1 be a database that is the same
as D0 except that a record is randomly chosen and replaced with r. Let view0 (resp. view1)
denote the view of IS when the client runs a query q with the database D0 (resp., D1).
A natural start would be to require that for any such (q,D0, r), the difference between
the two distributions view0 and view1 should be small ǫ (in the computational sense), which
we call ǫ zero-one indistinguishability. However, it does not seem possible to achieve negli-
gible difference ǫ without suffering significant performance degradation (in fact, our system
satisfies this notion for a tunable small constant ǫ). Unfortunately, this definition does not
provide a good security guarantee when the difference ǫ is non-negligible, in particular, for
the scenario of finding POIs. For example, let Π be a database system with perfect privacy
and Π′ be the same as Π except that when it is 1-case (i.e., a query with one result record),
the client sends the index server the message “the 1-case occurred” with non-negligible
probability. It is easy to see that Π′ satisfies the definition with some non-negligible ǫ, but
it is clearly a bad and dangerous system.
One-case indistinguishability. Observe that in the use case of finding POIs, we don’t
particularly worry about “the 0-case”, that is, it is acceptable if the airline company some-
times knows that a query definitely resulted in no returned record. Motivated by this
observation, this definition intuitively requires that if the a-priori probability of a 1-case is
δ, then a-posteriori probability of a 1-case is at most (1+ǫ)δ. For example, for ǫ = 1, the
probability could grow from δ to 2δ, but never more than that, no matter what random
choices were made. Moreover, if the a-priori probability was tiny, the a-posteriori probabil-
ity remains tiny even if unlucky random choices were made. In particular, consider (q,D0, r)
and D1 as before. Now consider a distribution E that outputs (b, v) where b ∈ {0, 1} chosen
with Pr[b = 1] = δ, and v is the view of the index server when the query q is run on Db.
The system satisfies ǫ one-case indistinguishability if for any (q,D0, r), δ and v, it holds
Pr
E
[b = 1|v] ≤ (1 + ǫ)δ.
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Augmenting the design. To achieve these indistinguishability notions, we change the
design such that the client chooses a small random number of paths leading to randomly
selected leaves. In particular, let D be the probability distribution on the number of random







1/α if 1 ≤ x ≤ α− 1
1/α · 1/2x−α+1 if x ≥ α
Here, α is a tunable parameter. The client chooses x ← D, and then it also chooses
x uniformly random indices (j1, . . . , jx) in [n]. When handling the query, the client super-
imposes the basic search procedure above with these random paths. Our system is 1/α
zero-one indistinguishable and ǫ one-case indistinguishable with ǫ = 1. Intuitively, the leak-
age to the index server is the tree traversal pattern, and these additional random paths
make the 0-case look like 1-case with a reasonably good probability.
If we slightly relax the definition and ignore views taking place with a tiny probability,
say 2−20, we can even achieve both 1-case and 0-case indistinguishability at the same time;
the probability of the number x of fake paths is now 1/2|x−α|+2 with a parametrized center
α, say α = 20 (except when x = 0, i.e., Pr[x = 0] = 1/2α+1).
Against the server. One-case indistinguishability against the server is easily achieved
by generating a sufficient number of dummy record decryption keys in the preprocessing
phase; the index server will let the client know the (permuted) positions of the dummy
keys. When zero records are returned from a query, the client asks for a dummy decryption
key from the server. For brevity, we omit the details here, and exclude this feature in the
security analysis.
One-case indistinguishability proof
Here, we give a formal definition of one-case indistinguishability. Since our system realizes
the ideal functionality Fdb, the definitions concern only input/output behavior and the
leakage profile L.
The distribution E discussed previously with δ is defined as follows:
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Let (D0, q, r) be a database, a query and a record. Choose a record in D0
uniformly at random and replace it with r. Let D1 be the modified database.
Choose a bit b ∈ {0, 1} according to the following distribution:
Pr[b = 1] = δ, Pr[b = 0] = 1− δ.
Run Fdb, calling Init with (D0, P ), and Query with q. Let v be the leakage to
the index server. Output (b, v).
We show that our system satisfies one-case indistinguishability. Note that the initial
leakage is none, and therefore, we only need to consider the query leakage which is the
query pattern and the tree search pattern. This implies that we only need to consider the
tree search pattern since the same query is considered in the experiment. Observe that
the newly introduced record r is equivalent to adding a random paths in terms of the tree
search pattern. Therefore, it suffices to focus on the number of added random paths. In
particular, let D+ be defined as follows:
x← D; output (x + 1).
Now, consider a following game X:
Choose a bit b ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[b = 1] = δ and Pr[b = 0] = 1− δ. If b = 0,
let x← D; otherwise let x← D+. Output (b, x).
Now, we show that for any x, it holds that
Pr
X
[b = 1| x] ≤ 2δ.
We show this by using case analysis:
• When x ≤ 1, it never comes from D+, so the inequality trivially holds.
• When 2 ≤ x ≤ α− 1, it holds that




δ/α + (1− δ)/α = δ.
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• When x ≥ α, it holds that
Pr[b = 1| x] = Pr[X = (1, x)]
Pr[x]
=
δ · (1/α) · 1/2x−α
δ · (1/α) · 1/2x−α + (1− δ) · (1/α) · 1/2x−α+1
=
δ




4.4.3 Delete, Insert, and Update from the Server
Blind Seer supports a basic form of dynamic deletion, insertion, and update of a record
which is only available to the server. If it would like to delete a record Ri, then the server
sends i to the index server, which will mark the encrypted correspondent as deleted. For
newly inserted (encrypted) records, the index server keeps a separate list for them with
no permutation involved. In addition, it also keeps a temporary list of their Bloom filters.
During search, the temporary list is also scanned linearly, after the tree. When the length
of the temporary Bloom filter list reaches a certain threshold, all the current data is re-
indexed and a new Bloom filter tree is constructed. The frequency of rebuilding the tree is
of course related to the frequency of the modifications and also the threshold we choose for
the temporary list’s size. Finally, update is simply handled by atomically issuing a delete
and an insert command.
We note that updates is not our core contribution; we implement and report it here,
but don’t focus on its design and performance. A more scalable update system would use
a BF tree rather than a list; its implementation is a simple modification to our system.
4.5 Security Analysis
We consider static security against a semi-honest adversary that controls at most one par-
ticipant. We first describe an ideal functionality Fdb parameterized with a leakage profile
in Figure 4.4, and then show that our system securely realizes the functionality where the
leakage is essentially the search tree traversal pattern and the pattern of accessed BF indices.
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider security where there are no insert/delete/update
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operations,2and unify the server and the query checker into one entity. We also assume that
all the records have the same length.
We use the DDH assumption (for ElGamal encryption and Naor-Pinkas OT), and our
protocols are in the random oracle model (for Naor-Pinkas OT and OT extension). We also
use PRGs and PRFs, and those primitives are implemented with AES.
Functionality Fdb
Parameter: Leakage profile.
Init: Given input (D,P ) from S, do the following:
1. Store the database records D and the policy P . Let n be the number records in D.
Shuffle D and let (R1, . . . , Rn) be the shuffled records. Choose a random permutation
π : [n] → [n]. Construct a BF-search tree for (R1, . . . , Rn) using the hash functions
H.
2. To handle the client’s queries, it chooses hash functions H = {hi : {0, 1}∗ → [ℓ]}ηi=1
for Bloom filters with parameters (η, ℓ) to maintain false positive rate of 10−6.
3. Finally, return a DONEinit and the leakage to all parties.
Query: Given input q from C, do the following:
1. Check if q is allowed by P . If the check fails, then disallow the query by setting y = ∅.
Otherwise, for each i ∈ [n], let Bi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
′
be the Bloom filter associated with the
ith leaf in the BF tree. For i = 1, . . . , n, check if the query passes according to the
filter Bi (refer to Section 4.3); if so, add (i, Ri) to the result set Y .
2. Return Y to C and return a DONEquery message and leakage to all parties.
Figure 4.4: The Ideal Functionality Fdb
2 As access patterns are revealed, additional information for inserted/deleted/updated records is leaked.
For example, C or IS may learn whether a returned record was recently inserted; they also may get advantage
in estimating whether the query matched a recently deleted record. We stress that this additional leakage
can be removed by re-running the setup of the search structure.
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4.5.1 Security of Our System
With empty leakage profile, the ideal functionality Fdb in Figure 4.4 captures the privacy
requirement of a database management system in which each query is handled determinis-
tically. The client obtains only the query results, and nothing more. The index server and
the server learn nothing. We show now that Blind Seer realizes the functionality Fdb with
aproppiate leakage profile.
4.5.1.1 Simulating Client’s Adversarial Behaviour
Leakage to Cin Init. The leakage to C is n, that is, the total number of records.
Leakage to C in each query. The leakage to the client is the BF-search tree traversal paths,
that is, all the nodes v in which the query passes according to the filter Bv. We denote this
leakage as SearchPattern. The protocol also leaks the permuted id’s of the retrieved records
π(id(r1)), ..., π(id(rℓ)).
Simulating Preprocessing. The simulator S stores n, runs the adversary A that will
follow the protocol description for the client. The client is suppose to receive n, (k,H)}. S
can randomly choose k,H.
Simulating Query. The simulator S works as follows:
1. Send query q to the ideal functionality, and receive back the records (r1, ..., rℓ) as well
as the leakage (π(id(r1), ..., π(id(rℓ))), SearchPattern, and cnt. The simulator S runs
the adversary A(q). S now simulates the tree traversal with adversary A starting at
the root as follows:
• If node v is not a leaf of the search tree, S checks whether v is in SearchPattern. If
so, S simulates Yao’s protocol such that the output to the client is 1. Otherwise,
simulate Yao’s protocol such that the output to the client is 0.
• If node v is a leaf of the tree then S checks if v belongs to SearchPattern (v is
π(id(rj)) for some j), S simulates Yao’s protocol so that output is 1. Simulator
now encrypts rj , and sends it to A along with additional information following
the the protocol specification.
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4.5.1.2 Simulating Server’s Adversarial Behaviour
Leakage to S in Init. None.
Leakage to S in each query. The server is involved only when the records are retrieved. Let
((i1, Ri1), . . . , (ij , Rij )) be the query results. Then, the leakage to the server is (π(i1), π(i2), . . . , π(ij)).
Simulating Preprocessing. Since IS has no input, the simulator can just follow IScode
to produce s̃′1, .., s̃
′
n, where each s̃
′
i is computed as Encpk(ri) for some random ri. Simulator
sends this values back to the adversary A.
Simulating Search. Given the permuted record indices π(id(1)), ..., π(id(n)), the simula-
tor acting as the client sends this indices to the adversary.
4.5.1.3 Simulating Index Server’s Adversarial Behaviour
Leakage to IS in Init. The number of records in the database n and the size of the records
|D1| = |D2| = · · · = |Dn|.
Leakage to IS in each query. The leakage to the index server is a little more than that
to the client. In particular, the nodes in the faked paths that the client generates due to
one-case indistinguishability are added to the tree search pattern, let’s denote this leakage
as iSearchPattern. Also, the topology of the query circuit topo(q) and of the policy circuit
topo(p) is leaked to IS as well. Finally, the BF indices (H(q)) are also revealed to IS
(although not the BF content), but assuming that the hash functions are random, those
indices reveal little information about the query. However, based on this, after observing
multiple queries, IS can infer some correlations a C’s queries’ keywords.
Simulating Preprocessing. After receiving the number of documents n and the length
of the documents len as leakage, S runs the adversary A. Simulating the server, S generates
a key pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(λ). For i ∈ [n] S samples si, then it encrypts si under pk (s̃i),
and finaly encrypts a dummy record as R̃i ← Encsi(0len). S gives (pk, {s̃iR̃i, }) to A. Then
it receives {s̃′i} from the adversary. To build the masked Bloom filter tree, he simulator
samples a key k for a pseudorandom function F and for each node v for the tree construct
the ”Bloom” filter as B̃v = G(Fk(v)), where G is a pseudorandom generator. S sends the
Bloom filter tree to A.
Simulating Search. Run the adversart A providing it with H(q). A and S traverse the
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search tree starting at the root. For each node v the S simulates Yao’s protocol as if it was
the client. If node v belongs to iSearchPattern, then S tell A that evaluation was successful,
and they visit the node’s children (if node was a leaf, S ask A to provide the encrypted
record and decryption information). Otherwise, S tell A that evaluation was unsuccessful.
4.5.2 Discussion
Leakage to the server. We could wholly remove the leakage to the server by modifying
the protocol as follows:
Remove the decryption key preparation (and blinded keys) in the preprocessing;
instead, the client receives the secret key sk from the server. The client (as the
receiver) and the index server (as the sender) execute oblivious transfer at each
leaf of the search tree. The choice bit of the client is whether the output of the
query circuit is success. The two messages of the index server is the encrypted
record and a string of zeros.
However, we believe that it is important for the server to be able to upper-bound the
number of retrieved records. Without such control, misconfiguration on the query checker
side may allow overly general queries to be executed, causing too many rows to be returned
to the client; in contrast, in our approach, S releases record decryption keys at the end,
and therefore it is easy to enforce the sanity check of the total number of returned records.
Moreover, if S has a commercial DB, it may be convenient to implement payment mechanism
in association with key release by S.
OR queries. For OR queries passing the policy, our system leaks extremely small infor-
mation. In particular, the leakage to the client is minimal, as the tree traversal pattern
can be reconstructed from the returned records. As a consequence, if the client retrieves
only document ids, the client learns nothing about the results for individual terms in his
query. The leakage to the index server is similar. We believe that the topology of the SQL
formula and the policy circuit reveals small information about the query and the policy. If
desired, we can even hide those information using universal circuits [KS08b] with a circuit
size blow-up of a logarithmic multiplicative factor.
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AND queries. For AND queries, the tree traversal pattern consists of two kinds of paths.
The first are, of course, the paths reaching the leaves (query results). The second stop at
some internal nodes due to our BF approach3; although the leakage from this pattern
reveals more information about which node don’t contain a given keyword, we still believe
this leakage is acceptable in many use cases.
We stress that the second leakage is related to the fact that a large linear running time
seems to be inherent for some AND queries, irrespective of privacy, but depending only on
the underlying database (see Section 4.7.3 for more detail). Therefore, if we aim at running
most AND queries in sublinear time, the running time will inherently leak information on
the underlying DB.
4.6 Implementation
We built a prototype of the proposed system to evaluate its practicality in terms of per-
formance. The prototype was developed from scratch in C++ (a more than a year effort,
almost two years including designing) and consists of about 10KLOC. In this section, we
describe several interesting parts of the implementation that are mostly related to the scal-
ability of the system.
Crypto building blocks. We developed custom implementations for the cryptographic
building blocks described in the preceding sections. More specifically, we used the GNU
Multiple Precision (GMP) library to implement oblivious transfers, garbled circuits and the
semi-homomorphic key management protocol. The choice of GMP was mostly based on
thread-safety. As for AES-based PRF, we used the OpenSSL implementation because it
takes advantage of the AES-NI hardware instructions, thus delivering better performance.
Parallelization. The implementation of Blind Seer supports parallel preprocessing and
per-query threading when searching. For all the multi-threading features we used Intel’s
3 For example, consider a query q that looks for two keywords, say, q = α ∧ β. Let v be some node and
c1, . . . , cb be the children of v in the search tree. If c1 contains only α, and c2 contains only β, then v will
contain both α and β, and so the node v will pass the query; however, neither c1 nor c2 would.
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Threading Building Blocks (TBB) library. To enable multi-threaded execution of the pre-
processing phase we created a 3-stage pipeline. The first stage is single-threaded and it
is responsible for reading the input data. The second stage handles record preprocessing.
This stage is executed in parallel by a pool of threads. Finally, the last stage is again
single-threaded and is responsible for handling the encrypted records. Concurrently sup-
porting multiple queries was straightforward as all the data structures are read-only. To
avoid accessing the Bloom filter tree while it is being updated by a modification command,
we added a global writer lock (which does not block reads). Since we only currently support
parallelization on a one-thread-per-query basis, it only benefits query throughput, not la-
tency. However, long-running queries involve a large amount of interaction between querier
and server that is independent and thus amenable to parallelization. The improvement we
see in throughput is a good indicator for how much we could improve latency of slow queries
by applying parallelization to these interactions.
Bloom filter tree. This is the main index structure of our system which grows by the
number of records and the supported features (e.g., range). For this reason, the space
efficiency of the Bloom filter tree is directly related to the scalability of the system. In the
current version of our system we have implemented two space optimizations: one on the
representation of the tree and another on the size of Bloom filter in each tree node.
Firstly, we avoided storing pointers for the tree representation, which would result in
wasting almost 1G of memory for 100M records. This is achieved by using a flat array with
fixed size allocations per record.
Secondly, we observed that naively calculating the number of items stored in the inner
nodes by summing the items of their children is inefficient. For example, consider the case of
storing the ‘Sex’ field in the database, which has only two possible values. Each Bloom filter
in the bottom layer of the tree (leaves) will store either the value sex:male or sex:female.
However, their parent nodes will keep space for 10 items, although the Sex field can have
only two possible values. Thus, we estimate the number of items that need to be stored
in a given level as the minimum between the cardinality of the field and the number of
leaf-nodes of the current subtree. This optimization alone reduced the total space of the
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tree by more than 50% for the database we used in our evaluation.
4.6.1 Additional Search functionality
Keyword search and stemming. Although we focus on supporting database search on
structured data, our underlying system works with collections of keywords. Thus, it can
trivially handle other forms of data, like keyword search over text documents, or even key-
word search on text fields of a database. We actually do support the latter – in our system we
provide this functionality using the special operator CONTAINED IN(column, keyword). Also,
we support stemming over keyword search by using the Porter stemming algorithm [ste].
In addition to our performance and security improvements, we have extended the func-
tionality of Blind Seer to support additional types of queries.
M-of-N queries. An M-of-N threshold query contains N clauses, and returns true if and
only if at least M of the clauses return true. To support threshold queries, we construct
query circuits for each individual clause, and use a Boolean counting circuit to count the
number of positive results. The counting circuit is implemented by chaining full adders to
compute each digit of a binary representation of the sum. Finally, the result is compared
to M with a simple comparison circuit.
Ranking M-of-N queries. In addition to supporting M-of-N queries, we can return
results to the querier ordered by the number of clauses they satisfy. The circuit construction
for this is the same as for normal M-of-N queries. However, instead of receiving only the
final bit of the comparison circuit from the garbled circuit evaluation, the querier receives
all of the bits from the counting circuit output.
Ultimately, we can sort all record results by rank on the querier’s side. However, we
also would like to reach higher ranking results more quickly. For instance, in a query with
many low ranking results, it would be advantageous for the querier to see the high ranking
results quickly.
To accomplish this, we use a priority queue seeded both by the depth of the node and
the value from the counting circuit during tree traversal. We thus do a depth-first search
favoring those branches with large amounts of matching clauses early on.
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This a heuristic, it is not guaranteed to reach the best results first; even if a parent node
has a high number of matching clauses, it is not necessarily true that its individual children
are a high match. However, in the common case, the method can allow us to return high
ranking results quickly.
Nearness queries. Another type of query we support is a proximity query, which takes
two terms in a text segment along with a range r, and returns all records for which the two
terms coincide within a window of r words.
This is not straightforward to do with a Bloom Filter representation of terms that does
not store term locations. As such, we are only able to do this efficiently for values of r that
are known during preprocessing. We can then add into the Bloom Filter all term pairs that
fit within that range. The nearness query becomes a simple check against the Bloom Filter
for the appropriate term.
4.7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our system. We first evaluate our system as a comparison with
MySQL as a baseline, to establish what the performance cost of providing private search is.
We then generalize the performance expectations of our system by performing a theoretical
analysis based on the type of queries.
Dataset. The dataset we used in all of our tests for the first part of the evaluation is
a generated dataset using learned probability distributions from the US census data and
text excerpts from “The Call of the Wild”, by Jack London. Each record in our generated
database contains personal information generated with similar distributions to the census.
It also contains a globally unique ID, four fields of random text excerpts ranging from
10 − 2000 bytes from “The Call of the Wild”, and a “fingerprint” payload of random data
ranging from 50000 to 90000 bytes. The payload is neither searchable nor compressible, and
is included to emulate reasonable data transfer costs for real-world database applications.
The census data fields are used to enable various types of single-term queries such as term
matching and range queries, and the text excerpts for keyword search queries.








































Figure 4.5: Comparison with MySQL for single-term queries that have a single result (first
four bar groups) and 2 to 10 results (last four bar groups). The search terms are either
strings (str) or integers (int) and the returned result is either the id or the whole record
(star).
Testbed. The tests were run on a four-computer testbed that Lincoln Labs set up and
programmed for the purpose of testing our system and comparing it to MySQL. Each
server was configured with two Intel Xeon 2.66 Ghz X5650 processors, 96GB RAM (12x8
GB, 1066 MHz, Dual Ranked LV RDIMMs), and an embedded Broadcom 1GB Ethernet
NICS with TOE. Two servers were equipped with a 50TB RAID5 array, and one with a
20TB array. These were used to run the owner and index server. MySQL was configured
to build separate indices for each field. DB queries were not known in advance for MySQL
or for our system.
4.7.1 Querying Performance
Single term queries with a small result set. Figure 4.5 shows a comparison of single
term queries against MySQL. We expect the run time for both our system and MySQL to
depend primarily on the number of results returned. The first four pairs show average and
standard deviation for query time on queries with exactly one result in the entire database,
and the latter four for queries with a few (2-10) results. Queries are further grouped into
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Number of results






















Figure 4.6: Comparison of the scaling factor with respect to the result set size, using single-
term queries. Both MySQL and Blind Seer scale linearly, however, Blind Seer’s constant
factor is 15× worse (mostly due to increased network communication).
those which are run on integer fields (int) and string fields (str), and those which return
only record ids (id) and those which return full record content (star). For each group, we
executed 200 different queries to avoid caching effects in MySQL.
As we can see, for single result set queries, our system is very consistent. Unlike with
MySQL, the type of query has no effect on performance, since all types are stored and
queried the same way in the underlying Bloom filter representation. Also, the average time
is dominated by the average number of results, which is slightly larger for integer terms.
Unexpectedly, there is also no performance difference for returning record ids versus full
records. This is likely because for a single record, the performance is dominated by other
factors like circuit evaluation, tree traversal and key handling, rather than record transfer
time. Overall, aside from some bad-case scenarios, we are generally less than 2× slower.
Variation in performance of our system is much larger when returning a few results.
This is because the amount of tree traversal that occurs depends on how much branching
must occur. This differs from single result set queries, where each tree traversal is a single
path. With the larger result sets, we can also begin to see increased query time for full
records as opposed to record ids, although it remains a small portion of the overall run
time.
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Figure 4.7: Boolean queries having a few results (< 10). The first three are two-term AND
queries where one of the terms has a single result and the other varies from 1 to 10K results.
The fourth group includes monotonic DNF queries with 4-9 terms, the last includes 5-term
DNF queries with negations.
Scaling with result set size. Figure 4.6 expands on both systems’ performance scaling
with the number of results returned. This experiment is also run with single term queries,
but on a larger range of return result set sizes. As one would expect, the growth is fairly
linear for both systems, although our constant factor is almost 15× worse. This indicates
that for queries with a small result set, the run time is dominated by additive constant
factors like connection setup for which we are not much slower than MySQL. However,
the multiplicative constant factors involved in our interactive protocol are much larger,
and grow to dominate run time for longer running queries. This overhead is mostly due
to increased network communication because of the interactiveness of the search protocol.
Although this is inherent, we believe that there is room for implementation optimizations
that could lower this constant factor.
Boolean queries. Figure 4.7 shows our performance on various Boolean queries. The
first three groups show average query time for 2-term AND queries. In each case, one
term occurs only once in the database, resulting in the overall Boolean AND having only
one match in the database. However, the second term increases up to 10000 results in the
database. As we can see, our query performance does not suffer; as long as at least one term
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in a Boolean is infrequent we will perform well. The next two groups are more complex
Boolean queries issued in disjunctive normal form, the latter including negations. The first
one includes queries with 4-9 terms, and the second one, with 5 terms. These incur a larger
cost, as the number of a results is larger and possibly a bigger part of the tree is explored.
As we can see, MySQL incurs a proportionally similar cost.
We note that the relatively large variation shown in the graph is due to the different
queries used in our test. Variation is much smaller when we run the same query multiple
times.
Parallelization. We have implemented a basic form of parallelization in our system,
which enables it to execute multiple queries concurrently. As there are no critical sec-
tions or concurrent modifications of shared data structures during querying, we saw the
expected linear speedup when issuing many queries up to a point where the CPU might
not be the bottleneck anymore. In our 16-core system, we achieved approximately factor
6x improvement due to this crude parallelization.
Discussion. We note several observations on our system, performance, bottlenecks, etc.
Firstly, we note that our experiments are run on a fast local network. A natural
question is how this would be translated into the higher-latency lower bandwidth setting.
Firstly, there will be performance degradation proportional to bandwidth reduction, with
the following exception. We could use the slightly more computationally-expensive, but
much less communication intensive GESS protocol of [Kol05] or its recent extension sliced-
GESS [KK12], instead of Yao’s GC. In reduced-bandwidth settings, where bandwidth is the
bottleneck, sliced-GESS is about 3x more efficient than most efficient Yao’s GC. Further,
we can easily scale up parallelization factor to mitigate latency increases. Looking at this
in a contrapositive manner, improving network bandwidth and latency would make CPU
the bottleneck.
All search structures in our system are RAM-resident. Only the record payloads are
stored on disk. Thus, disk should not be a bottleneck in natural scenarios.
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4.7.2 Other Operations
Although querying is the main operation of our system, we also include some results of other
operations. First, we start with the performance of the setup phase (preprocessing). Blind
Seer took roughly two days to index and encrypt the 10TB data. As mentioned before, this
phase is executed in parallel and is computationally efficient enough to be IO-bounded in
our testbed. We note that the corresponding setup of MySQL took even longer.
Also, we performed several measurements for the supported modification commands:
insert, update and delete. All of them execute in constant time in the order of a few
hundred microseconds. The more expensive part though is the periodic re-indexing of the
data that merges the temporary Bloom filter list in the tree (see Section 4.4.3). In our
current prototype, we estimated this procedure to take around 17 minutes, while avoiding
re-reading the entire database. This can be achieved by letting the server store some
intermediate indexing data during the initial setup and reusing it later when constructing
the Bloom filter tree.
4.7.3 Theoretical Performance Analysis
In this section, we discuss the system performance for various queries by analyzing the
number of visited nodes in the search tree. Let α1, . . . , αk be k single term queries, and for
each i ∈ [k], let ri be the number of returned records for the query αi, and n be the total
number of records.
OR queries. Our system shows great performance with OR queries. In particular, con-
sider a query α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αk. The number of visited nodes in the search tree is at most
r log10 n, where r = r1 + . . .+ rk is the number of returned records. Therefore, performance
scales with the size of the result set, just like single term queries.
AND queries. The performance depends on the best constituent term. For the AND
query α1∧· · ·∧αk, the number of visited nodes in the search tree is at most min(r1, . . . , rk) ·
log10 n. Note that the actual number of returned records may be much smaller than ris. In
the worst case, it may even be 0; consider a database where a half of the records contain α
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(but not β) and the other half β (but not α). The running time for the query α∧ β in this
case will probably be linear in n. However, we stress that this seems to be inherent, even
without any security. Indeed, without setting up an index for conjunctions, every algorithm
currently known runs in linear time to process this query.
This can be partially addressed by setting up an index, in our case by using a BF.
For example, for AND queries on two columns, for each record with value a for column A,
and value b for column B, the following keywords are added: A:a, B:b, AB:a.b. With this
approach, the indexed AND queries become equivalent to single term queries. However, this
cannot be fully generalized, as space grows exponentially in the number of search columns.
Complex queries. The performance of CNF queries can be analyzed by viewing them
as AND queries where each disjunct (i.e, OR query) is treated as a single term query. In
general, any other complex Boolean query can be converted to CNF and then analyzed in
a similar manner. In other words, performance scales with the number of results returned
by the best disjunct when the query is represented in CNF. Note that we do not actually
need to convert our queries to this form (nor know anything about the data, in particular,
which are high- or low-entropy terms) in order to achieve this performance (this aspect is
even better than MySQL).
Computation and Communication. Both computational and communication resources
required for our protocol are proportional to the query complexities described above.
False Positives. As our system is built on Bloom filters, false positives are possible.
In our experiments, we set each BF false positive rate to 10−6. Assuming the worst-case
scenario for us, where the DB is such that many of the search paths do reach and query the
BFs at the leaves, this gives 10−6 false positive probability for each term of the query. Of
course, the false positive is a tunable parameter of our system.
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4.8 Discussion
Semi-honest model. Semi-honest model is often reasonable in practice, especially in the
Government use scenarios. For example, C, S and ISmay be Government agencies, whose
systems are verified and trusted to execute the prescribed code. Further, regular audits will
help enforce semi-honest behavior.
Security against malicious adversaries can be added by standard techniques, but this
results in impractical performance. In Chapter 5 we show how to amend our protocols to
protect against a malicious clients at a very small cost. This is possible mainly because the
underlying GC protocols are already secure against malicious evaluator.
Impact of the allowed leakage. Formally pinning down exact privacy loss is beyond the
reach of state-of-the-art cryptography, even with no leakage beyond the output and amount
of work (the field of differential privacy is working on this problem, with very moderate
success). Therefore, understanding our leakage and its impact for specific applications
is crucial to ascertain whether it’s acceptable. We informally investigated the impact of
leakage in several natural applications, such as population DBs and call-record DBs and
query patterns (see example below); we believe that our protection is insufficient in some
scenarios, while in many others it provides strong guarantees.
Rough leakage estimation for call-records DB. Consider a call-records DB, including columns
(Phone number, Callee phone number, time of call). The client C is allowed to only
ask queries of the form select * where phone number = xxx AND callee phone number
= yyy AND time of call ∈ {interval}.
For typical call patterns (e.g.,0-10 calls/person/day), the query leakage will almost al-
ways constitute a tree with branches either going to the leafs (returned records) or truncated
one or two levels from the root. We believe that for many purposes this is acceptable leak-
age. Again, we stress that this is not a formal or detailed analysis (which is beyond the
reach of today’s state-of-the-art); it is included here to argue that Blind Seer gives good
privacy protection in many reasonable scenarios.
Reliance on the third party. While a two-party solution is of course preferable, these
state-of-the-art solutions are orders of magnitude slower than what is required for scalable
DB access. Probably the most reasonable approach would be to use ORAM, which is set up
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either by a trusted party or as a (very expensive) 2-PC between data owner and the querier.
Then the querier can query the ORAM held by the data owner. Due to privacy requirements,
each ORAM step must be done over encrypted data, which triggers performance that is
clearly unacceptable for the scale required in our application. We study this approach in
Chapter 6.
Further, in Government use cases, employing third party is often seen as reasonable.
For example, such a player can be run by a neutral agency. We emphasize that the third
party is not trusted with the data or queries, but is trusted not to share information with
the other parties.
4.9 Conclusion
Guaranteeing complete search privacy for both the client and the server is expensive with
today’s state of the art. However, a weaker level of privacy is often acceptable in practice,
especially as a trade-off for much greater efficiency. We designed, proved secure, built
and evaluated a private DBMS, named Blind Seer, capable of scaling to tens of TB’s of
data. This breakthrough performance is achieved at the expense of leaking search tree
traversal information to the players. Our performance evaluation results clearly demonstrate
the practicality of our system, especially on queries that return a few results where the
performance overhead over plaintext MySQL was from just 1.2× to 3× slowdown.
We introduced a policy checking mechanism over the queries as an extra feature of our
system. In real-life scenarios such a property is of great importance, and often mandatory
(otherwise a client can download the entire database by sending a sinfle SELECT * query, for
example). However, its security relies on semi-honest client behaviour. A malicious client
can easily circumvent the mechanism by providing different queries for the tree traversal
and for the policy procedures. We believe that this drawback is of great importance. In
the next chapter we show how to modify the Blind Seer system to enforce security against
a malicious client at virtually no cost.
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Chapter 5
Malicious Client Security on Blind
Seer
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we introduced Blind Seer; a highly practical, sublinear, and privacy
protected DB querying, with provable security with respect to a controlled amount of infor-
mation leakage (e.g., search patterns across multiple queries). OSPIR-OXT [JJK+13](see
Section 4.1.2) is another highly efficient private DBMS that was concurrently developted
with Blind Seer. No other system has been proposed that achieve the level of efficiency,
functionality and privacy of Blind Seer and OSPIR-OXT. These two systems offer varying
features and relative advantages, making each system better suited for different application
scenarios. In terms of privacy, the Blind Seer system offers stronger guarantees in that it is
formally ensured that the individual terms of the query formula are privacy-protected. (In
contrast, OSPIR-OXT leaks support sizes of the disjunctive formula terms.)
However, a major disadvantage of Blind Seer as compared to OSPIR-OXT is that it
is only secure against semi-honest clients, namely clients who honestly follow the protocol
specification. Even standard DBMS systems with no client privacy generally have robust
access control, which Blind Seer does not provide against actively cheating clients. In
fact, a very simple and undetectable deviation from the protocol enables a client to easily
circumvent all access control in Blind Seer. This failure to meet a standard requirement
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and a common feature of database systems severely limits Blind Seer’s viability and scope
for practical deployment.
The goal of this Chapter is to lifting the Blind Seer protocol into the malicious setting.
Achieving security against malicious players can be achived by using standard techniques;
however, these are very expensive. For example, the cut-and-choose approach to malicious
MPC (cf. [MF06; LP07; Lin13]) carries the cost of at least 128-fold performance degradation
for 2−128 security. These costs can be made somewhat better using very recent amortized
garbled circuit techniques [HKK+14; LR14]. Still, state-of-the-art generic or specialized
techniques result in order(s) of magnitude cost overhead.
The main result presented in this Chapter is, surprisingly, that security against a mali-
cous client in Blind Seer can be obtained for free. That is, we show how to protect against
a malicious client at virtually no additional performance cost, as well as no privacy or
functionality degradation.
Our result applies not only to Blind Seer, but also to any setting where a potentially
malicious party needs to evaluate a private function on a semi-honest party’s private inputs.
When both parties are semi-honest (or at least the party holding the private function is semi-
honest), the Yao Garbled Circuits (Yao GC) protocol is a practical method that entirely
preserves the privacy of the inputs and reveals no more than the private function’s circuit
topology. While it is well-known how to achieve this functionality (or even stronger privacy)
for malicious players using general and expensive techniques, our technique is as efficient
and achieves the same level of privacy as Yao GC.
We still assume that the server in our setting is semi-honest. In many natural applica-
tions, both in business and government, the trust in the server (e.g., Bank) is much higher
than in the client. This is often because the server is operated by a business or an agency,
and would risk a high legal penalty for actively compromising the privacy of a client. (Note,
however, that we do not trust the server with private information).
5.1.1 Contributions
− Malicious-client security in Blind Seer: We present the first design and imple-
mentation of a DBMS that features both fully robust access control and private arbitrary
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boolean querying, with performance about 2-3 times slower than (insecure and non-private)
MySQL. The access control mechanism is highly expressive, and can implement any policy
dependent on the client’s query.
− Novel SPF-SFE technique: We give an extremely simple and efficient protocol for a
semi-private function secure function evaluation which allows for secure function evaluation
of any private function of known circuit topology that is held by the party who will receive
the output.
− Formal proofs: We formally prove security against arbitrary malicious behavior of
the client. We note that full cryptographic proofs are unusual for large systems such as
ours. Our other privacy features and leakage profiles remain nearly the same as those of
the original Chapter 4 Blind Seer.
− Implementation and Performance: We implement the design of malicious-client
secure Blind Seer. We compare the performances of the new design, the original Blind Seer
design, and MySQL. We also demonstrate a greatly improved performance by implementing
batching and parallelization within query processing. Since the original design did not
support multi-threading, we ran the new system on a single thread when collecting the
comparison data. When running our system with 16 threads on a 10TB, 100M-record DB,
typical queries run in time comparable to MySQL, or up to only 3 times slower. This
is more than a 5-fold improvement over the single threaded Blind Seer (while security is
significantly better).
5.2 Overview
This section provides an overview of our solution for achieving malicious-client security in
Blind Seer. We will review the basic architecture of Blind Seer, point out how its design was
vulnerable to malicious-client cheating, and then describe how we address that vulnerability.
Preliminaries We use Bloom filters (BF), semantically secure encryption (both public
key and symmetric key), Yao Garbled Circuits (GC), and Oblivious Transfer (OT). All
these standard cryptographic primitives are described in Chapter 2.
We use Yao GC to achieve secure computation, also called secure function evaluation
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(SFE), which intuitively means that the two-party function is computed so that each of the
parties learns no information except what follows from their own inputs and outputs. One
may also consider Private Function SFE (PF-SFE), where in addition the function that
is being computed is itself the input of one of the parties, and remains hidden from the
other party. A generalization of this is Semi-Private Function SFE (SPF-SFE), where the
function is known to belong to some class of functions, but beyond that remains hidden.
Here, we will consider SPF-SFE where the function is known to have a certain topology.
Explicitly, the structure of the gates in the circuit describing the function is known, but the
operation of each gate (e.g., OR or AND) remains hidden. (See more details in Section 5.3).
Yao GC is an example of a protocol that achieves this property. Yao GC involves one party
sending a “garbled circuit” to the other, and while the technique was not designed to hide
the function, it turns out to hide the values of the gates.
In our setting, OT preprocessing [Bea95] and OT extension [IKNP03] dramatically im-
prove performance. We use the Naor-Pinkas protocol [NP01] for the “base” OTs that seed
OT extension. We then use a version of the IKNP protocol for OT extension suggested by
Nielsen [Nie07] that is robust against a malicious receiver with small additional cost.
Blind Seer’s Design and Vulnerabilities
We review here the basic features of the Blind Seer DBMS. We refer the reader to Chapter 4
for details, as well as discussion and motivation for the setting and design choices (some of
which are also discussed in [CJJ+13; JJK+13]). However, we stress that further details of
the Blind Seer design beyond what is described here and in Section 5.4 are not necessary for
understanding the malicious-client vulnerability of the original design and the contributions
of the present chapter.
Participants. The Blind Seer system consists of three main parties: a server S, a client
C, and a third party server called the index server IS. The server S owns a database DB.
The client C submits queries and retrieves records satisfying those queries. IS holds an
encryption of DB as well as an encrypted index to DB, and facilitates the private and
efficient evaluation of the client’s queries (without learning either the query or the data).
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A fourth logical entity, called the query checker QC, is responsible for enforcing policy
restrictions on the client’s queries. For instance, a policy restriction might prohibit queries
that ask for records associated with an important political figure. QC may be run by the
server S or index server IS, but we will view it as a separate logical entity for sake of
generality. This way, we also demonstrate that we can keep the policy hidden from S and
IS in addition to the client C. As long as the separate parties do not collude, C only learns
the results of queries that pass the policy, C’s query is kept private from all other parties,
the policy is kept private from C, and the results of the policy check are unknown to any
party.
Architecture. The basic architecture of Blind Seer is depicted in Figure 4.1, Chapter 4.
The server S, who holds the DB, will hand an encrypted copy of the DB to the third party
server IS. In addition, S builds an encrypted Bloom filter (BF) tree index to the DB and
sends it to IS.
The BF tree index is constructed as follows. The records of the DB are randomly
permuted, and a b-ary tree is initialized with a one-to-one correspondence of tree leaves to
records in the DB. A BF is placed at every node in the tree. Each leaf-node BF holds all
the (indexed) keywords of its corresponding DB record. Each internal-node BF contains
the union of all the keywords inserted into its children BFs. Keywords are inserted into a
BF using k cryptographic hash functions. Finally, each BF in the tree is encrypted with a
one time pad generated from a keyed pseudorandom function, which (via the PRF key) is
given to the client C.
The client evaluates all its queries with IS only. A query is expressed as a boolean
formula over keyword terms (e.g., fname:Jeffery ∧ lname:Smith). Each keyword terms
tests the presence of a keyword in a Bloom filter, and so expands into a conjunction of k
predicates, each testing a single bit in the input BF. The query is interactively evaluated
on each node down the BF tree. The query processing proceeds to children nodes only if
it returns true on their parent node. When a query returns true on a leaf-node BF, the
associated record is returned to the client. A Yao garbled circuit protocol variant is used to
evaluate the query at each BF node. To avoid garbling a circuit that takes an entire Bloom
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filter as input, C reveals to IS the relevant BF indices that the query circuit examines (k for
each individual keyword term). Note that IS does not know the value of the BF at those
indices because the BF is encrypted.
QC and C also separately engage in a computation of the policy circuit via the Yao GC
technique, and with the help of IS. Specifically, C chooses key pairs for the input and output
wires of the policy circuit, sends these pairs to QC, and sends only the keys corresponding
to its query input to IS. In turn, QC garbles the secret policy circuit using the client’s key
pairs, and sends this garbled circuit to IS for oblivious evaluation on the client’s inputs.
The output of the policy circuit is integrated into the query circuit evaluation so that C
learns only the AND of the two circuit outputs.
Finally, if the query evaluation (and policy approval) on any leaf record outputs suc-
cess, IS sends the record and decryption information to C. C obtains any final decryption
information from S.
Privacy and Leakage. Ideally, the client C would learn nothing except the result sets
of its authorized queries, and the servers S and IS (as well as the query checker QC) would
learn nothing at all. Blind Seer achieves privacy up to a controlled amount of leakage of
search patterns. IS may correlate repeated queries, and both C and IS may observe traversal
patterns through the tree index across multiple queries, possibly obtaining some correlation
information between different queries. Additionally, since Yao’s GC technique is used, IS
does learn certain structural information about C’s query and QC’s policy, namely their
circuit topologies. However, the individual search terms (i.e., keywords) and logical gates
are hidden (as Yao GC provides SPF-SFE, leaking only the circuit’s topology).
The privacy guarantees of Blind Seer have been formally proven with respect to semi-
honest adversaries using the simulation paradigm. Semi-honest adversaries will not deviate
from the prescribed protocol, but may attempt to learn arbitrary information from their
view of the protocol. The controlled leakage was formally captured by including a leakage
oracle in the ideal world functionality definition.
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Malicious-Client Vulnerabilities in Blind Seer
The Blind Seer policy enforcement collapses with a malicious client because there is no
mechanism for evaluating an authorization policy directly on the client’s private query.
The client submits one query (represented as a garbled circuit) to be evaluated privately
in the DB search protocol, and a second query (represented as input wires to the policy
circuit) to be evaluated privately in the authorization policy protocol. An honest client
will submit the same query to both protocols, but a malicious client could submit entirely
separate query inputs to the search protocol and policy protocol, making the access control
mechanism completely ineffective. Crucially, there is no risk of detection for C.
The Solution
Our solution simultaneously cryptographically binds the client’s inputs to both the query
evaluation and policy check circuits, and encrypts the DB record results under a key that can
only be obtained when both the outputs of the query and the policy are positive. Of course,
this could be accomplished using any number of off-the-shelf expensive techniques, such as
zero-knowledge or fully malicious-secure SFE, but our goal is to maintain the efficiency of
Blind Seer.
Blind Seer uses Yao Garbled Circuits (GC) in both the search protocol and the policy
protocol. In the Yao GC protocol, the two parties are distinguished as generator and
evaluator. The generator selects the function to evaluate and “garbles” the function. The
evaluator is able to obliviously evaluate the garbled function using both his own inputs and
secret inputs that the generator supplies. While Yao GC satisfies only semi-honest security
against the generator, it offers malicious security against the evaluator. Furthermore, Yao’s
GC is a special case of SPF-SFE in that it leaks only the boolean circuit topology (i.e.,
structure) of the function to the evaluator. The garbled circuit generator can even choose
to cryptographically bind any of the evaluator’s inputs by synchronizing the decryption key
pairs on the corresponding input wires. The evaluator receives only one of the two keys
through a single oblivious transfer, and is forced to reuse the same key for both wires.
The difficulty in using standard Yao GC to achieve malicious-client security in Blind
Seer arises since the client is the generator, rather than the evaluator, of the query circuit
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in the search protocol.
The crux of our solution is a low-cost way of converting the client’s query from a
circuit to a circuit input, thereby swapping the role of the client from generator to evaluator.
There are several challenges that we need to overcome in order to achieve this without
sacrificing either efficiency or privacy:
1. How does IS play the role of garbled circuit generator without knowing the query
circuit (that should remain hidden from IS)?
2. How do we link inputs to the query and policy that are related but formatted dif-
ferently? For instance, where the query circuit takes a keyword field : value, the
policy circuit might take only the field name field.
3. Recall how each DB index Bloom filter is encrypted with a randomly generated one-
time pad. C and IS receive random shares of each BF from S, and both parties submit
these bits as inputs to the query circuit. How do we prevent a cheating client from
faking positive query results by flipping some of its BF input bits?
Universal query circuit. IS can play the role of generator in the query evaluation pro-
tocol without knowing the query by using a universal circuit. A universal circuit UCF is a
well-known construction that can simulate any circuit C in the family F . Specifically, it is
a circuit that will take as input the description of any circuit C ∈ F , any input x, and will
output C(x). There are many constructions of universal circuits UCk that can simulate any
circuit of size k [Val76; KS08b]. This is a very powerful tool for PF-SFE since it can be used
to hide everything about the private function except its size. Indeed, a universal circuit
provides exactly what we need in terms of swapping the role of the circuit generator to be
input provider, while maintaining circuit privacy. Unfortunately, however, constructing a
general universal circuit UCk results in a significant increase in circuit size, and thus a very
high overhead in performance when evaluating it through the Yao GC technique.
Instead, we take advantage of the fact that we do not need full function privacy for
PF-SFE, since the topology of the circuit is already leaked to the IS even in the previous
solution. We construct a much simpler universal circuit UCT that simulates any monotone
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circuit with topology T , with virtually no overhead in its secure computation. We stress
that considering only monotone circuits is not a limitation, since Blind Seer’s tree traversal
(and any natural DB tree index traversal, for that matter) only works for monotone query
circuits (i.e., containing only AND and OR gates) over keyword terms, where negations are
pushed to the variable level (something which can always be done efficiently). Also note
that the keyword terms are computed by conjunctions of k XOR gates, each taking one
input from each party. However, since these circuits computing the keyword terms are fixed
and known to both parties, they are not included in the universal query circuit.
Our construction of UCT from T increases the number of gates by a factor two, but
the extra gates are all XOR gates. Thus, when using the free-XOR technique [KS08a], the
cost of securely computing UCT with Yao GC has practically the same cost as securely
computing any monotone circuit C with topology T .
In our new protocol, C sends the topology of its query circuit Q to IS, and IS generates
the corresponding universal query circuit UQ. IS garbles UQ and sends it back to C for
evaluation. Note that sending the topology of Q does not increase leakage to IS because
running Yao GC directly on Q (with C as generator and IS as evaluator) also reveals its
topology.
Policy circuit. QC garbles a policy circuit PC and sends it to C for evaluation. The
circuit outputs a key that reveals no information on its own, but is used to evaluate a
garbled conjunction of the policy and query: UQ ∧ PC. The key difference from the
previous design mechanism is that C will not submit any separate input to QC. Instead,
the client commits to its query only once, and receives from IS all the keys it needs to
evaluate both UQ and PC.
QC and IS exchange information on the keys used in the garbling of UQ and PC in
order to synchronize the keys used for common inputs to both circuits and so that IS can
respond to the client’s query with the appropriate keys. The new protocol also requires C
to separately submit cryptographic hashes of all the field names and keywords used in its
query. Keywords are inserted into the Bloom filter index in a way that binds each keyword
hash to its corresponding field hash.
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Figure 5.1: Malicious-client secure protocol overview.
While the query circuit must be evaluated on every BF node encountered during the
index tree traversal, it is only necessary to evaluate PC once per query. The only inputs to
UQ that change as the BF node changes are the BF input bits to the keyword terms. The
policy circuit is a fixed function of the query, and its output should be unaffected by the
BF input. Thus, as long as the same query is executed on every node of the BF tree, the
PC input should remain the same at every node. By reusing the same keys for all invariant
inputs, we guarantee this property. Likewise, the PC is evaluated once, and its output key
can be reused for every subsequent query-policy conjunction gate.
QC does not learn anything about the query except its topology, which it uses for
constructing the policy circuit. We may also avoid this leakage at some cost of efficiency
by using universal circuits for the policy. In fact, since the policy circuit is only computed
once per query, its size is not a critical point for performance.
Supported policies. The system supports a rich class of policies. The policy can be any
function of the keywords, field names, and syntax (structure) of the query. An example of
such a policy is: any conjunctive query that includes the keyword lname = Obama cannot
include any keyword on the field income. While our design essentially supports any policy
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that is dependent on the query, it doesn’t support policies that might depend on the data
as well. For instance, we would not support a policy that prohibits queries that have fewer
than 20 matching records.
Bloom filter false positives. The final question posed was how to prevent C from faking
positive query results by flipping input bits from its BF shares. C’s share is a pseudorandom
mask, and reveals no information on which bits in the BF are 1 or 0. In order to fake positive
results, C must set k specific bits to 1. C can only do this by flipping bits, and it does not
know if any given bit is initially a 0 or a 1. By setting parameters appropriately, we can
choose a false positive rate (FPR) that makes these events equally likely. This way C only
succeeds in setting any given bit with probability 1/2.
DB security and policy privacy. For each leaf node reached in the tree traversal, IS
sends C a final garbled gate that computes the AND of the policy and universal query circuit
outputs. IS sends the record R associated with this leaf node to C, but encrypted under the
output key out1R of this final gate. Concretely, C needs to obtain the 1-key output of both
the garbled PC and UQ in order to obtain out1R and decrypt the record received.
While policy failure prevents the client from feasibly obtaining any records of the
database, the tree traversal pattern still leaks partial information about the database. Alter-
natively, evaluating the conjunction of PC and UQ at the root of the search index prevents
such leakage, but arguably affords less privacy to the policy. In fact, the policy conjunction
can be evaluated anywhere inside the tree traversal, and this design decision is left open.
We formalize and prove security properties of the solution in Section 5.5. These proper-
ties are proved with respect to a malicious client adversary and a semi-honest index server
adversary. The definitions are general enough so that open ended design decisions do not
invalidate any of the proofs (e.g. where to evaluate the PC), and are intended to elucidate
the tradeoffs of such decisions.
Optimizations. To optimize performance, the universal query circuit protocol is only
run on leaf nodes of the Bloom filter tree index, where it matters the most. As a further
optimization, the policy circuit will only be evaluated once, and its output key will be reused
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for each leaf node.
5.3 Semi-Private Function Evaluation
Private Function Secure Function Evaluation (PF-SFE) is a two-party functionality in
which a private function known only to one party (the selector) is evaluated on private
inputs of both parties, and nothing but the outputs and function size is revealed. Semi-
private function SFE (SPF-SFE) [PSS09] is a generalization of PF-SFE in which the private
function is chosen from any restricted class of functions known to both parties.
Since Yao’s GC protocol reveals only the circuit topology to the evaluator, it can be
viewed as a special case of SPF-SFE, where both parties may learn the topology T of
the private function, but only the selector knows the identity of each gate in the circuit
(AND, OR, XOR, etc). This requires the function selector to be the garbled circuit generator.
Here, our goal is to construct such a protocol where the function selector is the garbled
circuit evaluator. While it is known that this (and even PF-SFE) can be accomplished
using universal circuits (UC), applying a general UC transformation would be expensive.
Instead, in this section we present a simple protocol which is as efficient as the standard Yao
GC protocol, as long as the circuit topology is monotone, with all negations pushed to the
input level (any circuit can be easily and efficiently converted to this form). To achieve this,
we capitalize on the fact that the topology T is known to both parties, and take advantage
of the free-XOR technique for Yao’s GC protocol.
UCT construction. First, a fan-in two (i.e. two wires per gate) circuit with topology
T is constructed out of universal gates, or “blank gates” that do not have any pre-defined
functionality. A third input wire is added to each universal gate, and represents the value
of the gate (either and or or). Equivalently, each universal gate is a function G(b, x, y) of
three bits so that G(0, x, y) = or(x, y), and G(1, x, y) = and(x, y). Next, each fan-in three
universal gate is replaced by the fan-in two cluster:
b⊕ ((x⊕ b) ∨ (y ⊕ b))
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Yao Semi-Private Function SFE with Selector As Evaluator
Party P1 selects a monotone boolean circuit C. P1 has input x and P2 has input y. The
topology T = topo(C) is known to both parties.
1. P2 constructs the universal circuit UCT and generates its corresponding garbled cir-
cuit ˜UCT according to the free-XOR GC protocol. P2 sends the tables of ˜UCT to P1
along with the keys corresponding to the input bits y.
2. P1 runs OT with P2 to receive the keys corresponding to its input bits x and its gate
value bits b.
3. P1 evaluates the garbled circuit ˜UCT and obtains the output.
Figure 5.2: Protocol for Yao SPF-SFE with Selector As Evaluator
Efficiency. Each gate of the original circuit is replaced with a cluster of 3 XOR gates and
1 OR gate. Thus, the number of non-XOR gates remains constant. The cost of applying
the free-XOR GC protocol to UCT is roughly the same as applying it to the original
circuit, since no communication and no expensive cryptographic hash function are needed
to generate/evaluate XOR gates.
Applications. The capabilities of the generator and evaluator in Yao GC are not sym-
metric, particularly when dealing with malicious adversaries. For instance, Protocol 5.2
is useful for repeated SPF-SFE, where the same private function is to be evaluated more
than once on different inputs, or possibly given as input to other functions. The selector
could cheat as the garbler by using different functions for each set of inputs. But when the
selector is the evaluator, the garbler can enforce consistency of the function. A special case
is the problem that we address in Blind Seer, where the private function (client’s query)
must be evaluated on the DB index and also supplied as input to the policy check. A second
capability of the generator is to encrypt a message under an output key from the garbled
circuit so that the evaluator can only decrypt the message contingent on the output of the
function.
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5.4 System Protocol
This section details our new system protocol for Blind Seer. We describe the protocol for a
single client C, a server S (data owner), and an index server IS. The outline of the protocol
is as follows:
Stage 1: Preprocessing. S encrypts the database, builds an encrypted Bloom filter
tree index, and sends these encrypted objects to IS.
Stage 2: Client queries. C builds a logical circuit Q representing its query, sends Q’s
topology to IS, together with hashes of all the field names and field values used in Q. IS
uses Q’s topology to construct a universal query circuit UQ (Section 5.2) equivalent to Q
with output keys outUQu , u ∈ {0, 1}.
Stage 3: Policy evaluation. The query checker QC generates and sends C a garbled
policy circuit (PC), C obtains the keys for evaluating PC from IS, and C computes the
output key of the policy evaluation outPCp , p ∈ {0, 1}.
Stage 4: Tree traversal. C and IS begin a multi-threaded traversal of the Bloom
filter tree index, evaluating the query Q on each node processed using Yao GC with C as
generator and IS as evaluator. Upon reaching a leaf node, the protocol proceeds to Stage 5.
Stage 5: Leaf (record) nodes. When a leaf node is reached, IS and C use the
universal circuit UQ constructed in Stage 2 and the SPF-SFE protocol (Protocol 3.1) to
evaluate Q on that node, and outputs outUQu , u ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, IS sends C a garbled
AND gate that takes outUQu and outPCp as input, and gives a final output key outu·p. IS sends
to C the encrypted record R̃ at this leaf node doubly encrypted as Encout1(R̃).
Stage 6: Record retrieval. When a query is successful in satisfying both UQ and
PC, C uses the output keys outUQ1 and out
PC
1 to obtain out1, and decrypts Encout1(R̃).
Finally, C uses the decryption keys obtained from the server S to decrypt R̃. Note that C
always asks for the decryption information from S and always receives an encrypted record
from IS, however, it only is able to successfully decrypt the record if both UQ and PC
evaluated to true.
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Stage 1: Preprocessing
Shuffle and Encrypt Records. Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a semantically secure homomor-
phic public key encryption, (Gen,Enc,Dec) a semantically secure symmetric key scheme.
S randomly permutes the database records, and encrypts each record Ri as:
(pk , sk)← Gen(1λ), si ← {0, 1}λ, s̃i ← Encpk (si), R̃i ← Encsi(Ri).
S sends (pk , {(s̃i, R̃i)}ni=1) to IS.
Generate Encrypted Index. S builds a balanced b-ary tree index T of Bloom filters.
Each leaf of the tree is associated with a unique database record, and a Bloom filter holding
all of that record’s indexed keywords. Each internal node filter Bv holds all of the keywords
of its children.
We introduce a subtle but significant change to the format of keyword insertions. For
the purpose of efficient policy checking, C will separately submit hashes of both the field
names and keywords in its query. In order to bind corresponding keyword hashes and field
hashes, S inserts the concatenation of these hashes into the Bloom filters.
Hash function generation. S chooses random keys kc, ks ← {0, 1}λ. S sends kc to C and
QC, and sends ks to IS. S then generates hash functions H = {hi : {0, 1}∗ → [ℓ]}ηi=1. S can
choose H1, H2 independently and set hi(x) = H1(x) + i · H2(x) [KM08]. (ℓ is chosen to
satisfy the desired false positive rate). We use the notation H(x) = {hi(x) : hi ∈ H}. Keyed
hashes are derived naturally as Hk(x) = H(k||x).
Inserting keywords. To insert the keyword field : value in a filter Bv of length ℓv:
• Derive the set I of BF index values by computing
I = Hks(Hkc(field)||Hkc(field : value))
• ∀i ∈ I, set Bv[i mod ℓv] = 1
BF mask: Let F denote a pseudorandom function (PRF). S chooses a new key key ← {0, 1}λ
for the PRF. Let T denote the BF tree. The filter Bv is masked as: B̃v := Bv ⊕ Fkey(v).
S sends {B̃v}v∈T to IS and (key,H, F ) to C.
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Prepare Decryption Keys. To reduce online query latency, the index server and the
server precompute decryption keys. S holds the decryption keys s1, ..., sn that it used to
symmetrically encrypt the records. It also holds s̃i = Encpk (si) for all i. S sends to IS
these values s̃1, ..., s̃n. IS chooses a random permutation ψ, and random values r1, ..., rn.
IS homomorphically computes s̃i + Enc(ri) = Enc(si + ri) = s̃
′
ψ(i) for all i, and sends these




Multiple clients. Although the description of the system protocol is for a single client,
we can easily support multiple clients without compromising security as long as the clients
do not collude. Under this assumption, we can actually use the same keys for all clients.
However, if all clients use the same key kc to encrypt their query keywords, then IS may
correlate the queries of different clients. To prevent this, the server S can distribute separate
keys kc to each client, and insert each keyword into the BF separately for each client
encrypted under that client’s key. The disadvantage of this additional security measure is
that the size of the BF will scale not only with the size of the data but also with the number
of clients.
Stage 2: Client Queries
Every query in the Blind Seer DBMS can be represented as a monotone boolean logical
formula over atomic search terms. There are three types of atomic search terms: keywords,
ranges, and negations. However, in Blind Seer, any range query from a field with value range
r is translated into a disjunction of O(log r) keywords queries. A negation of a keyword
α is translated into a disjunction of two range queries (i.e. x < α OR x > α), which is
again converted into disjunctions of keyword queries. Thus, the final representation of a
query is a monotone logical formula over solely keyword terms (see range/negation condition
paragraph in Section 4.3.3 for details).
Query circuits. Queries are computed by query circuits. A query circuit transforms each
atomic keyword term α into a small circuit computing the presence of α in an input Bloom
filter. This is simply a conjunction of the bits at the η BF hash indices of α, but since C
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and IS hold separate shares of the input Bloom filter, it is actually a conjunction of η XOR
gates.
Committing to Q. For the purpose of malicious-security, we force C to effectively commit
to its query circuit Q as follows.
1. C sends topo(Q) to IS.
2. For each keyword of the form field : value, C sends to IS the hashes: Hkc(field)||Hkc(field :
value).
3. IS generates a garbled universal circuit UQ from topo(Q) as described in Section 5.2.
Each gate in the query formula layer of Q is associated with a pair of keys in UQ. OR
maps to a 0-key, and AND maps to a 1-key.
4. C does OT with IS to receive the keys corresponding to the gate values (i.e. AND/OR)
of UQ.
5. IS computes the set of indices:
Hks(Hkc(field)||Hkc(field : value))
for each keyword field : value, and sends these back to C.
Stage 3: Policy evaluation
At the end of Stage 2, IS has received topo(Q) and hashes of the formHkc(field)||Hkc(field :
value) for each keyword, and has generated UQ. We denote by GQ = (g1, . . . , gn) the gate
value inputs to the garbled UQ, and by KQ = (α1, . . . , αt) the query’s keywords. Each
keyword αi is associated with a field fi. We use the following notations: FQ = (f1, . . . , ft),
Hkc(KQ) = (Hkc(α1), . . . ,Hkc(αt)), and Hkc(FQ) = (Hkc(f1), . . . ,Hkc(ft)). Recall that QC
receives kc from S during preprocessing.
Policy functions. A query policy is any function p: Q → {0, 1}, where Q is the space of
queries. Our system can implement as a policy any boolean function of the query keywords,
fields, and syntax (with a tunable probability of error). More precisely, we can implement
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any function of (Q,Hkc(KQ),Hkc(FQ)), and so the error probability of simulating p is
proportional to the collision probability of H.
Policy circuit structure. There are three types of inputs to policy circuits: gate values
GQ, keyword hashes Hkc(KQ), and field hashes Hkc(FQ). A policy circuit consists of an
upper logical layer built over a bottom layer of keyword check gates and field check gates.
A keyword check gate is associated with a blacklist/whitelist set of keywords, and evaluates
whether its input hashed keyword Hkc(α) is in the set. Likewise, each field check gate is
associated with a subset of the database fields, and indicates whether its input hashed field
Hkc(f) is a member of that set. The inputs GQ are fed directly into the logical layer along
with the outputs of the keyword check gates and field check gates.
Keyword check gates. Let L denote the blacklist/whitelist of the gate, and let α denote
the keyword submitted by the client. QC initializes a Bloom filter, and inserts into it Hkc(w)
for all w ∈ L. QC generates a mask for this filter and sends it to IS. Recall that IS holds
Hkc(α). QC and IS build a garbled circuit evaluating the presence of Hkc(α) in the filter,
and send both the garbled circuit and its input keys to C for evaluation.
Field check gates. Let F = {f1, . . . , fm} denote the fields of the database schema. Let
π : [m] → [m] be a random permutation. A field check gate consists of the following
elements.
− Field function. A boolean function b : F → {0, 1}.
− Permuted key table. A table of keys [kπ(1), . . . , kπ(m)]
− Output keys. A pair of output keys kout0 , kout1 .








Evaluation: The private evaluation of a field check gate on a field field between QC, IS,
and C is very simple. IS receives Hkc(field) from C. QC sends the permuted key table along
with the mapping of field hashes into the table so that IS may locate the key corresponding
to Hkc(field), and send it to C. QC sends the garbled table to C, who locates and decrypts
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the appropriate output key using the input key received from IS, exactly as in Yao.
Policy False Positives and Negatives. The use of Bloom filters for evaluating the
keyword gates introduces a tunable false positive rate in the outcome of the gate. This
contributes to either a false positive rate FPRp or false negative rate FNRp of the overall
policy, depending on how the keyword gates are used in the logical layer of the policy
circuit (e.g. keyword blacklists may cause false rejects, and keyword whitelists may cause
false approvals). Since the protocol only requires storing one relatively small policy circuit
in RAM, we can afford to make the false positive rates of the keyword gate Bloom filters
sufficiently small. For example, a policy that has 10 keyword gates, 10 keywords per gate
filter, and overall error rate 2−256 would only require approximately 4.6 GB of space at
most.
Policy protocol. IS initiates the policy evaluation.
1. IS sends topo(Q) to C along with key pairs for the gate value wires of the garbled UQ
(i.e. the key pairs for the inputs GQ).
2. Given topo(Q), QC generates the policy circuit PC. The input to PC is (GQ,Hkc(KQ),Hkc(FQ)).
3. QC generates a garbled circuit from PC. It sets the key pairs for the inputs GQ using
the key pairs received from IS, and it generates all other key pairs randomly (as in
the usual Yao garbled circuit construction). It sends the garbled tables of PC to C,
and sends the key pairs for all the input wires to IS. Additionally, it sends the key
pair {outPC0 ,outPC1 } for the policy output wire to IS.
4. Using the table of keys received from QC, IS identifies the input keys to PC corre-
sponding to inputs Hkc(KQ) and Hkc(FQ). IS sends these keys to the client. Note
that the client has already received the keys for the inputs GQ via OT in Stage 2
(these are the same input keys that C will use for evaluating UQ in Stage 5).
5. Finally, C uses the keys received from IS in (4) and the garbled tables received from
QC in (3) to evaluate PC, and obtains the output policy key outPCp , p ∈ {0, 1}.
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Stage 4: Tree traversal
C and IS begin a multi-threaded breadth first traversal of the Bloom filter index tree. They
do not process leaf nodes at this stage. At any non-leaf node v visited, C and IS evaluate Q
on the Bloom filter Bv (IS’s input bits are derived from B̃v and C’s input bits are derived
from the mask Fk(v) at the hash indices computed in Stage 2). They use the following Yao
GC variant:
1. C garbles Q and sends the garbled circuit to IS. C also sends keys for its own input
bits.
2. IS executes OT with C to obtain Yao keys for its input bits, evaluates the garbled
circuit, and sends the output key back to C.
3. C learns the output value from the output key.
When the output value of Q is 1, C visits all of v’s children nodes. Otherwise, C
terminates the path at v.
Stage 5: Leaf nodes
When C and IS reach a leaf node v corresponding to record index i in the search procedure
of Stage 4, IS selects keys (out0, out1), encrypts R̃i as Encout1(R̃i), and sends to C the tuple







IS constructed UQ in Stage 2 and C has already obtained the keys corresponding to its
gate value inputs via OT. Additionally, both IS and C already have the sets of Bloom filter
indices Iα for each keyword term α in the query. IS has a masked Bloom filter B̃v. C has a
mask Fk(v). Now:
1. IS generates a new garbled UC using fresh key pairs for all wires except the gate value
input wires.
2. IS sends to C the keys corresponding to its input bits {B̃v[i]}i∈Iα for each α.
3. C performs OT with IS to receive the keys corresponding to its input bits {Fk(v)[i]}i∈Iα
for each α.
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4. Finally, C evaluates the garbled UC and obtains an output key outUCu , u ∈ {0, 1}.
C has already obtained an output key outPCp , p ∈ {0, 1}, from PC in Stage 3. If
p = u = 1, then C can successfully obtain out1 and decrypt Encout1(R̃i). Otherwise, C
cannot feasibly deduce any information about R̃i other than its size.
Stage 6: Record retrieval
When C reaches a record Ri, IS will send it ψ(i), ri, and Encout1(R̃i). C then sends ψ(i) to
S, who sends back s′ψ(i). C obtains si = s
′
ψ(i)−ri. If C successfully decrypted Encout1(R̃i) to
obtain R̃i in Stage 5, then C now decrypts R̃i using si, and obtains the record Ri. Otherwise,
C cannot feasibly deduce any information about Ri other than its size.
5.5 Security and Privacy Analysis
Privacy and security in the Blind Seer system was previously achieved with respect to semi-
honest static adversaries. An ideal functionality Fdb was defined, and included a leakage
profile describing the precise information that is leaked to each of the parties C, S, and
IS. A standard simulation argument in the semi-honest static adversary model attests that
Blind Seer securely realizes Fdb (Figure 4.4).
The main contribution of the present work is a mechanism that strengthens the security
of Blind Seer against a malicious client adversary in numerous respects including privacy,
data protection, and access-control. The preceding sections presented the security benefits
of the new mechanism in conceptual terms, and with a focus on how they address the
vulnerabilities of Blind Seer’s previous design. The goal of this section is to characterize
these security properties more precisely in formal definitions, and to prove that our new
Blind Seer protocol realizes these properties.
Security properties. We distinguish and analyze four properties of the system.
Query indistinguishability captures the inability of the server (or index server) to dis-
tinguish between queries that the client may submit. Blind Seer does not achieve perfect
query indistinguishability. The query security of the original Blind Seer was analyzed using
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the simulation paradigm. It was shown that the client’s queries reveal nothing to the semi-
honest server and index server beyond a specified leakage profile. Essentially, the leakage
profile for the server included record retrieval patterns, and the leakage profile for the in-
dex server included the search tree traversal pattern and deterministic hashes of the query
keywords (i.e. BF indices). In terms of indistinguishability, this simulation security implies
that the server (resp. index server) cannot distinguish between two queries that have the
same (or indistinguishable) leakage profiles. The new system mostly preserves the privacy
of the client’s query that the original Blind Seer offered, but with some additions to the
query leakage profiles.
The modified leakage to IS is precisely the pairs of hashes Hkc(field)||Hkc(field :
value). The additional leakage allows IS to correlate common fields of different keywords
in the queries. In the original Blind Seer, IS learned the BF hash indices of the keywords, i.e.
H(field : value), but could not correlated common field patterns. The modified leakage
to QC is the topology of the query. We note that it is straightforward to make the above
modifications to the leakage profile in the simulation argument.
Policy compliance indistinguishability expresses that compliant queries with zero results
and non-compliant queries are indistinguishable provided that they have identical index
traversal patterns. Policy soundness is the extent to which the system prevents the release
of information on non-compliant queries. Query soundness is the extent to which the
system prevents the release of information from records that do not satisfy the query. We
show that non-compliant queries reveal no information about the DB payload—the non-
indexed primary data contained in the records of the DB. Similarly, we show that queries
reveal no information from the payload of records outside their result set.
The strongest notions of policy and query soundness would require that the amount of
information revealed is negligible. However, as previously discussed, Blind Seer’s search
mechanism may reveal some partial information about the indexed DB data, especially to
a malicious client. Thus, the client may learn some meta information even on records that
are not ultimately returned. The only way to prevent all leakage on non-compliant queries
is to prevent the client from evaluating non-compliant queries on any part of the DB index.
This would create an inherent asymmetry in the processing of compliant and non-compliant
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queries, detracting from policy privacy. We made a conscious design decision to compromise
full policy security for policy privacy.
Multiple clients. Our analysis assumes a single client. However, the proofs naturally
extend to multiple client parties as long as there is no collusion among the parties. If there
is collusion between parties, then the proofs still apply to the combination of those parties
as a single entity. We note that collusion between a client and the index server would
compromise security for everyone.
Indistinguishability vs. simulation. Our analysis will use indistinguishability games
rather than the simulation paradigm. Some of the primitives we implemented are not
simulatable in malicious and/or concurrent settings, specifically Naor-Pinkas OT, which
we use during the multi-threaded traversal of the Bloom filter. This technical issue could
be resolved by implementing a UC-secure OT primitive such as PVW [PVW08] instead
of Naor-Pinkas [NP01] and using simulatable UC-secure OT extension protocols1, or the
server S could actually distribute random OTs during the preprocessing phase.
OT Extension Security. As previously mentioned, our OT extension protocol does
not satisfy a simulation-based definition of security in our setting, which involves both
concurrency and a malicious receiver party (the client).
Nonetheless, we can prove that it is sufficiently secure for the malicious-client security
properties that we ultimately want to prove. Informally, the property we need is that no
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i ) is Sender’s output, e
ri
i is Receiver’s
output, All (e0i , e
1
i ) are independent and random, and r← {0, 1}p(k) is uniformly distributed.
1There are various OT extension protocols offering full simulation security in the malicious adversary
model that also have constant amortized cost [HIKN08; NNOB12], but these protocols still have constant
factor overheads that are relatively expensive.
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Lemma 1. No adversary corrupting Receiver in a polynomial number of concurrent and
independent OT-EXT
p(k)
m sessions can output both e0i and e
1
i from any individual session
with probability greater than negl(k).
Proof. Note that the protocol OT-EXT
p(k)
m is a randomized functionality that does not take
any external input. Internally, the Receiver samples r ← {0, 1}p(k) and T ← {0, 1}k×k,
and Sender samples s ← {0, 1}k. An adversary A can therefore simulate any session of
OT-EXT
p(k)
m , producing a view that is statistically indistinguishable from its view of the
real session. If A is active and substitutes arbitrary input (r′,T′) in place of the Receiver’s
randomly sampled input, it can still produce a statistically indistinguishable view of the
session by using the same r′,T′ and randomly sampling s for Sender’s input.2
By the hypothesis that the Sender behaves independently in all sessions, A cannot
distinguish between an experiment in which it engages with all real sessions versus an
experiment where it only engages with one real session and simulates all others. Therefore,
we restrict our attention to the security of a single session sid.
Recall that our OT-EXT
p(k)
m is Nielsen’s OT extension protocol for malicious receivers
[Nie07], using Naor-Pinkas to instantiate the base OT protocol. Nielsen gave a concrete
analysis showing that A cannot output both e0i and e1i for any i with probability greater
than negl(k) when the base OT is instantiated with an ideal OT box. However, the starting
point of Nielsen’s analysis only assumes that the output of the base OT is correct, and that
s remains uniformly random in the view of A. s is the choice vector of the Sender acting as
receiver in the base OT protocol. Sequential or parallel Naor-Pinkas OT guarantees both
correctness and the property that A’s views of the protocol (as sender) executed with dif-
ferent choice vectors of the receiver are statistically indistinguishable [NP01]. Equivalently,
conditioned on A’s view, s remains statistically indistinguishable from a uniformly random
vector. It follows that the adversary cannot gain a non-negligible advantage when the ideal
OT box is replaced with Naor-Pinkas in Nielsen’s OT extension (as otherwise this protocol
could be used to distinguish s from random).
2Note that this is different than simulatability, where the simulator in an ideal world secure execution
of the protocol is required to simulate the attacks of any adversary in the real world with the same results.
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In what follows we will refer to the new system protocol as mBS, for malicious Blind
Seer.
Client query privacy
We describe the client query leakage profiles for the server S, the index server IS, and the
query checker QC. Only the leakage to IS and QC has changed from the original Blind Seer
design. The new leakage to IS amounts to patterns in the keyword fields (e.g., columns)
used in the query, and the new leakage to QC is the query topology. We note that it is
straightforward to update the formal analysis of the original Blind Seer design to incorporate
these new leakage profiles, but we will not include here the updated analysis.
Leakage to S in each query. Let R1, ..., Rn denote the records of the database and
let ((i1, Ri1), . . . , (ij , Rij )) denote the query results. Let π : [n] → [n] denote a ran-
dom permutation (unknown to S, but fixed for all queries). The leakage to the server
is (π(i1), π(i2), . . . , π(ij)).
Leakage to IS in each query. The leakage to IS includes the BF-search tree traversal
paths, the topology of the query topo(Q), and the pairs of hashes Hkc(field)||Hkc(field :
value) for each of the client’s keywords field : value included in the query. This leakage
reveals to IS when two different keywords in the query share the same field. (In contrast,
the previous design only leaked hashes of the keywords in the query, and so IS only learned
when full keywords repeated).
These leakage profiles imply that S cannot distinguish any two queries that access the
same number of records and IS cannot distinguish any two queries that have the same num-
ber of repeated keywords/fields, indistinguishable traversal paths, and identical topologies.
However, both S and IS may respectively accumulate record retrieval and query pattern
information over many queries.
There we consider the views of both parties, or a third environment party observing the system, while here
we are only concerned with a single party’s view.
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Policy and query soundness
We first define the notion of payload indistinguishability. Assume that each record R of the
DB has a payload L, the main data associated with the record, and separate metadata M,
or the keywords that index the data. We write R = (L,M). Queries are evaluated on the
metadata, so for any boolean query q we can write q(M) ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 4. Let Σ(D,λ) denote a DBMS mechanism executed on input database D with
security parameter λ. We define the following game GamePAYINDΣ (A, λ) played with an ad-
versary A.
GamePAYINDΣ (A, λ):
− A chooses D0 = (R10, ..., Rn0 ) and D1 = (R11, ..., Rn1 ) where Rib = (Lib,Mib)
and Mi0 =Mi1 ∀i.
− Sample b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
− The protocol Σ(Db, λ) is executed with A in the querier’s role. A outputs a
decision bit b′.
− If b′ = b, output 1. If b′ 6= b, output 0.
Define AdvPAYINDΣ (A, λ) = |Pr[GamePAYINDΣ (A, λ) = 1]− 12 |. If AdvPAYINDΣ (A, λ) < negl(λ)
for any poly time adversary A, then the mechanism Σ is payload indistinguishable.
More generally, we define f -payload indistinguishability by modifying the game so
that Li0 = Li1 for all i where f(Mib) = 0, i.e. the payloads are only indistinguishable on
records for which f(Mib) = 1.
Theorem 3. An execution of mBS on any policy p and query q such that p(q) = 0 is
payload indistinguishable.
Proof. We prove the claim by reduction to the semantically secure encryption scheme Π =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) used by mBS.
Let us first unfold the meaning of executing mBS on policy p and query q. The policy
p is defined by an input to the semi-honest party QC. However, since C is now a malicious
adversary A, the query q defined by the actions of A may be unrelated to anything on C’s
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initial input tape. A commits to the query circuit Q that is ultimately evaluated on the DB
records when it sends the circuit topology, sends the keyword and field hashes, and receives
keys in {0, 1}k representing the gate values of Q using OTs generated by the subprotocol
OT-EXT
p(k)
k . If A submits ill-formatted messages, then the protocol is aborted, and the
query is considered empty. Thus, Q is uniquely determined unless A is able to obtain more
than one valid key for each OT, the probability of which is negligible in k by Lemma 1.
The garbled policy circuit PC and evaluation keys in {0, 1}k that A receives are derived
from the same information that determines Q. As long as Q is uniquely determined, the
following hold except with probability negligible in k: A only obtains the keys that allow it
to compute the output policy key outPC
p(Q), and the security of Yao GC evaluation guarantees
that A cannot obtain the key outPC1−p(Q).
Any record payload L that A receives is encrypted using Enc with the key outPC1 =
Gen(1k). We have seen that A cannot compute outPC1 when p(Q) = 0 except with some
negligible probability ǫ(k). Thus, it is easy to see that AdvPAYINDΣ (A, λ) ≤ AdvINDΠ (A, λ) +
ǫ(k) < negl(k) by semantic security of Π (cf. Appendix 2.5).
Theorem 4. For any query q, let q̄ denote its negation so that q̄(D) is the set of records
that fail q. An execution of mBS on any query q is q̄-payload indistinguishable.
Proof. For any record R = (M,L) that A receives, L is encrypted using Enc with a key
out
UQ
1 that is output by the garbled UQ circuit evaluated on M . As noted in the analysis
of policy soundness (Theorem 1), the query q is uniquely determined by A’s messages to
IS except with probability negligible in k, the security parameter of Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec).
We show that if q(M) = 0, i.e. q̄(M) = 1, then A cannot obtain outUQ1 with probability
greater than negl(λ) where λ is the minimum of k and the Bloom filter FPR used at the
leaf nodes of the tree index. In the q̄-payload indistinguishability game, the payloads Li0
and Li1 of records Ri0 and Ri1 are identical unless q̄(Mi0) = q̄(Mi1) = 1. Once we establish
that A’s probability of obtaining outUC1 when q̄(M) = 0 is negligible in λ, q̄-payload
indistinguishability reduces to the semantic security of Π, as in Theorem 1.
Consider A’s evaluation of UQ on record R. As with the policy, A can only obtain one
valid set of input keys, and can only compute one valid output key, except with probability
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negl(k). However, unlike the policy evaluation keys, the keys that A obtains to evaluate
UQ are not solely determined from the information that defines the query circuit Q. The
reason is that A has some control over the DB inputs to UQ. Recall that for each BF node
Bv, the client C holds a mask string mv = Fk(v) and IS holds B̃v = Bv ⊕mv. The circuit
UQ computes XORs of bits taken from m and Bv. Nothing prevents A from flipping bits in
mv when evaluating UQ.
We investigate A’s success probability in flipping the output of UQ from 0 to 1. Because
Q is monotone over its keyword predicates, A must succeed in flipping the output of at least
one keyword predicate Pα from 0 to 1 in order to succeed. Suppose A receives η indices
α1, ..., αη for a keyword α that has not been inserted into the filter Bv, i.e. Pα(Bv) = 0.
There is a unique vector of bits zα = (zα1 , ..., zαη ) such that B̃v[αi]⊕ zv[αi] = 1 for each i.
A must guess zα to succeed.
zα is actually a random variable over the randomness in the initialization of Bv. The
bits of Bv were set via insertions of keywords (distinct from α) using Hks , where ks is secret
from A, and H is a family of random oracles by assumption. Therefore, zα is distributed
independently from A’s view of the protocol. Recall that the BF parameters are set so
that the FPR is 2−η . Together with the simplifying assumption that the bits zαi are η-wise
independent, the FPR implies that Pr[zαi = 1] = 1/2 for each i, and that the min entropy
zα is 2
−η.3
False positives. The above theorems (policy soundness and query soundness) do not
account for false positives in the result set q(D) due to false positive hits in the Bloom
filters representing the indexed records. This threat becomes negligible when the FPR of
the Bloom filter is made negligible. Even a malicious client who has learned some bits of
the Bloom filter (e.g. from previous queries) and attempts to deliberately choose a query
3It is inaccurate to assume that all BF bits are mutually independent. However, η-wise independence of
the {zαi}
η
i=1 is easily obtained. With an FPR of 2
−η, the fraction of 1s in the BF cannot be more than 1/2
after all word insertions. If smaller, we can randomly set BF bits until exactly 1/2 are 1. The distribution
of the final subset of 1s is uniform, independent of H(α). Thus, the {zαi}
η
i=1 are independent if η < ℓ/2,
where ℓ is the BF length.
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that incurs a false positive has negligible advantage over the FPR because our Bloom filters
use non-invertible (cryptographic) hash functions.
Policy compliance indistinguishability
There are three possibilities when a query returns no results: the query was noncompliant,
the query actually had an empty result set, or both. The client cannot ever tell with
certainty which one of these is true. However, the search pattern may give the client
heuristic reasons to believe one possibility over the other. For instance, if the policy is
evaluated at the leaves and a query traversal reaches many leaf nodes in the DB index
before failing on all, the client may reasonably infer that the query is failing the policy.
Thus, a definition that requires complete indistinguishability regardless of the database
and query would be too strong for mBS to satisfy. Instead, we use a definition that incorpo-
rates a database equivalence relation Eq parametrized by the query q. Similar to a leakage
profile, Eq factors out instances where the adversary may defeat the indistinguishability
game, for reasons either related or unrelated to distinguishing query non-compliance from
empty results.
Definition 5. We define the policy compliance indistinguishability game GamePCINDΣ (A,Eq, λ)
as follows.
GamePCINDΣ (A,Eq, λ):
− A chooses a query q, databases (D0,D1) ∈ Eq, and policies p0, p1 such
that p0(q) = 1, q(D0) = 0, and p1(q) = 0.
− A bit b is sampled uniformly at random.
− The protocol Σ(Db,q,pb, λ) is executed with A in the querier’s role. A
outputs a decision bit b′.
− If b′ = b, output 1. If b′ 6= b, output 0.
AdvPCINDΣ (A,Eq, λ) = |Pr[GamePCINDΣ (A,Eq, λ) = 1] − 12 |. If AdvPCINDΣ (A,Eq, λ) <
negl(λ) for any poly time adversary A, then Σ satisfies policy compliance indistin-
guishability with respect to Eq.
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We formally define an equivalence relation ≡q for mBS. First, the relation must express
traversal pattern equivalence. Otherwise, A could distinguish executions of q on D0 and
D1 whenever the traversal patterns differ. In certain instances the traversal pattern may
actually reveal policy failure (e.g., a search for a single name that returns true at the root
and fails on every single record must be non-compliant). This instance is eliminated from
the game by requiring that the traversal patterns are identical for both the compliant and
non-compliant scenarios. Formally, let Iπ(·) denote the DB index construction function of
mBS using the record permutation π. Let TP (q, Iπ,D) denote the distribution of traversal
patterns induced by q on Iπ(D) for randomly sampled π. If D0 ≡q D1, then TP (q, Iπ,D0) ≈
TP (q, Iπ,D1). Further, since the client generates the query circuit for the internal nodes, a
malicious client can compute an arbitrary single bit of the BF inputs at each node. Thus,
≡q must express the stronger condition that corresponding Bloom filter nodes in the two
databases must be identical on all indices the query touches. This does not include the last
layer, where policy and UQ circuits are evaluated.
Theorem 5. mBS satisfies policy compliance indistinguishability with respect to ≡q.
Proof. Given the strict definition of ≡q, A’s views of the executions mBS(D0,q,p0, λ) and
mBS(D0,q,p0, λ) are identical up until the failure nodes where UQ∧PC is evaluated with
Yao GC. If A can distinguish the intermediary outputs of UQ and PC, it would contradict
the security of Yao.
5.6 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of our design in C++. In this section, we describe some in-
teresting choices we made during the development of the prototype, and show experimental
results.
OT pool. One important component of our system is the OT pool. This pool contains
preprocessed Oblivious Transfers that are used in garbled circuit evaluations. The OT
pool is filled regularly using the OT extension protocol of [IKNP03; Nie07]. We use the
Naor-Pinkas [NP01] OT protocol as a base for OT extension.





















Figure 5.3: Query Latency versus number of threads on a 107 record database. Run on a
Boolean query with individually frequent terms but with sparse aggregate results.
Parallelism within queries. The most important efficiency improvement comes from
query parallelization. While the original Blind Seer implementation supported paralleliza-
tion between queries to improve throughput (Parallelization paragraph Section 4.6), the
new system supports multi-threaded evaluation of the tree structures within a single query
to improve latency. Instead of having one global OT pool for all threads, each thread has
its own OT pool. This significantly decreases the standby time of filling a single OT pool,
as well as bypassing synchronization issues. We used the Intel Threading Building Block
library to implement most of the parallelization used in the system.
Figure 5.3 shows query latency time plotted against the number of threads for the query
first:DIANE AND last:CASTRO
This query traverses a large fraction of the DB index, and hence, clearly illustrates the
benefits from parallelization. We see full utilization and improvement all the way up to 15
threads.
Cryptographic Tools. Our system requires pseudorandom bits, used primarily for gar-
bling circuits. We avoid expensive system calls to /dev/urandom by implementing a PRG
using AES as a building block. All AES operations were performed using 128-bit key length.
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We used SHA256 for hashing, and implemented the keyed hash for keyword ingestion as an
HMAC using SHA256 as the underlying hash function. Since OpenSSL uses the AES-NI
instruction, we used this library to implement our basic cryptographic primitives. Our sys-
tem also depends on operation on a group to which DDH intractability applies. We used
the standard quadratic residues subgroup of Zp, where p is a 2048-bit strong prime
4. The
group operations were implemented using the GNU Multiple Precision library.
Tree Traversal. During tree traversal, each internal node evaluation requires 4 rounds of
communication. The client first submits the node identifier to be evaluated and the garbled
circuit to be evaluated, then OT is performed (2 rounds), and finally the index server sends
back the output key. The roles are reversed at the leaf nodes. Since these rounds involve
small packets, network latency becomes the bottleneck. In order to reduce standby time,
we batched the evaluation of all sibling nodes. This reduced the number of rounds by 10
rounds. This batching technique is mostly helpful for queries with low branching traversal
patterns, e.g., a single root to record path in the tree index.
5.7 Evaluation
Our system was tested in a similar way to the original Blind Seer. A synthetic 100-million
record database mimicking the US census data was constructed. Each database record
contained global unique ID, personal information taken from randomized census, text fields
for free-text search, XML data, and a payload of 100KB of random bytes used to simulate
the cost of transferring data in real-life practical applications.
Our system was compared against MySQL (having separate indexes for each field) using
a special-purpose testbed implemented by Lincoln Labs specifically for this purpose. Each
party ran on a separate machine equipped with two Intel Xeon X5650 processors of 2.66Ghz
and 12M cache, 96GB RAM5at 1066 MHz, and Broadcom 1GB Ethernet NICS with TOE
each. Index Server and Server each had a 20TB raid array attached also. All machines ran
64-bit Ubuntu 12.04LTS as base OS.
4p = 2 · q + 1 where q is also prime
5Although we ran the client on a machine with 96GB RAM, the client’s actual memory consumption in
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We show next the efficiency of our system (running using 16 threads on full 100-million
record DB) in terms of query latency time for a number of representative queries: single-
term and size-3 conjunctive and disjunctive SELECT-id queries. We also show that when
using SELECT-* queries on 100KB records, and thus incorporating a payload with our
interactions, the associated overhead which is constant for all systems begins to dominate
the costs of our system.
Boolean SELECT-id Queries. We compare the performance of our system against
MySQL. Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show the query latency for single-term, 3-term conjunc-
tions (with two low-entropy terms and one medium-entropy term), and 3-term disjunctions
as SELECT-id queries plotted against the number of records satisfying them. While origi-
nal Blind Seer was 15 times slower than MySQL, our implementation manages to be only
2-3 times slower than MySQL for the case of single terms queries and 3-6 times slower for
conjunctive and disjunctive queries on 3 terms. This saving is due to parallelization and
low overhead of our new construction. Note that these queries are SELECT-id, and thus
delivering a small payload. The relative overhead of our system would decrease with larger
payloads since this cost is constant for both systems.
Single-term SELECT-* Queries. We measured query latency of our system and MySQL
for queries returning 100KB records. Our system, as well as original Blind Seer, performs
better (compared to MySQL) when the records retrieved are bigger. In this case, the
standby time required to submit records’ data dominate the network usage. We can ob-
serve from the results shown in Figure 5.7 that our system is only 10% slower than MySQL
in this setting.
our system is insignificant. The client only needs to store a key and pre-processed OTs. In our experiments,
the client used approximately 200MB of RAM.
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Figure 5.4: Single-term SELECT-id performance against number of records returned for
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Figure 5.5: 3-terms conjunction SELECT-id queries performance against number of records
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Figure 5.6: 3-terms disjunction SELECT-id queries performance against number of records
returned for our system and MySQL.
Overhead of malicious-client security. As a validation of the costs of our malicious-
client algorithms, we also compare the performance of our malicious-client secure Blind
Seer to that of the original Blind Seer. To eliminate extraneous implementation perfor-
mance variables, we compare the two designs by running our current implementation of
Blind Seer with and without the design changes introduced in this work. In particular, the
design differences potentially affecting performance include two additional hash function
calls per keyword, the new semi-private SFE using a universal circuit, an additional Obliv-
ious Transfer per gate of the query circuit, and one additional symmetric encryption and
decryption per record returned to C. The experiment consisted of running single-threaded
SELECT-id queries for single-term, 3-term boolean queries containing a conjunction and a
disjunction, and range queries (which are each translated to a 5-7 term disjunction) over a
1-million record database. The results are shown in figures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10. As expected, the
design changes for achieving malicious-client security incur no significant overhead. The
costs of the design changes for malicious-client security are proportional to the query size
and number of leaf nodes reached in the Bloom filter tree index traversal, and not the
total number of tree nodes processed. Thus, the performance gap will be even smaller on
large databases when the number of leaf nodes reached is small compared to the number of
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Figure 5.9: Performance of our prototype against original Blind Seer for 3-term boolean
queries.
internal nodes processed, which we expect to often be the case in practice.
Caching. We did not run experiments on repeated queries. On repeated queries, MySQL
benefits from server-side caching of query results. In our system, the client caches result
sets (database record indices) locally.
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Figure 5.10: Performance of our prototype against original Blind Seer for range queries.
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Chapter 6
Low-Leakage Private Search of
Boolean Queries
6.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters we presented a private search system called Blind Seer. We have
seen that Blind Seer manages to be very efficient and allows for powerful queries. However,
to acomplish high efficiency the scheme accepts some privacy loss on the client’s queries
and server’s data. In this Chapter we are mainly concern in how much the storage server
(a third party) learns about the client’s queries and the database. While the encryption of
records and the index’s data helped by hidding the content stored on the server, the client
privacy is still vulnerable since its access pattern to index and data is revealed to the server.
A recent work [IKK12] has demonstrated that this leakage can be substantial even in the
simplest search scenario of exact match such as keyword search. For more complex types of
queries, such as Boolean queries (as supported by Blind Seer), this leakage can have even
more serious security implications.
This chapter is motivated by the lack of a good grasp on analyzing the above privacy
leakage in the Boolean search protocols such as Blind Seer and OSPIR-OXT [JJK+13].
Here we propose a new construction that adopts the general approach of combining access
pattern hiding properties of ORAM together with small secure computation steps, as done
in the general-purpose secure two-party computation scheme of section 3. This approach
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was also taken by Gentry et al. [GHJR15] to construct a single keyword search scheme. We
go further and focus on Boolean queries, and we develop tailored and optimized solutions
for that. Our solution for secure search enables the same functionality for Boolean queries
as Blind Seer, and it diminishes the access pattern leakage, while preserving the sublinear
efficiency overhead for queries that are executed in sublinear time in these protocols. As
expected, the concrete efficiency overhead for our protocol increases compared with these
solutions that reveal complete access patterns.
Although direct comparison with the work of Gentry et al.[GHJR15] is hard, since their
work implements much simpler queries compared to our protocols, our protocols achieve
much better efficiency for comparable functionality.
Setting. As in Chapters 4 and 5 we are interested in the Outsourced Symmetric Private
Information Retrieval (OSPIR) setting [JJK+13]. It captures the scenario in which the data
owner outsources the data to a server, and gives search capabilities to clients. Recall that
such a setting involve three main actors: S, IS, and C. The server S owns the database
(Di,Wi)
d
i=1, builds an index and outsources the list of documents (Di) and the index to the
index server IS. The client C has a query φ(W ) composed by a Boolean formula φ(·) over a
set of keywords W . C gets the set of documents Di, whose associated searchable keywords
Wi satisfy the query.
In a Setup phase, the server (or data owner S) on input DB, does some preliminary
computation on the data and produces an encrypted database EDB and access parameters
params. EDB is then given to the index server (IS). In the Search phase, a client (C) inputs a
query q, S inputs params, and IS inputs EDB. After protocol execution, C obtains database
records satisfying its query. Such a scheme was formally defined in section 2.7.
6.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter we provide a new Private Database Search mechanism supporing Boolean
queries, that avoids the main leakage introduced by Blind Seer and OSPIR-OXT systems.
We introduce new cryptographic primitives we called Mul-OPRF and Masked MOPRF.
We use this primive together with Oblivious RAM holding a Bloom filter tree to obliviously
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evaluate queries on each index node.
We provide a prototype implementation of the system, and give analysis of performance.
Our experimental results shows that for simple queries, records can be returned within a
few seconds.
To our knowledge, and despite generic protocols, this is the first Private Database Search
scheme that uses ORAM techniques, and also allows for Boolean queries. The use of ORAM
diminishes the leakage to the server holding the database and its index.
6.1.2 Background
Between the range of Private DB search schemes available (see Section 7), the HE-over-
ORAM approach [GHJR15], and the Blind Seer and OXT-OSPIR[JJK+13] are of particular
interest. First, these schemes focus on the delegated query scenario, that is, the client is not
the owner of the data. Secondly, while HE-over-ORAM aims for a secure asymptotically
sublinear solution for single keyword search, the Blind Seer and OXT-OSPIR systems focus
on practicality: they both support a rich set of queries and their efficiency is close to the
plaintext database case. Our goal is to build a system that lies in-between these systems in
terms of the privacy vs. efficiency trade-off.
OSPIR-OXT and Blind Seer. The first solutions for the OSPIR setting was proposed by
Jarecki et al. [JJK+13](OSPIR-OXT) and Pappas et al. [PKV+14] (Blind Seer). Although
they solve the same problem, they provide very different approaches. OSPIR-OXT is an
extension of the OXT searchable encryption scheme [CJJ+13]. This solution allows for
Boolean queries in Searchable Normal Form (t1∧φ(t2, ..., tn)), and runs in time proportional
to the number of records satisfying the term t1. The solution is based on an inverted index
approach, which is used to search information about the leading term t1. This information
is used then to search for the records satisfying the sub-queries t1∧ti. A completely different
approach was taken in Blind Seer. Instead of using an inverted index, Blind Seer builds a
Search Tree on the searchable keywords of the database. Each leaf of the tree is associated
with a record in the database, and each internal node holds to a masked Bloom filter
containing the searchable keywords of the records in its subtree. Hence, a Boolean formula
is answered by following paths root-to-leaves where the nodes’ Bloom filter satisfy the query.
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The above two systems are incomparable in terms of leakage since their underlying data
structures are completely different. Blind Seer, though, has the advantage that the search
procedure does not reveal partial evaluation results.
HE-over-ORAM Database Search. Gentry et al. [GHJR15] proposed a private DB
system with no leakage based on ORAM and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption. ORAM
is used to protect the client’s access patterns and the owner’s data from the server. To
protect the database information from the client, data is also encrypted using a variation of
a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Scheme that enables Equal-to-Zero and Comparison
operations. These operation enable the client to blindly perform ORAM operations until the
requested value is found. Although this work shows the feasibility of the HE-over-ORAM
approach, it has significant limitations in efficiency and functionality. In terms of efficiency,
their experimental results shows that it requires 30 minutes to execute a single keyword
query on a 222 record database. In terms of functionality, the system only allows single
keyword queries, and conjunction may be enable by a trivial addition of the keywords into
the database index.
Approach. We use the Bloom filter Search Tree of Blind Seer as our search structure,
but storing the encrypted data and its index in ORAM structures at the server. Then, we
give the ORAM access parameters to the client, as done in the HE-over-ORAM scheme. To
avoid the case where the client learns more information than strictly necessary, the actual
data in ORAM should be encrypted in a special way. While this is done using Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption by Gentry et al. [GHJR15], we provide a new encoding scheme
that allows parties to securely evaluate an index node, revealing to the client only the
necessary information to continue the search procedure. We accomplish this by using a
novel protocol for conjunctive query evaluation on specially encrypted Bloom filters. This
protocol is then extended to handle queries in Disjunctive Normal Form.
The use of ORAM eliminates all important leakage to the index server of Blind Seer.
ORAM protocols, however, do leak the number of queries performed by the client; hence,
our solution reveals the amount of work done by the client (which is unavoidable if we
require sublinear time). In particular, the server can infer the number of records retrieved
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by the client. It also learns the relation between the amount of work in the index and the
amount of records retrieved. Nevertheless, the server is unable to link the work done in the
index and the specific record retrieved.
Notation.
We use λ to denote a security parameter, and fp a false positive rate. The set {1, 2, ..., i} will
be denoted as [i]. Let G be a group of generator g and prime order q, where the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds. We will use multiplicative notation for the group
operations. Let H : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a keyed hash function (or MAC) having
keys in {0, 1}λ, in which H(s,w) is denoted as Hs(w). Similarly, let F : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ → G
be a pseudo random function (PRF) indexed by keys in {0, 1}λ, having domain in {0, 1}λ,
and image in G. We denote F (k, r) as Fk(r). Let E = 〈Gen,Enc,Dec〉 be semantically secure
encryption scheme. For a query q correspoding to a DNF formula φ(·) we let topo(q) (or
topo(φ)) be the number of clauses in φ and the number of variables in each clause. We
denote by x
$← S the process of sampling a uniformly random element x from set S. For a
tree node v we let Children(v) be the set of children nodes of v. We let BFBuild(S, fp) denote
the proccess of building a Bloom fiter for set S with false positive rate fp. BFMatch(BF, w)
denoted the proccess of matching keyword w in Bloom filter BF. For a set of hash functions
H, we let H(w) = {h(w) : h ∈ H}. Finally, we abuse ORAM notation and let Di ←
ORead(i, struct) denote a read ORAM access on address i at ORAM structure struct held
by the server. That is, we ommit in the notation the client’s parameters and the updated
struct given to the server.
6.2 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we describe some cryptographic primitives we use in the construction of
our private search scheme. These primitive are presented in a modular way, and can be of
independent interest.
Oblivious PRF. First, our solution uses an Oblivioius Pseudorandom Function (OPRF).
It involves two parties, C having input m and S having input k, who jointly evaluate a pseu-
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dorandom function Fk(m), while keeping their input private. A simple construction pro-
posed by Jarecki and Liu [JL10] uses the Hashed Diffie-Hellman PRF (Fk(m) = Hash(m)
k).
The protocol is described in Figure 6.1. C starts by sampling a uniformly random invert-
ible exponent α and sends X = Hash(m)α to S. S replies with Y = Xk, and C outputs




Parameter: A random hash function Hash : {0, 1}∗ → G.
Input C: w ∈ {0, 1}∗. S: k.
1. C samples a uniformly random α ∈ Z∗q , and sends back X = Hash(w)α.
2. S replies with Y = Xk.
3. C outputs Z = Y α−1 .
Figure 6.1: The Two-Party Protocol OPRF
MUL-OPRF. In a simple variation of the above primitive, C inputs a set {m1, ...,mn},
S inputs the secret key k, and C receives as output ∏Fk(mi). We call this new primitive
MUL-OPRF. We obtain a secure protocol for this primitive by using
∏
Hash(mi), as the
random hash function in the protocol of Figure 6.1.
Masked MOPRF. For the purpose of the construction in Section 6.3, we require a slight
modification on the above MUL-OPRF functionality. We call this new primitive a Masked
MOPRF. In this primitive, C gets the result of the MUL-OPRF protocol masked with a
random value R, while S obtains the mask R. This simple modification is achieved by
adding one extra message in the protocol (Figure 6.2). The server starts by sampling
a uniformly random exponent β, and sending W = gβ back to C. C responds with X =
(W ·∏Hash(mi))α for the uniformly random invertible exponent α. S replies with Y = Xk,
and outputs R = gβ·k. C outputs Z = Y α−1 = R ·∏Hash(mi)k.
Security. The security of the MUL-OPRF protocol follows directly form the security of the
Hashed DH Oblivious PRF protocol [JL10] by using
∏
Hash(·) as the random function in
the random oracle model. The security and correctness of the Masked MUL-OPRF protocol
follows directly from DDH assumption since it implies that the value gβ·k ×∏Fk(mi) is
pseudo-random even given gβ (and even if the adversary somehow knows
∏
Fk(mi)).
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Two-party Protocol Masked-MOPRF
Parameter: A random hash function Hash : {0, 1}∗ → G.
Input C: {mi}i∈[n]. S: k.
1. S samples random β in Zq and sends W = gβ.




3. S replies with Y = Xk.
4. C outputs Z = Y α−1 .
5. S outputs R = gβ·k.
Figure 6.2: The Two-Party Protocol Masked-MOPRF
6.3 Scheme
In this section, we present our private search scheme. Our ultimate goal is a secure search
functionality that enables oblivious delegated queries on outsourced data to a party we call
index sever (IS), where the data owner (S) can obliviously issue a search token to a client
(C) for a query that remains hidden from the owner. Given this search token, C should only
learn the data matching the query, while minimizing the information that IS learns about
the issued queries (we analyze what IS learns formally in Section 6.4).
Recall that our search structure is a Bloom filter tree in which documents are associated
with the leaves of the tree and each node contains a Bloom filter holding the searchable
keywords of the documents associates with the leaves of its subtree. In the simple two-party
setting, where S is the querier (or client), S can build a plaintext Bloom filter tree storing
it as an ORAM at the index server. Then, for each query, S traverses the Bloom filter tree
(via ORAM accesses), to find the documents that satisfying its query (which it retrieves
and decrypts also via ORAM accesses).
In the delegated queries scenario (i.e., where C is not the database owner), allowing
complete ORAM access to C reveals information beyond what is strictly necessary. First,
since each ORAM access may retrieve several elements, C gets bits of the index that do not
correspond to its query. Equally important, C learns partial evaluation information, such
as which keywords of the formula are satisfied at each node, and which Bloom filter bits
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are set. Ideally, C should only learn if the complete query is satisfied by the index node
being evaluated. These two problems are addressed by specially encrypting the index bits
and introducing an oblivious protocol that allows C to only learn whether the formula is
satisfied by an index node, but nothing more.
In Section 6.3.1, we introduce techniques that allow for secure delegated queries lever-
aging Bloom filter tree and ORAM approaches. We first show how to generate query tokens
without reveling the client’s query to either party. We then describe how to securely eval-
uate single term queries, conjunctions and DNF queries on each Bloom filter, allowing C
to traverse the tree and find the documents satisfying its query. Finally, we describe how
C can decrypt the retrieved documents without any party knowing the identifiers of these
documents.
In Section 6.3.2, we present the complete construction of our private search scheme.
6.3.1 Building Block Techniques
Obliviously Generating Search Tokens. Before C can evaluate its query, it needs to
be able to compute Bloom filter indices corresponding to the terms in the query for each
Bloom filter in the tree. For security reasons, these indices are derived from a PRF, whose
key is held by the database owner: each term is mapped through the use of this PRF to a
search token, which is then hashed to get the Bloom filter indices. Similarly to Jarecki et
al. [JJK+13], we use the Hashed Diffie-Hellman PRF Hsbf (m) = Hash(m)
sbf as our PRF to
compute search tokens for each term. This PRF is computed via the oblivious protocol in
Figure 6.1, hiding the key from the client, and the keyword from the server.
Single Term Queries. For single keyword queries, φ(w) = w, the client needs to learn
if all the bits queried in a Bloom filter are set. For this purpose, we leverage the Masked-
MOPRF protocol making use of the underlying PRF to encrypt each bit. We encode a bit to
an arbitrary element in the range group of the PRF F , and use F to encrypt the bit. Let g be
a uniformly random group generator that we keep secret to the client (and given to the index
server); we map a bit b to gb and encrypt it as ri ← {0, 1}λ, 〈gb·Fk(ri), ri〉 for position i in the
Bloom filter1. The client and the index server use the Masked-MOPRF primitive described
1The values ri accross different Bloom filters are sampled independently.
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in Section 6.2 to evaluate a Bloom filter query that reveal no additional information to the
client as follows. They execute the Masked-MOPRF protocol with inputs a set of {ri}i∈S ,
for the client, and a PRF key k for the index server, where S is the set of BF indices
corresponding to the query. The client obtains as output R ·∏i∈S Fk(ri), while the index























= R−1 · g
∑
i∈S bi .
The index server now provides H(R−1 ·gh) so that the client can do the matching evaluating
H(R−1 · g
∑
i∈S bi) and doing the comparison. The random element R prevents the client
from learning the value g
∑
bi . The hash over the server-side matching key R−1 · gh, impede
canceling out R−1, and hence computing gh−
∑
bi . Note that if the generator g was known
to the client, he could multiply R−1 · g
∑
i bi with gj for j ∈ [h] and compare it against
H(R · gh), hence learning ∑ bi exactly, hence we require the generator to be secret to the
client. We will prove in section 6.4.4 the security of this Bloom filter matching procedure.
Conjunction Queries The method described above can be trivially extended to conjunc-
tions since the single term case is in fact a conjunction on the corresponding Bloom filter
bits. We can treat a conjunction as a bigger-size single term query. Let C be a conjunction,
then the number of bits to be checked is h× |C|.
Disjunctive Normal Form Queries. In the case of single term queries (and conjunc-
tions), a match requires that all the bits at the query indices of the Bloom filter be set to
one. Therefore, it suffices that the server provide the hash of a single “randomized matching
key” H(R · gh) to the client. In contrast, a disjunction allows many satisfying assignments
for the bit values for the query BF indices, hence, there are many possible matching keys.
In fact, there can be as many as |C| · 2h·(|C|−1) different satisfying assignments for the BF
query indices. However, in our construction we only need to consider the expression g
∑
i∈S bi
for each term in the conjunction, which has only h different possible values. Hence, there
are only |C| · h|C|−1 possible matching evaluation values for the client formula. With this
observation in mind we construct the following protocol:
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• For each conjunctive clause C the client and the index server execute the protocol
for the single query matching (without the final stage where index server reveals the





where SC denotes the set of Bloom filter positions to be checked for clause C.
• Each of the resulting values is blinded by public a random exponent LC , and the final








• The index server computes the set Matching of all the possible matching values, and
the client obliviously does the matching. There are several ways to do the matching.
One possibility is to hash and permute all the matching keys, before sending them to
the client. Another approach is through a Bloom filter.
The purpose of the exponent LC is to separate the space of possible values of each clause
evaluation, so that there are no overlaps (with high probability) that could make a set of
unsatisfying clauses evaluate to a matching key.
Record Retrieval. After finding the list of identifiers of records satisfying the query, C
can actually retrieve them by querying the ORAM that contains the records. However, as
mentioned earlier, in the case of the index ORAM, each ORAM access can potentially reveal
records that do not satisfy C’s query. Hence, each document should be encrypted under a
key unknown to C. However, the client should be allowed to decrypt the satisfying records.
To support this feature, during the preprocessing phase, S samples a secret key sr and,
using again the Hashed Diffie-Hellman PRF, it derives for each document Di a document
encryption key ki ← H(i)sr . Them, in the online phase, S and C execute the OPRFprotocol
in Figure 6.1 to derive the decryption keys: C inputs the document identifiers, and S inputs
sr.
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Procedure Setup
Public: Group G of prime order q and public generator g′.
Parameters: A security parameter λ, false positive rate fp, the tree degree d.
Input: Database {Di,Wi}Di=1.
1. Sample sk ← {0, 1}λ, and compute sets {W̃i = {Hsk(w)|w ∈ Wi}}.
2. Sample sr ← {0, 1}λ, and compute ki ← Fsr (i), D̃i ← Encki(Di).
3. 〈H,BFT〉 ← BFTBuild({W̃i}, fp, d).
4. 〈EBFT, sbf , g〉 ← BFTEncrypt(BFT, 1λ).
5. 〈paramI , structI〉 ← OSetup(EBFT, 1λ).
6. 〈paramD, structD〉 ← OSetup({D̃i}, 1λ).
Output:
S : 〈sk, sr〉
C : 〈paramI , paramD〉
IS : 〈sbf , structI , structD〉.
Figure 6.3: The preprocessing procedure Setup
6.3.2 Final Scheme
Preprocessing. The procedure is parametrized by a false positive rate fp, a security
parameter λ, and the Bloom filter tree degree d. The database owner starts by choosing
keys sk, sr for the keyed hash function H. It then proceeds by building a Bloom filter
Search Tree with false positive rate fp for the database DB = (Di,Wi)
D
i=1, where each
keyword w ∈ Wi is mapped to Hsk(w) forming set W̃i. Each record Di is encrypted using
the derived key ki ← Hsr(i),D̃i = Encki(Di). Given the public generator g′, the owner
sample a random exponent y to get a new random generator g = g′y . The Bloom filter tree
is then encrypted by first sampling a key sbf , then encoding each Bloom filter bit b as g
b, and
encrypting it as bEncsbf (g
b) = 〈gb · Fsbf (r), r〉, where r is sampled uniformly random from
{0, 1}λ. The owner continues by preparing an ORAM structure (paramI , structI) holding
the encrypted index, and the ORAM structure (paramD, structD) holding the records. In
principle, each encrypted Bloom filter bit can be an ORAM block. However, this can be
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optimized to pack several bits in the same ORAM block to reduce the number of ORAM
lookups. We can choose, for example, to hold an entire Bloom filter in one ORAM block,
or to pack together bits in the same position across sibling Bloom filters.
The setup phase is formally described by procedure Setup in Figure 6.3. We describe
next the basic procedures used by Setup:
• BFTBuild({W̃i}Di=1, fp, d). Let BFT be a balanced d-ary tree of D leafs. Let L =
⌈logdD⌉ be the height of the tree. We build the tree level by level, starting from
the bottom level L. We then proceed recursively until reaching the root of the tree.
Let NL = max |Wi|. Using NL and fp, compute Bloom filters length nL and number
of Bloom filter hash function hL . Then, we sample hL independent hash function
HL = {H1, ...,HhL} with image {0, 1, ..., nL − 1}. For each i ∈ [D], we build a Bloom
filter Bi (using HL) inserting the elements of W̃i. We maintain each Bloom filter in
a unique leaf of BFT. The internal nodes of the tree are built recursively as follows:
we associate each node at level ℓ with the keywords held in its children. That is, for
each internal node, we build a Bloom filter that contains the elements from all its d
children. Return H = {H1,H2, ...,HL} and tree BFT. To avoid revealing the level of
the nodes being evaluates, we force the set of hash functions to be of the same size
h = hL = |HL| ≈ log(1/fp).
• BFTEncrypt(BFT, 1λ). Sample a random generator group generator g and a uniformly
random key sbf for PRF F . Build a tree EBFT by: a) encoding each bit b of BFT as
gb, b) encrypting gb as bEncsbf (g
b) = 〈gb · Fsbf (r), r〉, where r is uniformly random in
{0, 1}λ. Return the generator g, the key sbf and tree EBFT.
Search. C inputs a DNF formula φ(W) = C1∨C2∨ · · · ∨Cq on keywords in W. The client
reveals the query topology (number of clauses and size of each clause) to IS. C and S then
execute the protocol in Figure 6.1 to obtain search tokens for each keyword in each clause .
For each clause C in the query, C (or IS) uniformly samples LC from [q] and sends it to IS
(C). C and IS then start the tree traversal protocol. For each node being evaluated, both
parties proceed as follows:
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• For each clause C of the query, the client computes the Bloom filter positions of
the clause’s hashed keywords for the node being evaluated, and performs the ORAM
queries to get the corresponding encrypted bits 〈gbi · Fsbf (ri), ri〉.
• To get each clause evaluation key, C and IS engage in the Masked-MOPRF protocol,
where C inputs the encryption randomness ri of each encrypted bit, and IS inputs the
PRF secret key sbf . C obtains πC = RC ·
∏
i∈SC
Fsbf (ri), and IS obtains the random
mask RC . C computes each clause C evaluation key as
∏
i∈SC
(gbi · Fsbf (ri)) · (πC)−1.




• The client computes each clause evaluation key as KC = ζLCC , and multiplies all keys










• The index server, which is given the generator g, computes all possible matching keys.





(RC · g|C|·h)LC ·
∏
C′ 6=C




where for each C ′, νC′ ranges in {0, . . . , |C ′| · h}.
• Each node evaluation finishes by checking if C’s FinalKey belongs to the set Matching =
⋃
C MatchingC . This can be done securely by computing a Bloom filter with all match-
ing keys and sending the filter to the client, or by sending a permutation of all hashed
keys.
After the tree traversal, C gets the indices of all documents satisfying the query. It can
obtain the documents by querying the documents ORAM structure. To obtain the document
decryption keys, C and S execute protocol OPRF, where S inputs key sr and C inputs the
document identifiers. A formal description of the search protocol is presented in Figure 6.4.
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Protocol Search
Public: Group G of prime order q.
Inputs.
C: DNF query φ(W), and ORAMs’ parameters paramI , paramD.
IS: Key sbf , group generator g, and structures structI , structD.
S: Keys sk and sr.
I. Tree Traversal
1. C. Set OUTI = ∅. ∀ clause C ∈ φ(·),  LC $← [q]. Send (topo(φ), {LC}C∈φ(·) to IS.
2. C-S. ∀C ∈ φ(·), ∀w ∈ C (w̃,⊥)←OPRF(w, sk).
3. C-IS start the tree traversal. C set queue Q = {(0, 0)}.
(a) if Q is empty go to Document Retrieval, otherwise v ← Q.pop().
(b) For each clause C derive from v and from Bloom filter bits positions Hv.level(w̃)
the set of addresses {i} of the Bloom fiter bits in the index, and do:
i. {(ei, ri)← ORead(i, structI)}.
ii.〈πC , RC〉 ← Masked-MOPRF({ri}, sbf).










(d) IS. Compute set Matching, and corresponding Bloom filter BF ←
BFBuild(Matching, 2−λ). Send BF to client.
(e) C. If BFMatch(BF,FinalKey) do:
if v.level = L then OUTI = OUTI ∪ {v},
else Q = Q ∪ Children(v).
(f) Go to 3a
II. Document Retrieval. C sets OUTD = ∅. For each index i ∈ OUTI do:
1. C-IS. D̃i ← ORead(i,ORead〉, structD).
2. C-S. (ki,⊥)←OPRF(i, sr)
3. C. Di ← Decki(D̃i). OUTD ← OUTD ∪Di
Output: Client output set OUTD.
Figure 6.4: The Protocol Search
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6.4 Security
Our protocol guarantee security in the semi-honest case against the client, server and data
owner. We discuss next the correctness for our protocols, define the leakage to each party
during the execution of the protocol. We then provide formal security definitions and proofs
of security.
6.4.1 Protocol Correctness
Without considering false positives, the correctness of our protocol follows from the cor-
rectness of ORAM, Bloom filter Search tree, and node evaluation. Note that if a clause C
is satisfied by the keywords held in the node, then the FinalKey obtained by the client is
(RC · g|C|·h)LC ·
∏
C′ 6=C(RC′ · gνC′ )LC′ for ν ′C ∈ {0, ..., |C ′| ·h} for every C ′. This key belongs
to set matchingC , and hence the node evaluation is correct.
We now consider sources of false positives. In our protocol there are three posibilities
for false positives: the false positive rate of the BF instances that we use in the search tree,
collisions between node evaluation values that correspond to satisfying and unsatisfying
assignments, and false positive in the final matching of the FinalKey against set matching.
Note that false positives that occur in Bloom filters look-ups at intermediate levels of the
search tree may result in longer search time for the query; however, only the false positives
at the tree leaves may result in the client obtaining a document that does not match its
query.
We analyze the probability of each of the three independent events that cause a false
positive Bloom filter match. If we use Bloom filters with the false positive rate fp at the
leaves of the search tree, then for a DNF query of n clauses that consist of |C1|, . . . , |Cn|
terms (or keywords), the probability for a false positive match coming from a false positive




The second event that causes an incorrect match on a Bloom filter DNF query is a
collision on the node evaluation final keys. For each clause Ci, let rCi such that g
rCi = RCi ,
then we can look at the evaluation key as g
∑n
i=1 LCi(rCi+νCi) where νCi ranges between 0
and |Ci| · h. In a matching evaluation key, at least for some i νCi equals |Ci| · h, whereas in
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a mismatching key, none of the νCi equals |Ci| · h. Let {νCi}i be the number of bits set for
each clause Ci in a satisfying assignment (that is, for some i νCi = |Ci| · h), and let {ν ′Ci}
the numer of bits set for each clause in an unsatisfying one. Then, the probability that the
corresponding keys collide is the probability that
∑
i(νCi − ν ′Ci)LCi = 0, which is negligible
in |Zq| = negl(λ) by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80; Zip79].
The third source of false positives is the final key matching procedure. In Figure 6.4
we use a negligible false positive rate of 2−λ, we note however, that this can be set as a
tunnable parameter of the system.





In this section, we describe the leakage to each party in the setup and search phases of the
protocol.
Leakage During Setup. After Setup procedure is called by S, IS gets the encrypted
database, and PRF key sbf . The encrypted database consists of ORAM structures structI
and structD. The structures reveal the number of elements contained in the ORAMs, and
the size of the elements in them. Hence, the leakage to the server after the setup phase is
the Bloom filter tree total size |BFT|, the size of the database records |D1|, and the number
of records in the database D = |DB|. We call this leakage Lsetup,is.
Before each query search starts the client needs to know the structure of the Bloom
filter tree, and the number of records in the database D. We call this leakage Lsetup,c.
The data owner leakage Lsetup,o is empty since C and IS have no input.
Leakage During Search. During the search procedure, there is leakage to all parties. We
describe them individually next:
• IS starts by learning the query topology topo(q) (number of keywords in each con-
junctive clause). During the tree traversal, it learns the number of Bloom filter tree
node evaluations N . Finally, index server learns the number of records retrieved by
the client |DBfp(q)|. We call this leakage Lsearch,is.
• S learns the number of terms in the query |q|terms, and the number of records retrieved
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by C |DBfp(q)|. We call this leakage Lsearch,o.
• C learns the tree traversal pattern TraversalPattern, composed by the identifiers of
the evaluated nodes and the result of each evaluation. We call this leakage Lsearch,c.
6.4.3 Security Definitions
We define security in the standard ideal vs. real world paradigm assuming semi-honest
adversarial behavior. In both worlds we let an adversary to choose the protocol inputs (the
database and the set of queries). In the real world the participant follows the prescribed
protocol, but we let the adversary to see the view (i.e. incoming messages and internal
randomness) of a single party. In the ideal world the adversary interacts with a simulator of
the protocol which doesn’t know the information we are protecting from the adversary. If
the view of the adversary in the real world is indistinguishable from the view produced by
the simulator we say that the protocol is secure, since whatever the adversary learns about
the private information in the real execution of the protocol can also be learned from the
simulator which have no information about the private information.
In our construction, however, we do allow for some limited privacy leakage. For example,
the index server knows how many nodes of the Bloom filter search tree the client evaluates.
To formally capture this leakage, we give the simulator access this leakage. Therefore,
security in this setting implies that an adversary cannot learn anything beyond the specified
leakage and output of the queries. In what follows we define the real and ideal procedures
of an adversary attacking a participant P :
real
Π
A,P (λ). Run A(1λ) to obtain database DB = {Di,Wi}Di=1. Execute Π with honest
parties allowing A to adaptively select queries at his choice. After each query give the view





(λ). RunA(1λ) to obtain database DB = {Di,Wi}Di=1. Run SP (1λ, setup,Lsetup(|DB|))
to produce output to A. Have A repeatedly select queries q and run SP (1λ, query,Lquery(q))
and give output to A. We denote the output as idealΠ,Lsetup,LqueryA,SP (λ).
Definition 6. We say that an OSPIR protocol Π is (Lsetup,Lsearch)-adaptively secure against
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semi-honest party P if for every polynomial time stateful algorithm A there exists a poly-
nomial time stateful algorithm SP such that the random variables idealΠ,Lsetup,LsearchA,SP (λ) and
real
Π
A,P (λ) are computationally indistinguishable, for all sufficiently large λs.
We also consider a weaker selective security definition, in which the adversary can adap-
tively select queries traversing the database index, but can only request the satisfying docu-
ments once all the queries have been executed. The real and ideal procedures are redefined
in this setting next.
real
Π
A,P (λ). Run A(1λ) to obtain database DB = {Di,Wi}Di=1. Execute Π.Setup with hon-
est parties. Then, for each adversary’s query, execute Π.Search.TreeTraversal giving the view
of party P to A. When A finishes its queries, parties execute Π.Search.DocumentRetrieval
for each of the document satisfying the client’s queries, giving the view of party P to A.




(λ). RunA(1λ) to obtain database DB = {Di,Wi}Di=1. Run SP (1λ, setup,
Lsetup(DB)) to produce output to A. Have A repeatedly select queries qi and run SP (1λ,
traversal,Lsearch(qi)) and give output to A. Then, execute SP (1λ, Document Retrieval,
{DBfp(qi)}i) We denote the output as idealΠ,Lsetup,Lquery,selectiveA,SP (λ).
Definition 7. We say that an OSPIR protocol Π is (Lsetup,Lsearch)-selectively secure against
semi-honest party P if for every polynomial time stateful algorithm A there exists a polyno-
mial time stateful algorithm SP such that the random variables idealΠ,Lsetup,Lsearch,selectiveA,SP (λ)
and realΠ,selectiveA,P (λ) are computationally indistinguishable for all sufficiently large λs.
We will prove next that our system is adaptively secure against semi-honest owner and
server (separately) behaviors, and selectively secure against semi-honest client behavior.
We are not able to prove adaptive security for the semi-honest client case for the following
reason. On each ORAM access the client sees several encrypted records (in addition to
the one being queried); if these records are never requested by the client, the encryption
can be easily simulated by encrypting a dummy element. On the other hand, if some of
these records are requested later, the client should see the actual encrypted records, since
at some point it will be able to decrypt them. Hence, we allow the simulator to “build” the
ORAM containing the records, and simulate the queries after it knows which records are
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being satisfied by the queries (including false positives).
6.4.4 Proofs of Security
Let Π be the protocol described in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Let (Lsetup,is, Lsearch,is), (Lsetup,o,
Lsearch,o) (Lsetup,c, Lsearch,c) as described in section 6.4.2.
Theorem 6. Π is (Lsetup,is,Lsearch,is)-secure against semi-honest adaptive index servers.
The security of the scheme against semi-honest adaptive index servers follows almost
directly from the security of the underlying ORAM scheme used, and the security of the
Masked-MOPRF protocol. In fact, all incoming messages that are not ORAM are inde-
pendent and uniformly random elements of G; hence, they are perfectly simulatable. For
ORAM accesses, we use the security of the ORAM scheme. In particular, we assume the
existence of simulators SOSetup, SOAccess that simulates the OSetup procedure, and OAccess
procedure given only access to the number of elements in the ORAM and the size of the
elements. 2
Proof. We show that the index server’s view given to A in the real world experiment is
computationally indistinguishable from the one produced by the following algorithm S in
the ideal world experiment.
S(1λ, setup,Lsearch,is(DB)): Given index size ℓ = |BFT|, use the simulator SOSetup to build
an ORAM structure for ℓ elements of size len + λ, where len = poly(λ) is the bit-length
of elements in G. Given the number of records D and size of the records, use the ORAM
simulator SOSetup to build parameters and structure of another ORAM. Give both ORAM
structures and a uniformly random key sk to the adversary. Finally, derive number of
Bloom Filter hash functions.
S(1λ, query,Lsearch,is(DB, q)): Given query topology topo(q), the number of nodes traversed
N , and the number of records returned |DBfp(q)|, simulate each node evaluation as:
• Derive number of ORAM lookups from topo(q) and number of hash functions used.
Then use ORAM access simulator to perform the ORAM lookups.
2For the Path-ORAM, for example, the SOSetup can create an ORAM structure out of dummy elements,
and SOAccess can be simulated by requesting random paths root to leaf.
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• Simulate Masked-MOPRF protocol by sampling uniformly random element in G.
The index server’s view is composed by ORAM lookups and incoming messages from
the Masked-MOPRF protocol. The view’s of this two procedures are independent since
the element received in each the Masked-MOPRF protocol execution (W ·∏H(mi))α, for
uniformly random α, is a uniformly random element in the group (assumed to be of prime
order). Hence, the security of the scheme relies on the simulators SOSetup and SOAccess. We
conclude that the adversary cannot distinguish between the execution of the real protocol
from the execution of the ideal world.
Theorem 7. Π is (Lsetup,o,Lsearch,o)-secure against semi-honest adaptive owners.
Proof. The owner S is involved only in OPRF computations at query token generation,
and the computation of records decryption keys. The view of S is hi ← H(xi)ri for many
uniformly and independent random ri ∈ Z∗q. Since H is onto G\{1}, and G is of prime order,
for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, H(xi)ri is uniformly and independently distributed in G. Hence, the
each invocation to the OPRF protocol can be perfectly simulated. The simulator only needs
the number of terms in the query |q|terms, and the number of satisfying records |DBfp(q)|.
Theorem 8. Π is (Lsetup,c,Lsearch,c)-selectively secure against semi-honest clients.
Proof. The leakage Lsetup,c is composed by the number of documents in the database D =
|DB|, the size of the documents |D1|, and the size of the index structure. The leakage
Lsearch,c is the tree traversal pattern for the query q. We next present the ideal world
simulator S.
S(1λ, setup,Lsetup,c(DB)): Create an ORAM for the index using random elements {(e, r)},
where e is a uniformly random element of G, and r is uniformly random in {0, 1}λ. Sample
uniform exponents sk and sbf to be used as key for the token generation PRF and ORAM
element encryption PRF respectively. Give ORAM parameter to the adversary and save
the ORAM structure, and keys.
S(1λ, Tree Traversal,Lsearch,c, q): 1)Token generation: For each term ti in the query sam-
ple a random invertible exponent r, and produce H(ti)
r·sk as the incoming message. 2)Tree
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traversal: From tokens derive the address of the elements in the ORAM, and honestly per-
form lookups on the saved ORAM structure holding the simulated index. Let (ei, ri) be the
random elements gotten in the lookup. For each clause Cj , simulate the Masked-MOPRF pro-
tocol, by sampling random element gβ , exponent α, and computing gβ·α·sbf ·∏H(ri)α·sbf as
the incoming message from the index server. The final step corresponds to the key match-
ing procedure, in which the client’s evaluation key is matched against the set of all possible
matching keys. When the tree traversal pattern indicates that the node satisfies the query,




ei · g−β·sbf ·
∏
H(ri)
−sbf )LC and sample uniformly ran-
dom elements for the rest of the possible matching keys. Otherwise, all possible “matching
keys” are sampled at random from the group. The keys are then inserted in a Bloom filter
of false positive rate 2−λ.
S(1λ, Document Retrieval, {DBfp(qi)}i). Sample a random exponent sr, and encrypt each
document in
⋃
i DBfp(qi) using H(i)
sr as the respective key. Then, create an ORAM simu-
lating the records’ ORAM, in which we maintain the encrypted elements of
⋃
iDBfp(qi), as
well encryptions of dummy records simulating the elements not requested by client. Give
the ORAM parameters to the adversary, and then honestly perform ORAM queries for ele-
ments in
⋃
i DBfp(qi), giving the client’s view to the adversary. To decrypt each record Di,
we simulate the OPRF protocol by sampling a random exponent r, and computing H(i)sr·r.
We now argue that the view simulated by the above algorithm is computationally in-
distinguishable from the client’s view in a real execution of the protocol. Let’s divide the
client’s view in the following groups:
1. ORAM access parameters.
2. OPRF messages for token generation and decryption keys.
3. ORAM elements gotten in lookups at tree traversal.
4. Masked MOPRF messages.
5. Hashed matching evaluation keys.
6. ORAM elements gotten in lookups for document retrieval.
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7. Decrypted documents.
We first note that messages in groups 1, 2, 6, and 7 are independent from messages in
groups 3, 4 and 5 corresponding to node evaluation procedures. Also it is easy to see that
these first messages in the real world experiment are indistinguishable from the correspond-
ing view produced by S in the ideal world. In fact, since ORAM access parameters only
depend on the size of the data, S perfectly simulates them from the leakage profile. OPRF
messages are perfectly simulated by sampling a random keys sk, sr and following the pre-
scribed protocol. The document retrieval procedure is also correctly simulated by S since it
generates the document’s ORAM knowing which elements the client gets. Hence, security
reduce to the security of the underlying encryption scheme for the records not retrieved by
the client.
We now prove the messages in groups 3, 4, and 5 are correctly simulated by S. Assume
without loss of generality that query correspond to a single term. In the following analysis,
we do not include the encrypted bits gotten during ORAM lookup that do not correspond
the Bloom filter bits we are evaluating. We can safely do so because these encryptions are
independent from the rest of the messages, and the encryption scheme protects their values.
Hence, we focus on the set I corresponding to addresses of Bloom filter bits derived from
the query tokens.
The client’s view on each node evaluation correspond to:





The simulator produce the following view:










ei) if evaluation is a match, and T is uniformly random if evaluation is a





i∈I bi , and let’s make the change of variables
e′i = g
bi · Fsbf in ViewReal:
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(e′i · Fsbf (ri)−1) · gh−
∑
i∈I bi)
Let’s assume for now that e′i is uniformly random. Them, if h =
∑
bi, then evaluation
correspond to a match, and ViewReal is identically distributed to ViewIdeal. We next
prove that if e′i is uniformly random and h >
∑
bi, then there is no PPT distinguisher for




i∈I bi) from uniformly random T . However, since H is random function,
the distinguisher can only win if he is able to compute the input g−β·sk ·∏i∈I(e′i ·Fsbf (ri)−1) ·
gh−
∑
i∈I bi . It is not hard to see that this is equivalent to computing gh−
∑
i∈I bi . Nevertheless,
since g is a uniformly random generator of a prime-order group that is hidden from the client,
the distinguisher cannot compute gc with noticeable probability for any c > 0. Hence, the
views are indistinguishable.
We show now that {e′i}i∈I is a pseudorandom element, and hence, the above argument
holds.
We use an hybrid argument to get to ViewReal in which e′i are uniformly random
elements. We first use DDH assumption to change gβ·sbf with a random element R. Indeed,
given public generator g′, and g′α, g′β , and the challenge C, a distinguisher can simulate one
of hybrids by sampling a private random exponent x to create a secret generator g = g′x
and simulating the hybrid as {gbi · Fsbf (ri), ri}i∈I , gα, C ·
∏
i∈I Fsbf (ri),H(C · gh) and call a
distinguisher for ViewReal vs. ViewIdeal, where Fsbf (r) is implemented as g
β·hash(r), and
hash : {0, 1}λ → Zp is a random oracle. Hence, we can change ViewReal to






(e′i · Fsbf (ri)−1) · gh−
∑
bi)
Let Q = R ·∏Fsbf (ri). Then we can rewrite the above as





where Q is uniformly random. We now use the security of F to change e′i = g
bi ·Fsbf (ri)
for a uniformly random elements ei. In fact, a successful distinguisher D for ViewReal
with e′i and uniformly random ei can be used to distinguish F from a uniformly random
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function. The distinguisher D
O(·)
PRF for F is as follows: Sample uniformly random {ri}, Q, gβ ,
and computing ei = g





Note that if oracle is Fsbf (ri), then the input produced to D is identically distributed to
ViewReal’. On the other hand, if oracle is a random function f , then eis are random as
long as ri does not repeat, but this happens only with negligible probability.
We conclude that if F is a PRF, DDH holds in the prime-order group, H is random func-
tion, and g is kept secret to the client, then ViewReal is computationally indistinguishable
from the view produced by the PPT simulator S.
6.5 Implementation
We implemented a prototype of our system in Java that consisted of approximately 4K lines
of code. We next list some choices we made during the development of our prototype.
Cryptographic Primitives. We used Java Cryptography Architecture to implement the
required symmetric key operation in our system. We used SHA-256 as the underlying
hash function. ORAM elements where symmetrically encrypted using AES-128. The group
operations were instantiated using the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo p = 2q + 1,
where p, q are both prime. The bit-length of p was chosen to be 1024. Large integers and
operations were instantiated using java.math.BigInteger class.
Optimization. A common Bloom-filter-based index optimization packs together bits
stored at the same position across different Bloom filters. In our case, whenever we visit a
node, we need to check all its siblings Bloom filters at the exact same positions. With this
consideration we packed the encrypted bits at the same position of all siblings nodes in a
single ORAM block, reducing the number of ORAM read operations.
ORAM. We implemented the simple and efficient Path ORAM of [SvDS+13]. Each ORAM
bucket (nodes in the ORAM tree) contained four elements. The ORAM stash was main-
tained entirely on the client. The lowest-level position map was set to maintain 1000 indices
at the client side. Each element was between 1-2KB, containing “siblings” encrypted bits
as explained above.
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Private Set Membership Queries. At the end of each node evaluation, C and IS engage
in a private set membership query, where IS inputs a set of all possible matching keys for
the node, and C inputs the key computed. We implemented this protocol by having the
server hash all the keys, randomly permute them, and send them to the client.
6.6 Evaluation
In this section, we quantify the performance of the encrypted index traversal of our OSPIR
protocol by both showing the results of running our prototype on datasets of 1K, 10K, and
100K records, and providing an asymptotic analysis of performance.
Experimental Setup Motivated by the audit logs application on cloud services, we col-
lected provenance data from an Ubuntu 14.04 system running Apache. From this data, we
built a single table database containing on each row a node from the provenance graph and
its annotation. We set up two Intel Xeon E5-2430 2.2Ghz (2 cores of 12 threads), 100GB
RAM machines with Broadcom 1GB Ethernet. IS and S run together on the same machine.
Our system parameters were set so that the index for the 100K records database fits in
100GB of RAM. Specifically, we fixed the degree of the tree to 10, the Bloom filter false
positive to 10−5, and the number of searchable keywords per record to 4.
Queries. We ran SELECT-id queries that match a single record. The performance of
queries that return one result provides the worst-case latency per record, since queries
returning several records do not need to inspect already-evaluated nodes. Additionally, by
returning just the record identifier, we can evaluate exactly the cost of the search procedure.
The types of queries covered were single term, conjunctions, disjunctions and 3-DNFs.
Conjunctions vs. Disjunctions. Figure 6.5 shows, in log10 scale, the latency time
for conjunctions and disjunctions of sizes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 on a 100 K record database.
We observe that while conjunctive queries run in a few seconds, disjunctive queries are
exponentially more expensive. It is interesting to note that the number of ORAM queries
performed by both types of queries is exactly the same; hence, the latency time is dominated
by cryptographic operations and data transfer of the matching keys set. In the case of
disjunctive queries, we also note that the use of multiple cores does not reduce the latency
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significantly (at most a factor of two for 24 cores). In the case of conjunctions, the evaluation

















Figure 6.5: Latency of conjunctions and disjunctions of sizes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for 100K
records DB.
Varying Database Size. Figure 6.6 shows the latency for different DNF queries across
databases of sizes 1K, 10K, and 100K. The difference between running a query on databases
of varying sizes is captured in the number of nodes to be evaluated and the potentially larger
ORAM size for larger databases. We observe the sub-linearity of our system’s running time;
increasing the database size by a factor of 10, increases the running time by a comparatively
small amount, which is due to a single extra evaluation node and a larger ORAM structure.
ORAM vs. node evaluation. In table 6.1, the second and third columns illustrate the
time our prototype spent in ORAM read queries and node evaluation, once ORAM queries
have been performed. Since same-size queries require the same number of ORAM operation,
the ORAM time is identical for same-size queries. Disjunctive queries, however, exhibit
a much more expensive node evaluation execution, since they involve an exponentially
large number of possible matching keys, which IS has to compute and hash individually.
Moreover, the fourth column indicates that the network usage increases significantly with
bigger disjunctions. The reason is that IS also needs to send the set of possible matching
keys to C. In particular, for size-4 3-DNF, the network usage raises to 1GB, and we can
























Figure 6.6: Query latency time for different-size DNF queries for databases of sizes 1K, 10K
and 100K records.
infer that for these queries the index traversal will dominate the running time, considering
queries that also return the records’ payload.
Index Size. One of the drawbacks of our solution is the space utilization of the index.
Each bit of a plaintext version of our index is encoded using 140 bytes. Moreover, the
index is stored as is in an ORAM structure, which multiplies the space by a non-small
constant factor. In our evaluation, each record was associated with 4 searchable keywords.
Consequently, for our 100K records dataset, the encrypted index uses 75GB of RAM.
Asymptotic Performance Analysis. The cost of our search procedure is proportional
to the number of Bloom filter node visited. Each node evaluation consists of a stage of
ORAM lookups and stage of matching keys calculation. Consider a general DNF formula
consisting of k clauses, each of ti terms. The number of ORAM lookups is
∑k
i=1 ti · h each
having polylog(D) index server-side lookups of size polylog(λ) each (by using Path-ORAM
the polylog(D) term is of degree 2). At the same time, the number of possible matching




j=1 tj ·h ·
∏k
j=i+1(tj ·h+1) ( < k · (max(ti) ·h+1)k−1), where
each key can be computed by 2k exponentiations on the group 3. Summarizing, the cost of
3Since keys have common terms, it is not necessary to compute 2k exponentiations for every key, and a
much faster algorithm can be used.
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Query ORAM Eval Network
Single Term 4 6 26 MB
2-Conjunction 9 6 52 MB
2-Disjunction 9 10 52 MB
3-Conjunction 14 6 78 MB
3-Disjunction 14 20 80 MB
4-Conjunction 18 6 105 MB
4-Disjunction 18 90 140 MB
5-Conjunction 18 6 131 MB
5-Disjunction 18 90 932 MB
Size 2 3-DNF 25 11 158 MB
Size 3 3-DNF 35 35 249 MB
Size 4 3-DNF 50 680 1173 MB
Table 6.1: Latency in seconds of tasks in protocol and network usage per query on a 100K
records DB.
each node evaluation is















(tj · h+ 1))
The number of nodes visited varies from query to query. For disjunctions, if a node
matches the query, there must be at least a record in its subtree that matched the query.
In this case, the worst case per record returned is when there is a single matching record,
and hence the procedure needs to evaluate an entire path root-to-leaf to reach the record.
Therefore, the worst-case per record cost H ·Cnode, where H = logd(D) is height of the tree.
On the other hand, it is specialy hard to analyse conjunctions since in the worst case, we
can visit the entire tree, without finding a single matching record. For example, imagine a
AND query of 2 terms, where the first term is present in half the records and the second
term in the other half. However, as noted first in Chapter 4, the performance of AND
queries is proportional to the least frequent term of the query in the database, which is
optimal without an specialized index for conjunctions.
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6.7 Conclusions
We proposed an encrypted search scheme that supports Boolean queries and enables del-
egated queries. Our system diminishes the leakage of existent solutions, preserving the
sublinear search efficiency. Our construction integrates ORAM techniques with efficient
search index structures leaking to the index server only the number of nodes visited in the
search tree during the execution of a query. We also proposed a new protocol for oblivious
product of pseudorandom function we called Masked-MOPRFthat allow us to securely eval-
uate Bloom filters. This protocol enables the delegated-query feature by disclosing only the
match result. Finally, to hide the details of delegated queries from the data owner, we also
used an oblivious search token generation.
We implemented our system prototype and ran it on a 100,000-record database. We showed
that our system can handle conjunctive queries and small DNF formulas in 10-30 seconds.
The sublinearity of our solution, also experimentally illustrated in Figure 6.6, allows us to
extrapolate that queries on much larger databases (106, 107, and 108 records) will run in a
few minutes. The cost of eliminating leakage is substantial; the Blind Seer and OXT-OSPIR
systems manage to return records in less than a second for databases of size 108 records with
a much larger number of searchable keywords. On the other hand, our system outperforms
the secure single-keyword search of the HE-over-ORAM solution whose experimental results
showed that their system answers a query in 30 minutes for 4 × 106 record databases.
Therefore, our scheme provides a new tradeoff mark between privacy and efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, our system is the first to apply ORAM techniques in pri-
vate database search to reduce the leakage exhibited by other systems that allow Boolean
queries. Our experimental results show that the use of ORAM is not the bottleneck for com-
plex queries; hence, possible future work may focus on reducing the overhead of disjunction
evaluation at each index node. In addition, we note that reducing the memory required to
maintain our index is crucial for practical applications. This can be achieved by providing
a better encoding scheme for the Bloom filter bits and optimizing the ORAM parame-









7.1.1 RAM based Secure Computation.
The first part of this thesis proposed a scheme for secure two-party computation that achieve
sublinear time complexity, in an amortized sense. The main idea was to combine an ORAM
scheme together with small generic secure computation steps.
This idea was first explored by Ostrovsky and Shoup [OS97] for the purpose of private
storage. In their construction, there are three playes, a database owner and two non-
colluding servers. One server simulates the ORAM server, and the ORAM state is shared
between the two servers. An access to the data is done by having both servers execute an
ORAM instruction using a secure computation protocol as we do. Although the construction
of Chapter 3 follows the same paradigm of “ORAM + 2PC”, the scenarios are quite different.
Another approach to using ORAM for secure computation was observed by Damg̊ard
et al. [DMN11], where the players share the the entire ORAM structure. Hence, all players
require superlinear storage. In our construction, the client maintains only a polylogarithmic
number of bits.
After the publication of our techniques [GKK+12], RAM based secure computation has
continued been estudied in [LO13b; LO13a; GGH+13; GHL+14]. In addition, the work
of [KS14] implements several data structured using ORAM and uses them for secure com-
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puation of specific functionalities. While all these schemes assumed semi-honest adversaries,
the recent work of Afshar et al. [AHMR15] achieve malicious security in this model.
7.1.2 Encrypted Search
In the second part of this thesis we focused on the specific scenario of private DB querying.
The problem of private DBMS can be solved by general purpose secure computation
schemes [GMW87; BGW88; Yao82; Yao86; LP09]. These solutions, however, involve at
least linear (often much more) work in the database size, hence cannot be used for practical
applications with large data.
Private Information Retrieval protocols (PIR) [CGKS98] consider a scenario where the
client wishes to retrieve the ith record of the server’s data, keeping the server oblivious
of the index i. Symmetric PIR protocols [GIKM00] additionally require that client should
not learn anything more than the requested record. While most PIR and SPIR protocols
support record retrieval by index selection, Chor et al. [CGN97] considered PIR by keyword.
Although these protocols have sublinear communication complexity, their computation is
polynomial in the number of records, and inefficient for practical uses.
Another approach would be to use fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). In 2009, Gen-
try [Gen09] showed that FHE is theoretically possible. Despite this breakthrough and many
follow up works, current constructions are too slow for practical use. For example, [GHS12]
showed an implementation that homomorphically compute 720 AES blocks in two and a
half days.
Little work has appeared on practical, private search on a large data. In order to
achieve efficiency, weaker security (some small amount leakage) has been considered. The
work of [PRV+11; RVBM09] supports single keyword search and conjunctions. However,
the solution does not scale well to databases with a large number of records (say millions);
its running time is linear in the number of DB records. A more efficient solution towards
this end was proposed in [CLT11]. However, they only considered single keyword search.
Any single keyword search solution can be used to solve (insecurely) arbitrarily Boolean
formulas; solve each keyword in the formula separately and then combine (insecurely).
Obviously, however, this leaks much more information to the parties (and also has work
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proportional to the sum of the work for each term). Our systems, in contrast, provides
privacy of the overall query (and work proportional to just the smallest term).
There has been a long line of research on searchable symmetric encryption (SSE)
[SWP00; Goh03; CM05; CGKO06; MS13; CJJ+13; CK10]. Note that, although many
of the techniques used in SSE schemes can be used in our scenario, the SSE setting fo-
cuses just on data outsourcing, and does not considering delegating search capabilities.
That is, in SSE the data owner is the client, and so no privacy against the client is re-
quired. Additionally, SSE solutions often offer either a linear time search over the number of
database records [SWP00; CM05; MS13], or a restricted type of client’s queries [CGKO06;
KP13], namely single keyword search or conjunctions. One exception is the recent SSE
scheme of [CJJ+13], which extended the approach of [CGKO06] to allow for any Boolean
formula of the form k0 ∧ φ(k1, ..., km−1), where φ(·) is an arbitrarily Boolean formula.
Their search time complexity is O(m × D(k0)), where D(k0) is the number of records
containing keyword k0. Note that an arbitrary formula could be represented this way,
as k0 can always be set to true, but then the complexity will be linear in the number
of records. On the other hand, if the client can format the query so that k0 is a term
with very few matches, the complexity will go down accordingly. In contrast, all of the
solutions presented here addresses arbitrary Boolean formulas, with complexity propor-
tional to the best term in the CNF representation of the formula. Searchable encryp-
tion has also been studied in the public key setting [ABC+08; BBO07; BW07; BCOP04;
SBC+07]. Here, many users can use the server public key to encrypt their own data and
send it to the server.
The CryptDB system [PRZB12] addresses the problem of DB encryption from a com-
pletely different angle, and as such is largely incomparable to our work. CryptDB does
not aim to address the issue of the privacy of the query (but it does achieve query privacy
similar to the single-keyword search solution described above). Their threat scenario fo-
cuses on DB data confidentiality against the curious DB administrator, and they achieve
this by using a non-private DBMS over what they call SQL-aware encrypted data. That
is, the SQL query is pre-processed by a fully trusted proxy that encrypts the search terms
of the query. The query is then executed by standard SQL, which combines the results of
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individual-term encrypted searches. Additionally, for free-text search, CryptDB uses the
linear solution of [SWP00].
The closest to our setting is an extension of the OXT scheme [CJJ+13], called OSPIR-
OXT [JJK+13], supporting the class of functions as OXT. A comparison between our work
and OSPIR-OXT was described in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2 and Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis focused on achieving efficiency in secure computation protocols for the use in
application involving high volumes of data. Hence, the primary goal was to overcome the
linear time lower bound explained in the introducing chapter of this work.
By taking advantage of key properties in specific scenarios, and making use of modern
cryptographic techniques we provided ad-hoc protocols achieving various level of security,
efficiency and functionality.
We noted first that in many scenarios the function to be computed applies repeatedly
over same or slightly modified data. This allowed us to preprocess the data so that future
function evaluations over it can be computed securely, achieving sublinearity in an amortized
sense. We gain further efficiency in some settings by making use of the help of a semi-honest
third party. Furthermore, in some settings allowing some controlled privacy leakage is worth
the extra efficiency that the protocol can achieve.
In addition to several novel techniques, we made extensive use of Oblivious RAM pro-
tocols and Yao’s Garbled Circuits. ORAM was used to hide the access pattern to the data
(hence protecting the data as well as the queries from the server holding it). To additionally
protect data from a client, we evaluated privacy critical small subroutines using state-of-
the-art Yao’s Garbled Circuit construction. ORAM was used in Chapters 3 and 6, and
Yao’s Garbled Circuit technique was used in the protocols of Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
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8.1 Summary of contributions
Part I . In the first part of this work we studied the problem from a theoretical perspec-
tive. We asked whether a two player functionality that can be computed insecurely over
a Random Access Machine in sublinear time, can also be computed efficiently, hence over-
coming the linear time complexity lower bound. We answered this positively in Chapter 3
by composing an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) protocol with small generic secure computation
steps. The construction compiles a RAM program on virtual addresses into an ORAM pro-
gram on physical, server-side addresses in which the “next instruction” of the program is
computed securely via some generic Secure Computation protocol. Since the “next instruc-
tion” is usually a small program, and Oblivious RAM incurs a polylogarithmic overhead,
the solution guarantees that if the original RAM program uses space s and requires t steps,
then the compiled program runs in time t · polylogs, and uses poly(s) space.
We went further and provided an optimized protocol that takes advantage of an specific
construction of ORAM, and uses Yao’s’ GC technique for the small secure computation
steps. We provided a prototype of such scheme and showed its efficiency experimentally.
We compared our protocol executing a binary search against a linear time secure search
using Yao’s protocol, and showed that our solution outperforms the trivial scan for dataset
of 219 elements. We note that since the development of Chapter 3 there have been many
improvements over the ORAM scheme used. Since the same techniques we use can be
applied to these newer schemes, we can infer that the construction would outperforms the
linear scan for even smaller datasets.
Part II . In the second part of this theses we focused on the specific application of Private
Database Search. In this setting, we aimed at protecting the client’s query as well the
server’s data set. However, instead of looking at the problem from a theoretical perspective
like in Part I, we searched for practical systems that still achieve strong security guarantees.
We proposed 2 systems achieving different levels of efficiency and privacy.
The first system, called Blind Seer, was studied in Chapters 4 and 5. Blind Seer achieves
extremely high efficiency while still protecting the query and data by making use of a third
party assumed not to collude with server or client. In terms of functionality Blind Seer
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allows for:
• Arbitrary Boolean queries over the terms, where the only requisite is that negations
are pushed down to the input level of the formula.
• Ranges queries.
• Stemming and free-text search.
• Ranking of results.
• Private access control over the queries.
• Indistinguishability of small result sets queries.
A prototype of the system was developed and tested with anonymized census data. The
data set consisted of 100,000,000 records each composed by 70 searchable keywords and a
payload of 100 KB. We compared the system against plaintext MySQL database system.
Experimental results shows a performance multiplicative overhead of 1.2-3 over MySQL for
many interesting SELECT id queries.
In addition, we formally showed that the system protects the client’s query, the access
control policy, and the server’s data up to some limited specified leakage to the players.
The privacy leakage primary correspond to access patterns to the database records and the
traversed index, as well as query circuit and access control policy topology.
In Chapter 4 we showed the basic architecture and construction of Blind Seer, assuming
that all players follows the protocol specification. However, we noted a weakness in the pro-
tocol that would allow a malicious client to easily circumvent the access control mechanism
with no possible detection. In Chapter 5 we solved this issue by cryptographically binding
the query to the access control mechanism and the traversal of the database index. In
addition, our solution involve virtually no overhead by using a novel protocol that allow to
securely evaluate a topology-aware universal circuit with no additional cost over evaluating
the original circuit.
We presented a new prototype of Blind Seer that implemented the protection against
malicious client behavior. We compared this new prototype against MySQL and the original
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Blind Seer. The new Blind Seer manage to be only 2-3 times slower than MySQL when
using multiple cores on both systems. Against the original Blind Seer, we showed that the
system in fact introduce no significant overhead. The new implementation also allows for
parallel traversal of the index, achieving up to ×15 improvement when using 15 cores.
In the next and final chapter we asked whether we can avoid the leakage to the index
server and still achieve the level of efficiency reached with Blind Seer. The Blind Seer leakage
mainly correspond to access pattern to the database records and index structure, as well
search pattern in the query. We proposed a new scheme that stores the index and the records
using ORAM structures to hide access and search patterns to the index server. Instead of
secretly sharing the state of the ORAM between the players (as done in Chapter 3), we
gave the client the entire ORAM parameters. However, we encrypt the ORAM data from
the client in a special way and developed a novel protocol we called Masked-MOPRF, that
we use to obliviously evaluate Bloom filter evaluation. Therefore, a client can traverse the
index knowing only the result of the query in each index node, and nothing more. The
new system allows for Boolean queries represented as DNF formulas over keywords. To our
knowledge this is the first work that uses ORAM in the specific scenario of Boolean Private
Search.
Our experimental analysis showed that the cost incurred is significant, both in terms
of space required to hold the index and query search time. While Blind Seer can return a
single records in a few milliseconds, the new system takes seconds on much smaller dataset.
Although a straight forward comparison against the sublinear secure computation construc-
tion of Chapter 3 is not fair (since different ORAM schemes and dataset were used), we can
infer that using that such a solution would be much more inefficient, since several look-ups
would need to be performed to return records satisfying the Boolean formula, and the “next
instruction” would require a complex circuit to compute.
We also noted that for DNF queries the bottleneck of the scheme is not the use of
ORAM, but the oblivious Bloom filter evaluation protocol, whose complexity increases
exponentially with the number of disjunctions in the query. Hence, future work may focus
on a more efficient oblivious Bloom Filter evaluation procedure.
In Table 8.1 we summarize the trade-off space position of the schemes presented in this
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System Functionality Efficiency Leakage
Sublinear 2PC General Seconds per look-up Amount of work
Blind Seer Boolean Practical access pattern
DB Search Milliseconds per record to index and records
Low-Leakage DNF Practical work on index
Secure Search DB Search for small formulas # records returned
Seconds per record tree traversal to client
Table 8.1: Comparison between the protocols
Thesis. The first scheme for sublinear secure two-party computation potentially allow for
any two party functionality, however every look-up perform in each evaluation runs in several
seconds. The leakage is minimal and only reveals the running time of the computation.
The Blind Seer system is the most efficient scheme presented here, and its also rich in
functionality. Records satisfying a Boolean query can be returned within a Milliseconds.
However, the leakage incurred include access pattern, search patterns, and index traversal
pattern. The last scheme, allows for Boolean queries given as DNF. Is practical for small
queries since records satisfying a small query can be returned in a few seconds. The leakage
of such scheme is reduces only to the traversal pattern to the client, while the server learns
only the amount of work performed.
8.2 Direction for future work.
Each of the system presented in this work can be improved in several ways. The use of
better and simpler ORAM schemes would be of direct improvement over the solution of
Chapters 3 and 6. In the same way, new secure two-party computation techniques can be
used to improve efficiency in the schemes of Chapter 3 and Blind Seer. The Blind Seer
system can be improved in terms of functionality by supporting more complex queries,
and stronger query policies. Also, many real application make use relational multi-table
database that Blind Seer can only supports naively (by adding keywords joining the tables).
The last low-leakage version of Blind Seer can be enhanced by supporting access control,
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and multiple clients. As mentioned earlier, for large DNF formulas the ORAM running
time stops being the bottle-neck of the search mechanism, and hence future work would
concentrate in reducing the complexity of the oblivious Boom filter evaluation mechanism.
This last scheme could potentially be modified to a two party setting (as in Chapter 3). This
would require a much more expensive preprocessing step that result in the database owner
holding its data in an ORAM structure for which he does not know the key. An important
line of work is to develop efficient algorithms for such preprocessing, since otherwise a
trusted third party is needed in any practical application.
We note that the range from complete privacy to best performance and functionality
is wide, and this work only targets specific points within it. We see it as a step towards
exploring several other trade-offs in this space. For example, it would be very interesting
to develop an ORAM-like scheme that is specially designed for an application. A line of
work in this direction is [WNL+14] were the authors take advantage of a-priori known
access pattern to the data structure to design a more efficient ORAM that leaks this access
pattern. Another work is [GGH+13] in which a single binary search is performed with one
ORAM look-up.
An additional interesting line of research for future work is to develop a highly tunable
system which will be able to be configured and match many practical scenarios with different
privacy and performance requirements.
8.3 Publications
• The work of Chapter 3 paper has been presented at the ACM Conference of Computer
Security (CCS) in 2012, and published in the corresponding proceedings [GKK+12].
The paper was in joint effort with Dov Gordon, Jonathan Katz, Vladimir Kolesnikov,
Tal Malkin, Mariana Raykova, and Yevgeniy Vahlis.
• The first version of the Blind Seer system described in Chapter 4 is product of a 2
years of work together Vasilis Pappas, Binh Vo, Seung G. Choi, Vladimir Kolesnikov,
Tal Malkin, Wesley George, Steve M. Bellovin, and Angelos Keromytis. A research
paper presenting the contributions was presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security
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and Privacy 2014 (S&P) and published in the corresponding proceedings [PKV+14].
• The techniques of Chapter 5 that augment Blind Seer security against malicious-client
behavior is product of work with Ben Fisch, Binh Vo, Abishek Kumarasubramanian,
Vladimir Kolesnikov, Tal Malkin, and Steve M. Bellovin. A research paper presenting
the contributions was presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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